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Dedication
Spending 22 years in school is an uncommon thing. Taking all of that schooling and applying
it toward the study of education policy, to pass along the lessons learned along the way and
work toward a brighter future for generations of students and teachers to come, is more
uncommon yet. I would not have gone down this long and winding road leading to a Ph.D.
and beyond without the inspiration of so many teachers, from elementary school through
graduate school, who helped to push me to get the most out of myself and showed me how
many things education can make possible. This is for them.
Even as I bounced around it looking for the right fit, a lot of people made the Berkley,
Michigan school system feel like home. Judy Bauer got me to exercise my creativity when
I couldn’t sit still. Michelle Karas encouraged me to bring my outside interests into the
classroom and introduced me to new ones. Robin Ziebert and Beth Hanna made every day
an adventure. Laura Scribner and Rob Snyder-Pitts took fifty rowdy middle-school kids into
the woods for a week every year and brought back a community.
The International Academy has been the single greatest blessing in all my years of school-
ing. Bert Okma’s vision for a small school where curious and ambitious students could
motivate each other to become global citizens, asking deep questions and bringing out the
best in each other, has been a smashing success, and so many people there helped me be-
come the person who I am today. Steve Eschrich introduced me to economics and showed
me how it’s in everything around us. Scott Wolf made an unspectacular violinist strive to
feel the performer’s rush, and then taught me to look deeply at the ways that knowledge
and information work. Anna Fleury pushed me to pay attention to details in my writing
and not to settle for good enough. Rebecca Riggs harnessed my language-learning skills and
motivated me to major in Spanish when so many future economists choose math. Robert
Uhelski brought history to life and showed how to look for the connections between things
that may first seem unrelated.
When I first got to the University of Michigan as an undergraduate, I didn’t know what
a Ph.D. was, and I thought that all the questions in economics had been answered and the
answers were written in the textbooks. Rebecca Thornton introduced me to contemporary
research in economics and proved that it is a living social science that can be applied to
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make a real difference in people’s lives. Jeff Smith helped me start doing a bit of research of
my own, and was the first person to tell me to consider a Ph.D. in economics. Frank Stafford
saw what I had learned and gave me the opportunity to reinforce it by helping others to get
their start in research. Chris Mayer, Catherine Thomas, and Tomasz Piskorski at Columbia
Business School gave me an inside look at what it’s like to do economics research every day
and just how much time and work go into a high-quality academic paper.
The best choice I made in graduate school was to email a professor I’d never met named
Sue Dynarski and ask for a meeting. I started working with Sue as a research assistant
the summer after my first year and never really left, and it has been a joy to watch the
world learn what I already knew: she is a world-class researcher with a passion for public
engagement and a fierce advocate for young and prospective scholars. Brian Jacob’s door
has always been open to have a helpful and friendly conversation about my work and his,
cutting against the stereotypes of academics and economists in all the best ways. Charlie
Brown has kept me tied to the economics field when I’ve been drifting off toward the policy
side. Kevin Stange has shared the latest methodological rigor and given valuable advice as
someone who’s been in my shoes not too long ago. It has been a blessing to have this team
behind me, and I look forward to keeping in touch with them as colleagues in the field.
The Education Policy Initiative has been a perfect home for me as an applied interdis-
ciplinary scholar passionate about education, and so many people behind the scenes have
made it all possible. Mahima Mahadevan was an endless source of knowledge and good
cheer, even in the most dire circumstances. Tedi Engler and Jasmina Camo-Biogradlija
made sure the research people in Ann Arbor and the data people in Lansing stayed on the
same page. Julie Monteiro de Castro has been a steadying constant in the midst of frequent
staff turnover. And of course, the benefit of affiliating with a research institute like EPI
includes a great network of students and postdocs working on similar topics, who have been
valuable mentors, patient sounding boards for new ideas, and great friends. I cannot possibly
thank all of them, but I will start with Meredith Billings, Sarah Cannon, Fernando Furquim,
Kolby Gadd, Max Gross, Mo´nica Herna´ndez, Jonathan Hershaff, Julian Hsu, Josh Hyman,
Dan Kreisman, Andrew Litten, Elizabeth Mann, Kathy Michelmore, Stephanie Owen, Silvia
Robles, Rachel Rosen, Brittany Vasquez, Mark Wiederspan, Carrie Xu, and Xiaoyang Ye.
A support network of people outside of academia is an extremely important part of a
successful dissertation, because sometimes you need to talk to someone who has no idea
how to spell “heteroskedasticity”, much less what it is and how to correct for it. Umair Ali
Daimee, Becca Denison, Ajin John, Michael Novinson, and Kenny Tang have been there for
me for over half of my life now, and they’ve helped to keep me grounded and take my mind
off of my work when I need to. I am lucky to have them in my life.
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Mimi Takami and Megan Riehl at the University of Michigan Health System helped me
to solve a problem that I never expected to face in graduate school. I am incredibly grateful
that I got to study at a university that has a world-class hospital right on campus. They
made sure that I saw the light at the end of the tunnel, both for my health and for my
studies.
Jessica Kahan came into my life at a time when I was just starting to gain traction on
my research, far enough along to have developed a routine but not far enough along to see
the next steps on the path. She pulled me out of that rut and brought joy, excitement,
adventure, and the world’s friendliest cat. The memories I’ve shared with her are many
of the happiest of my life. Her areas of expertise couldn’t be further from my own, but I
couldn’t imagine having gone through this without her. I can’t wait for all the adventures
to come.
My mother, Linda Hubbard, has been at my side through every step of my long academic
journey. She asks insightful questions and keeps me motivated when I’m struggling; her
calm, even-keeled demeanor has been a necessary antidote to some of graduate school’s
frustrations. Returning to Michigan for graduate school has allowed me to share a home-
cooked meal or a walk in the woods with her, and that has recharged me when my energy
has been low. I could fill a whole dissertation with thanks and praise for her, but I’ll leave
with this: retiring to Ann Arbor was a smart move and a tremendous blessing. I’ll be back.
Finally, my father, Roger Hubbard, was a fiercely devoted advocate for my education.
From the earliest ages when he showed me that the most exciting place on Earth was the
local library, to my early adulthood as he beamed while walking across Columbia’s campus,
relishing the thought of me getting to explore his beloved New York City while working at a
world-class university, and all of the long nights in between when we pondered the next step
in my educational process, he took no greater joy than in my growth and exploration as a
scholar. I wish he could join me at the culmination of our great academic adventure, but I
know that he, more than anyone, helped to light the way. We made it, Dad. Thank you for
everything.
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Abstract
In this dissertation, I apply administrative data from Michigan’s public schools to address
crucial policy questions in the economics of education. In Chapter I, I shed light on the
persistent effects of attending high-quality high schools by creating a value-added model
that isolates each high school’s effect on students’ test scores, then matching the results to
students’ college transcripts to determine the relationship between high-school value added
and first-year college grades. I find that students who attend high schools with one standard
deviation higher value added receive first-year grades about 0.09 grade points higher than
their otherwise-identical counterparts. These gains in college are not driven solely by math
and English, but are evenly distributed across subjects. This result is robust to adjustments
for a number of potential biases that arise throughout the process, including selection into
high schools and selection into college attendance. Overall, I find evidence against some of
the more skeptical interpretations of test-score improvement, such as the claim that schools
“teach to the test” or the concern that the content tested on standardized exams is not
relevant to future learning.
Human capital theory suggests that when students would graduate into a weak labor mar-
ket, the opportunity cost of schooling declines, and they should instead invest in themselves
and get more education. However, this assumes that they have no borrowing constraints; if
students are credit-constrained and their families are hurt by the struggling labor market,
then their educational options may actually diminish as they are less able to pay for col-
lege. In Chapter II, I determine which of these effects predominates empirically using data
on plant closings and mass layoffs from the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
(“WARN”) Act, examining the impact of exposure to job losses during the senior year of high
school on whether and where students attend college. A 1-standard deviation increase in per-
capita job losses is associated with a small but statistically-significant 0.2-percentage point
increase in the probability of attending college, driven entirely by attendance at community
colleges. This result supports the argument that the opportunity cost effect dominates, as
any movement out of college as a result of credit constraints and firsthand exposure to job
losses is comparatively small.
xi
Having access to an effective and experienced teacher can make a crucial difference in a
student’s academic achievement. In Chapter III, written with Kolby Gadd, I examine the
factors that predict whether teachers will stay in their first jobs or leave for opportunities
elsewhere, and then study how students perform after teachers leave, looking both at teacher
turnover in general and at teacher departures for particular destinations such as new districts
or the private sector. In a multinomial logit framework in which we examine each teacher’s
employment status in his or her fifth year, we find that the characteristics that predict
departures most consistently are the fraction of Black students in the teacher’s first school,
the fraction of economically-disadvantaged students in the teacher’s first school, the teacher’s
first job being in special education, and the teacher’s first school being a charter. Turning to
how student achievement changes in the wake of teacher turnover, we find a modest decline
in test scores after teacher exits, driven by students in schools that lost teachers to other
full-time teaching positions, both within and across districts.
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I More Gains Than Score Gains? High School Quality and
College Success
I.1 Introduction
Most measures of school quality focus only on how a school’s students perform while they
attend that school. Accountability measures such as average test scores, school value-added
measures, graduation rates, and many other metrics focus on outcomes that occur before
(or as) a school’s students graduate. While this allows the metrics to focus on the things
that the schools being evaluated influence most directly, it also treats success at the given
level of education as an end goal rather than a stepping stone. In reality, earning a high
score on a standardized test does not, or should not, mean anything on its own. Test scores
and other such metrics are valuable as signals of what students have learned and, perhaps
more importantly, how much knowledge they have accumulated to support them in further
education and in their careers.
Test-score value-added models are the current methodological gold standard, but even
these models generally stop at or before graduation. The skills used to perform well on a
test may not transfer well into other contexts, and the knowledge accumulated may fade out
before students can continue to apply it. Even well-designed exams can have unique types
of questions that test students’ exam-preparation skills more than their content knowledge.
When faced with pressure to have high test scores, either in average scores or in value added,
teachers can “teach to the test”, drilling students on specific aspects of the exams in lieu
of maximizing their content knowledge or providing transferrable skills. Students who are
“taught to the test” will score highly on that particular exam, but will not have knowledge
of the subject matter that will persist into other contexts.
I measure the persistent value of going to a “good high school”, defined here as a high
school that raises students’ test scores. Particularly, I evaluate the relationship between
high schools’ contributions to test-score gains and their alumni’s achievement in college. In
this study, I develop a theoretical model in which schools allocate their resources between
test-specific preparation and teaching of content, subject to an endowment budget constraint
1
and accountability measures of varying strictness. Schools with high endowments (generous
funding, for instance, or talented students) are unconstrained by the test score requirement
and can allocate their resources as they please, while schools with lower endowments may
need to allocate resources away from teaching and toward test preparation in a way that
they would not if there was no accountability. Some schools may not be able to satisfy high-
stakes accountability constraints regardless of their resource allocation, and they go out of
business.
I then test the findings using administrative data from public high schools and public
colleges in Michigan. I develop value-added scores for each high school in Michigan using
test scores in math and reading (the two most highly-emphasized subjects in school account-
ability), then match high school students to their college transcripts and examine the effects
of test-score value added on their grades in their first-year college courses in tested subjects
and other subjects. I show that attending a school with high test-score value added predicts
higher first-year grades across the board, in both tested and untested subjects, controlling
for students’ middle-school test scores and an extensive set of covariates. I include a number
of adjustments for selection into college and into high school, and the result is robust to all
of them. Effects are similar across racial groups, socioeconomic groups, and college settings;
the benefits are not limited to more-privileged students or students in four-year colleges.
I.2 Literature Review
This study fits into two principal strands of literature. The first strand deals with the long-
term effects of attending a “good” school on outcomes such as college graduation, earnings,
or disciplinary incidents. The second focuses on how schools respond to high-stakes testing
and other forms of accountability.
The first strand largely takes advantage of excellent integrated state data systems in states
such as Texas and North Carolina. Deming et al. (2014) take advantage of a school choice
lottery in Charlotte, finding that students who attend their first-choice (and presumably
higher-quality) school are more likely to complete college, with effects concentrated among
female students. Deming et al. (2016) find that Texas students who attend schools that
raise high-stakes test scores in response to school accountability are more likely to attend
and graduate from a four-year college, and their earnings at age 25 are higher. Jennings et
al. (2015) find that high school quality explains more of the difference in college attainment
than in test scores, and that high school quality can reduce racial gaps in student outcomes
but exacerbates income gaps. Jackson (working) uses data from North Carolina to show
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that teachers can have larger and more-persistent effects on behavior, grades, and on-time
completion that surpass their impacts on test scores, particularly for English teachers.
Other analyses in this strand make use of charter-school lotteries and other randomized
experiments. Dynarski, Hyman, and Schanzenbach (2013) revisit the Tennessee STAR exper-
iment and find that assignment to a small class increased students’ probability of attending
and completing college and their probability of studying a high-earning field such as science,
engineering, or business; the effects were particularly large among Black students, and they
were well-predicted by the shorter-term effects on standardized test scores. Angrist et al.
(2016) find significant effects of charter attendance on exit exam scores, SAT scores, and
AP scores; the effects on college attendance are more modest and mostly involve movement
away from community colleges and toward four-year colleges. Dobbie and Fryer (2015) find
wide-ranging effects of assignment to the Harlem Children’s Zone, ranging from increased
test scores to reductions in the probability of teen pregnancy and incarceration. Allensworth
et al. (2017) find improvements on academic outcomes from attending higher-performing
non-selective schools in Chicago, though the effects do not extend to selective schools.
A number of studies have weighed in on the effects of accountability on teaching prac-
tices and student learning. Cohodes (2016) finds reason for optimism in Boston’s charter
schools, as these schools manage to raise students’ test scores without placing disproportion-
ate weight on higher-stakes subjects or common question types. Merseth (2010) views the
high-performing Boston charters with more skepticism, noting their students’ more modest
gains on college entrance exams.
Other schools’ test score gains may owe more to behaviors that have less to do with
sustainable learning. Jennings and Bearak (2014) find that most of the score gains in several
large states come from the most common question types, implying that such questions are
particularly emphasized in the test preparation as well as in the testing. Jacob (2005)
examines a new accountability policy in the Chicago public school system and finds that
schools that raise high-stakes exam scores often do not raise low-stakes exam scores, as the
schools focus heavily on test preparation, retention of underperforming students, and careful
selection of the set of students to be tested. McNeil and Valenzuela (2000) find an almost
single-minded focus on test score gains in Texas schools, crowding out many other valuable
school functions. Both Jacob (2005) and Neal and Schanzenbach (2010) note the reallocation
of resources toward students who are on the margin between passing and failing high-stakes
exams in the Chicago public schools. Ahn (2016) and Muralidharan and Sundararaman
(2011) outline valuable theoretical models of behavior under accountability; Ahn (2016)
focuses on school-level investments, proposing that schools invest in test preparation when
they are in danger of sanction but this detracts from teaching, while Muralidharan and
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Sundararaman (2011) focus on teacher merit pay and show that teachers may similarly be
tempted to move away from curriculum teaching and toward test preparation when their
bonuses depend on test scores.
I.3 Theoretical Framework
I.3.1. Setup
Schools exist for the purpose of helping students learn, and in the absence of any testing,
schools would expend as much effort as they saw fit on student learning. However, once low-
stakes testing is put into place, if test scores are less than perfectly correlated with student
learning, schools may adjust their practices to maximize some function of test scores and
student learning. This does not impose any constraints; it merely adds another variable to
the schools’ objective functions. In practical terms, even if there is no formal accountability
system in place, families may still be hesitant to send children to a school with low stan-
dardized test scores, giving schools an incentive to consider them in their resource allocation
decisions. In turn, this incentive may induce schools to increase their effort.
High-stakes accountability imposes formal penalties for low performance. A simple high-
stakes accountability system states that a school’s average test score must be above some
threshold score θ, or else the school will be closed. High-stakes accountability may also
induce a further increase in effort above the level under low-stakes accountability.
Let each school j consume two types of resources: short-term resources S, which only
affect standardized test scores T , and long-term resources L, which simultaneously1 affect
both test scores and student learning G. Short-term resources are more effective in producing
test scores than are long-term resources. In other words, Tj = f(Sj, Lj);Gj = g(Lj);
∂T
∂S
>
∂T
∂L
> 0.
Schools get some utility2 Uj from student learning and, if there is a testing regime in
place, test scores. However, they gain no utility if they are shut down because they do not
meet the high-stakes accountability threshold. We can phrase this as Uj = p(Gj) under no
accountability, U∗j = p(Tj, Gj) under low-stakes testing, and U
∗∗
j = 1(Tj ≥ θ)p(Tj, Gj) under
high-stakes testing. Under any accountability regime,
∂Uj
∂Tj
> 0,
∂Uj
∂Gj
> 0.
1This is extremely important. While most traditional production equations require resources to be allocated
toward producing one good or another, if a school invests in long-term resources, those resources increase
the output of student learning and test scores at the same time. This models the true usefulness of those
resources more effectively, in addition to making the model much easier to solve.
2I am modeling schools as firms here, but I use “utility” in place of “profit” in order to prevent confusion
related to for-profit and non-profit schools. The schools in this model do not have a financial motive.
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The resources have costs cS and cL, respectively. Schools’ effort E is an increasing function
of the strictness of accountability A; for convenience, I normalize E(0) = 1, to phrase all
effort levels as relative to the baseline of no accountability. Each school has an endowment
Ωj; schools face the effort-weighted budget constraint ΩjE(A) = cSSj + cLLj. To emphasize
the shortcut nature of teaching to the test, let cS < cL. High-stakes accountability is more
stringent than low-stakes accountability, which in turn is stricter than no accountability;
A∗∗ > A∗ > 0.
I.3.2. An Example With Cobb-Douglas and Linear Functions
Let both the utility function and the production functions be Cobb-Douglas, and let the
effort function be linear, as follows. All j subscripts are removed for ease of reading.
(I.1) U = TαGβ
(I.2) T = KSγLδ; γ > δ
(I.3) G = BLζ
(I.4) E = 1 + A
K, B, and all lower-case Greek letters are non-negative constants. Different schools may
have different values of these parameters.
I begin with the case of no accountability, in which A = 0 and thus E = 1. The school
spends its entire endowment on long-term resources:
(I.5) L0 =
Ω
cL
Under low-stakes testing A∗ > 0, the school’s effort increases to 1 + A∗. Substitute the
production functions into the profit function in order to create a utility function over the
consumption of the teaching resources. I remove j subscripts for readability.
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(I.6) U = (KSγLδ)α(BLζ)β
Rearrange and collect terms, and define a new constant D ≡ KαBβ.
(I.7) U = DSαγLαδ+βζ
The marginal rate of substitution between S and L is:
(I.8) MRSS,L =
αγL
(αδ + βζ)S
Set this equal to the price ratio cS
cL
, substitute in from the budget equation, and get:
(I.9) S∗ =
Ω(1 + A∗)
cS
(
αγ
αγ + αδ + βζ
)
(I.10) L∗ =
Ω(1 + A∗)
cL
(
αδ + βζ
αγ + αδ + βζ
)
L∗ > L0 if 1 + A∗ >
αγ+αδ+βζ
αδ+βζ
; in other words, long-term resource consumption (and, by
extension, learning) is higher under low-stakes testing than under no testing if the increase
in effort is greater than the relative importance of long-term resources in the school’s utility
function.
Moving to a high-stakes testing regime A∗∗ > A∗ is unequivocally beneficial in schools
that meet the threshold score with their unconstrained optimal resource bundle; the math
is the same except A∗∗ replaces A∗ in the respective formulas. Even if the school would not
have met the threshold at its low-stakes optimum, if the additional effort induced by the
high-stakes testing puts the school over the threshold, there will be a commensurate increase
in long-term resource consumption and therefore student learning.
The problem is not analytically tractable under high-stakes testing if the unconstrained
optimum bundle does not meet the constraint; the school will alter its its resource bundle
so that the constraint is just satisfied and consume the solution to the following system:
(I.11) KSγLδ = θ
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(I.12) Ω(1 + A∗∗) = cSS + cLL
In lieu of determining the exact levels of S and L that a school will consume under high-
stakes accountability in order to meet the threshold, I show that schools will respond to
falling short of the threshold score by moving toward short-term resources if αδ+βζ
cL
> αδ
cS
. If
the costs of the short-term and long-term resources are equal, it is always more profitable to
move toward short-term resource use from the unconstrained optimum. Details are in the
Mathematical Appendix.
Some schools have such low endowments that they cannot meet the constraint; there does
not exist a pair (S, L) in their budget set such that KSγLδ ≥ θ. In this case, the school
shuts down.
I.3.3. Interpretation
The main implication of this model is that test score gains under high-stakes accountability
are more likely to reflect increased content knowledge in wealthier schools or schools with
higher-performing students, while schools without these luxuries may make more use of test
preparation methods to improve scores. As such, these schools with greater endowments
will have a stronger relationship between test score improvements and long-term learning
than their poorer counterparts. Schools with high endowments are more likely to be able to
choose their utility-maximizing levels of resources without being bound by the constraint.
Because the constraint requires only a certain level of test scores, constrained schools will be
forced to sacrifice student learning to meet the test score minimum, and will often do this
through trading long-term resources for short-term ones. The endowment can be thought of
as the school’s financial budget, but this is not the only interpretation; a school could also
have a high endowment because its teachers are effective or its students are talented. If its
teachers and/or its students are especially skilled, a school does not need to devote many
resources to test preparation and can focus as much as it wishes on student learning3.
In the Cobb-Douglas example, schools will consume more short-term resources S if their
endowment Ω increases, the cost of short-term resources cS decreases, the productivity of
short-term resources γ increases, or the importance of test scores in the utility function α
increases. Schools will consume more long-term resources L if Ω increases, the cost of long-
term resources cL decreases, the productivity of long-term resources in producing test scores
δ increases, the productivity of long-term resources in student learning ζ increases, or the
importance of student learning in the utility function β increases.
3Alternatively, these qualities could be seen as lowering the costs of the resources; better teachers can
provide content knowledge more easily, for instance.
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I am intentionally agnostic about the proper values of α and β. Some schools may be
philosophically opposed to testing and have an α of 0; that is, test scores have no role in
their utility function other than through the constraint. Others may place heavy weight on
test scores and have very high values of α; one could imagine a for-profit charter school in
a poor and densely-populated area, for instance. There are many schools to choose from in
the area, but they are generally seen as being low-quality. The charter must attract enough
students to make a profit, and the easiest signifier of quality when the competing schools are
low-performing is higher test scores.
Note that the threshold score θ does not enter into the expressions for the unconstrained
maximizing resource consumption bundle. If the threshold is met by the actions that the
school would take anyway, the numeric value of the threshold score does not matter. However,
when the constraint binds, θ does enter into the expressions for the maximizing bundle.
Schools must adjust their consumption and consume the right amounts of resources to just
meet the threshold.
This model assumes a single representative student in a school; it does not account for how
resources could be targeted within a school. In reality, of course, schools are composed of
wide varieties of students with abilities all over the distribution. If schools have an idea of how
their students would perform on a standardized test at the moment, they can allocate their
resources among the students in a more targeted fashion. Under an accountability regime in
which schools are rated based on the fraction of students exceeding a proficiency threshold,
for instance, schools may apply short-term resources to students near the threshold to ensure
that they pass the test, while students in the upper part of the distribution may receive
long-term resources and students at the very bottom might receive nothing at all. A regime
like the one outlined here, in which schools are rated based on average test scores, might
leave more room for students in most of the distribution to receive short-term resources,
although if one assumes the returns to short-term resources are low for students near the top
of the distribution (both because they cannot score much higher and because the last few
concepts are the most difficult), the highest-ranking students are still less likely than their
lower-achieving peers to receive short-term resources.
The Cobb-Douglas functional form is a convenient illustration, but some of the most basic
conclusions hold when the functional form assumption is relaxed. Specifically, as the cost
of a resource decreases, schools will demand more of it; as endowments increase, schools
will demand more of both resources. As schools place more emphasis on test scores (via
increasing
∂Πj
∂Tj
), their demand for short-term resources will go up. Effects of some other
parameters are more ambiguous.
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I.4 Data and Methodology
I.4.1. K-12 Data
This project draws from several different administrative data sources. I begin by using
student-year level test scores and demographic data from public middle and high schools in
Michigan to estimate school value added, then merge the K-12 data with several sources of
college data to create the variables necessary to measure postsecondary outcomes.
My base sample is all students in Michigan public4 schools, who first sit for the 8th-grade
math and reading Michigan Educational Assessment Program (“MEAP”) test between the
2005-06 and 2007-08 school years. Students must take the 11th-grade standardized exam
(which includes the ACT) to be included in deriving the value-added model; other outcomes
do not condition on having any data past eighth grade. Students who take the 8th-grade
MI-Access exam for special-education students are dropped from both samples.
I merge in some student characteristics (race, gender, age, limited English proficiency,
economic disadvantage5, special education status) measured each year, and the student’s
home district and the school that the student attends measured three times per year6, as
well as the student’s ZIP code and Census block group. The latter two variables allow me
to merge in neighborhood household income from the American Community Survey (along
with a missing indicator if such data are unavailable for the given student).
Because students may change schools within an academic year, I briefly reshape the data
to the student-collection period level, so that I can determine the fraction of periods between
the middle-school exam and the high-school exam that a student attends each school. I use
this fraction to assign each student to the school that the student attends for the most col-
lection periods; students who do not attend any school for four collection periods or more
are not used to derive the VAM.7 I keep the values of economic disadvantage, limited En-
glish proficiency, and special education enrollment from the student’s eighth-grade year as
to avoid any manipulation by their high schools. I bring in a few school-level aggregate vari-
ables, keeping the most common values for indicator variables and the means for continuous
variables. Finally, I reduce the sample to one observation per student, keeping the student’s
4For the purposes of this paper, “public” schools include both traditional public schools run by local school
districts and charter schools.
5During the sample period, economic disadvantage is measured by a student’s eligibility for subsidized
school lunch.
6Following the Center for Educational Performance and Information’s terminology, I refer to the three
measurement dates per year (once each in the fall, spring, and end of year) as “collection periods”.
7Previous versions of this paper have weighted the contributions of each student+school combination ac-
cording to the fraction of time spent in that school; the results do not change. The current specification
is simpler to explain.
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first home district and Census block group while attending their longest-tenured school.
I.4.2. Value-Added Estimation
To calculate schools’ value added, I follow the procedure outlined in Chetty, Friedman, and
Rockoff (2014; henceforth “CFR”). This process starts by regressing students’ 11th-grade
test scores Yijnt (an average of math and reading) on their 8
th-grade scores Yi,t−3 (math,
reading, and the interaction of the two), a variety of student, school, and neighborhood
demographics8 (Xi, X¯j,t−1, and Z¯n, respectively), cohort dummies τt and a high school fixed
effect σj.
(I.13) Yijnt = λ+ ψ1Yi,t−3 + Ψ2Xi + Ψ3X¯j,t−1 + Ψ4Z¯n + τt + σj + ijnt
I take a “residualized score” for each student, consisting of the school fixed effect and the
error term, and collapse the data to leave one observation per school-by-year combination,
keeping an average residualized score ρjt for school j in year t.
(I.14) ρjt =
1
Njt
Njt∑
i=1
σj + ijnt
I then regress the average residualized score on the same school’s average residualized scores
from each of the preceding and following two years, plus the relevant missing indicators. The
predicted value ρˆjt from this regression is the value added for the given school in the given
year.
(I.15) ρjt =
2∑
y=−2,y 6=0
κyρj,t+y + ξyMissingj,t+y + øjt
The main advantage of the CFR model is that it is robust to noise, measurement error, and
cohort-specific shocks, through its Bayesian shrinkage “leave-one-out” framework. Results
do not change significantly if I use a Bayesian shrinkage estimate of the school value added
without the leave-one-out specification (see Koedel, Mihaly, and Rockoff 2015; Herrmann,
Walsh, and Isenberg 2016), a simpler one-step VAM, or a two-step model (as in Ehlert et al.
2014).
8See Appendix B for the full list.
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Figure I.1 presents the distribution of value added across schools, weighted by the number
of students. Most estimates are between -0.3 and 0.3 standard deviations; there are fewer
positive estimates than negative estimates. Figure I.2 repeats the exercise but with one
observation per school instead of per student; there is more dispersion in these estimates,
but the outlier schools tend to be small. A school that is one standard deviation better than
average improves students’ test scores by 0.234 student-level standard deviations over their
8th-grade baseline scores, corresponding to about 1.1 points out of 36 on the ACT composite.
Table I.1 provides detail about how students are distributed across levels of school value
added. Even as the measure focuses on student improvement rather than raw scores, the
students in higher-value added schools are more privileged and higher achieving than their
counterparts in lower-value added schools. 58% of students in these schools are economically
disadvantaged, and 35% are Black; these figures are 19% and 13%, respectively, in the
highest-quartile schools. The average 8th-grade exam score in the lowest-quartile schools
is 0.341 standard deviations below the statewide mean, while the average in the highest-
quartile schools is 0.384 standard deviations above the statewide mean. I also include several
intermediate outcome measures separated by school VAM quartile; students in schools with
higher value added perform better on their 11th-grade exams and are more likely to graduate
from high school and enroll in college.
I.4.3. College Data
Most of the outcome data used in this paper come from a data set called STARR. The STARR
data consist of student-course level records for all public colleges in Michigan, starting with
students who attended college in 2009. Each student would have a separate observation
for each course that the student has taken at a Michigan public college (including both
community colleges and four-year colleges), containing information about the student, the
course, and the student’s grade in the course. Unless stated otherwise, grades are expressed
on a 4.0 scale (3.7 for an A-, 3.3 for a B+, etc.) in this study.
I keep only credit-bearing courses from a student’s first year in a Michigan public college9. I
drop courses titled “Departmental Credit” (which tend to be credits for Advanced Placement
or International Baccalaureate scores rather than for college coursework), drop observations
from students who take the subject in question at multiple institutions in the same year,
and restrict math and English courses10 to be the first course taken in the given subject; if
a student takes multiple math courses or multiple English courses at once in the student’s
9Because STARR only contains data from Michigan public colleges, students technically could have taken
courses at other colleges first, but this is unlikely given later restrictions on time since graduation.
10I identify math and English courses using the course codes listed in Appendix B.
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first semester taking a course in that subject, the course with the lower course number is
kept (for instance, “MATH 215” over “MATH 217”). I keep all first-year courses in subjects
other than math and English.
The final data preparation step is to merge the data sets together. I merge the value-
added measures onto the 8th-11th grade student observations, and then merge the resulting
file into the college data. What remains is one observation per student-course combination,
containing the student’s demographics, high-school value added, and course performance. In
order to reduce the impact of events that happen between high school and college, college
observations are dropped if a student does not start college “on time”, meaning five years
after taking the 8th-grade exam.
In order to have at least some information about students who do not attend college at a
Michigan public institution, I also merge in enrollment and graduation information from the
National Student Clearinghouse. These data are available for colleges attended by over 90%
of Michigan public-school students. The focus of the paper is on the course outcomes, but
examining the effects of high school quality on other outcomes such as college attendance
and completion informs the calculations made to ensure that the course grade results are
robust.
Table I.2 outlines the changes in college attendance across the distribution of test-score
value added. While every quartile of schools in the distribution sends around 60% or more of
its students to college, students who attend schools with higher value added are more likely to
attend college, a gain driven mostly by increased probability of attending a public four-year
college in Michigan. The fraction of students attending a private college in Michigan and
the fraction attending a community college is higher in the middle of the distribution than
at the ends but stays in a fairly narrow band. Of particular concern for the identification of
this paper, however, is the steady increase in the probability of being in the college grade
sample as high school VAM increases. I explore this more in Section I.4.5.
I.4.4. Empirical Specification
To determine the effect of high-school value added on college performance, I build up to the
following specification:
(I.16) Gradecijknt = ι+φ1Yi,t−4+φ2V alueAddedj,t−1+Φ3Xi+Φ4X¯j,t−1+Φ5Z¯n+χckt+νijkct
The course grade earned by student i from neighborhood n, who attended high school j
before enrolling at college k and taking course c in semester t, is a function of the student’s
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middle-school test score Yi,t−4i; student characteristics Xi; school-level average characteristics
X¯j,t−1; neighborhood characteristics Z¯n; a course fixed effect χckt; and the high-school11 value
added.
Empirically, the course grade is measured on a 4.0 scale, and the student characteristics
are the same ones used in the value-added model (except with the 8th-grade score included as
an average of math and reading, up to a fourth-order polynomial, as opposed to separating
them and including an interaction). I scale the value added in terms of its school-level
standard deviation; the coefficient φ2 represents the effect of raising a school’s test-score
value added from the statewide average to one standard deviation above it. Standard errors
are clustered by school; this accounts for serial correlation and is generally more conservative
than clustering by school and year. To account for the generated regressor in the value-added
term, I present bootstrapped standard errors in the full specifications, following Bastian
(working), among others. The fixed effects χckt are for each combination of college, year,
semester, subject code, and course number (for instance, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor,
fall 2011, ENGLISH 125). Only students who take a course in a Michigan public college
within five years of the year in which they take their 8th-grade test are included. Observations
in the “all subjects” and “other subjects” specifications are weighted by their fraction of the
student’s relevant credits in the non-bootstrapped specifications.
The specifications for outcomes other than college course grades are similar, but with a few
important modifications. There is one observation per student, rather than one observation
per student-course combination; there is no course fixed effect, because there is no course
being measured; and the sample no longer consists only of students who enroll in college, or
even students who take the 11th-grade exam. Instead, anyone who has an 8th-grade exam
score that is not from the MI-Access special education exam is included in the sample.
I.4.5. Threats to Identification
Potential biases lurk throughout the empirical analysis process. First, the 8th-grade exam
scores may be measured with error, stemming from anything from poorly-filled bubbles to a
malfunctioning Scantron machine. If the measurement error is classical, this would introduce
attenuation bias into the value-added estimates, and in turn the coefficients in the outcome
regressions would be biased upward as they measure the effect of an attenuated regressor.
The measurement error is not precisely classical, as scores are necessarily bounded between
0% and 100%, but as 0.02% of students receive the minimum or maximum score on the math
11I use this term for convenience to describe the school that a student attends most frequently between the
exam taken in grade 8 and the exam taken in grade 11. It could be a junior high school, which has grades
7-9; it could be a school that contains grades K-12. It does not need to only contain grades 9-12.
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exam and 0.01% receive the minimum or maximum on the reading exam, the bounds are so
rarely reached that I treat the measurement error as classical.
The next threat comes from selection into high schools. One of the most important issues
in the value-added literature is that attendance in “better” schools is not random. Even
though they cannot observe value added explicitly at the time that students enroll, schools’
reputation for quality is presumably at least somewhat positively correlated with value added.
Students then sort across districts across two dimensions that reinforce each other. Families
sort across home districts based on preferences for education and available resources, among
other things; students can then, conditioning on where they live, take advantage of policies
that allow them to attend schools in other districts or in specially-designed settings such
as charter schools and magnet schools. In both cases, students best equipped to succeed in
college will be sorting into higher-quality high schools, biasing my estimates upward.
I present a handful of falsification tests in Table I.4 to quantify the degree of the sorting. If
there was no sorting, then high-school value added should not predict 7th-grade test scores,
7th-grade attendance, Census block group poverty rates, or Census block group education
levels. However, all of those variables except for poverty rates are indeed predicted by high-
school VAM. For instance, students who attend high schools with one standard deviation
higher value added measures have 7th-grade scores that are about 0.043 standard deviations
higher, even after controlling for 8th-grade scores and the other typical covariates. This is
an economically modest but statistically significant bias.
Finally, students in higher-VAM schools are more likely to attend college, most notably at
the in-state public institutions that collect the transcript data used in this study, as shown
in Table I.3. Table I.3 contains probit marginal effects for various attainment outcomes:
taking the 11th-grade state exam, graduating high school, attending college, and being in
the sample for the course grade specifications. All of these are predicted very well by the
test-score value added of a student’s high school. The college outcomes track closely with the
results shown in Table I.2, showing that the unconditional results in Table I.2 are not driven
solely by covariates that are controlled for in the probits. However, they raise concerns about
selection into the college grades sample.
There are two different interpretations of the selection. On one hand, if students are more
likely to get into college if they attend a good high school, then perhaps the students who
still manage to get there despite attending a low-performing high school must be particularly
resilient, which makes them likely to perform better in college. This would argue against
finding a positive effect of high-school value added on college performance. However, an
alternative interpretation is that students are sorted into high schools by some unobserved
quality; this quality makes the students perform better in high school, raising their value
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added, and in college, raising their grades, but not due to anything that their high schools
contributed. This would bias toward finding a positive effect.
I.5 Course Results
I.5.1. Main Specifications
Table I.5 presents results for the full sample, adding more covariates with each column. The
specification in column 5 weights the contribution of each observation by its fraction of the
student’s total credits, but does not bootstrap the standard errors; column 6 includes boot-
strapping but weights 1-credit classes equally to 4-credit classes. Regardless of specification,
there is a positive and significant relationship between high-school value added and college
course grades. The effect of attending a school with one standard deviation higher VAM is
about 0.086 grade points, almost one third of the difference between a B and a B+. This
result provides evidence against the hypotheses that schools are teaching to the test; there
appear to be long-term benefits to attending a school that raises high-stakes test scores. The
effect size does fall short of the 0.1-standard deviation threshold that denotes a large impact
in the education literature, however; the standard deviation of course grades is about 1.34
grade points in this sample, meaning that the effect size is closer to 0.07 standard deviations.
Table I.6 presents results by subject, using the specification from column 6 of Table I.5;
the effect is very similar. Controlling for a full set of demographics and bootstrapping
standard errors, the effect of going to a school with one standard deviation higher VAM is
about 0.131 grade points in math, positive and highly significant. For English, the effect
sizes are slightly smaller at about 0.061 grade points, still highly significant when including
full controls and bootstrapped standard errors. In subjects other than math and English,
the impact of attending a one-standard deviation more-effective school is about 0.082 grade
points. This is evidence against the hypothesis that schools are focusing only on subjects that
have high-stakes tests, at the expense of overall skills and learning in fields not subject to test
score-based accountability. The courses in this category include anything from psychology
to business to welding; none of these subjects are included in accountability measures and
many of them are not even taught in high schools.12
12One reason why there may not be reallocation toward high-stakes subjects in high school is the Michigan
Merit Curriculum (“MMC”), which requires that students take biology, either chemistry or physics, three
social studies courses, two years of a foreign language, gym, art, and an online course (in addition to its
math and English requirements). The first cohort exposed to the MMC entered high school in the fall of
2007; some cohorts in this study preceded the MMC, while others were exposed to it. (Jacob et al. 2017)
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I.5.2. Accounting For Biases
I begin by accounting for the attenuation bias in the value-added model. Although students’
7th-grade test scores are likely measured with a similar type of error as their 8th-grade
scores, if these measurement errors are not correlated with each other, one can be used as
an instrument for the other. In this case, I use 7th-grade test scores to instrument for their
8th-grade counterparts in the first step of the VAM. I then proceed with the model as normal,
using the residualized scores from the instrumented first step to constructed the predictions
used in the value added, and then using the resulting value-added measures as regressors in
the outcome specifications.
To reduce the bias from selection across high schools, I construct a “home-district” sample.
This sample consists only of students who attend a non-charter, non-magnet high school in
their zoned school district. These students often, though not always if their district offers
multiple high schools, attend the “default” high school associated with their home address.
This reduces the upward bias from selection into higher-quality high schools, although it does
not eliminate it, as families also sort residentially by income, education, and preferences for
school quality. Appendix Table I.12 presents the results from Table I.4 for this sample; it
remains selected on some observable characteristics, even if the home-district sample deals
with selection on some unobservable characteristics such as motivation.
I conduct three different adjustments for selection into college. First, I present results
estimated for a smaller sample of students who are very likely to go to college. These
students have less margin to have their college-going decisions altered by the quality of their
high school. To construct this subsample, I take advantage of ACT’s cutoff score for college
readiness: a student who meets all of ACT’s benchmarks for college preparation would have a
composite score of 21 (ACT, Inc.). 31% of students in the sample received an ACT composite
of 21 or higher. Because ACT scores are, by construction, influenced by high school quality,
I instead include the top 31% of scorers on the 8th-grade standardized test. 86% of these
students in the lowest-VAM schools attended college; 92.4% of these students in the highest-
quartile schools attended college. Other than in the very lowest quartile, there does not seem
to be a significant unconditional relationship between high-school value added and college
attendance for these “college-ready” students. A relationship remains when I condition on
the usual set of covariates, but it is notably smaller than the equivalent relationship in the
full sample, and there is no significant relationship between high-school value added and
presence in the grade sample for the college-ready students, as shown in Appendix Table
I.11
Second, Oster (2016) derives a method of accounting for selection on unobservables that
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incorporates the relative changes in treatment effects and R2 values as covariates are added
to the model, building on work by Altonji, Elder, and Taber (working). To construct this,
I start by regressing college grades on high-school value added with no other covariates,
saving the R2 value R0 and the treatment effect φ0. I then run the fully-specified outcome
model, again saving the R2 value Rfull and the coefficient on value added φfull. Oster (2016)
imposes that a specification with all possible controls, observable and unobservable, would
explain 30% more of the variation than the model with the full set of covariates13; therefore,
I let Rmax ≡ 1.3Rfull. The formula for the bias-adjusted coefficient φ∗ is:
(I.17) φ∗ = φfull − (φ0 − φfull)
(Rmax −Rfull
Rfull −R0
)
The bias-adjusted coefficients that result can provide a bound on the effect size; it is a
good sign if the bias-adjusted coefficients are not statistically different from their unadjusted
counterparts, while if the bias-adjusted coefficient is actually larger than its unadjusted coun-
terpart, then the bias is skewing the effect toward zero and is of relatively less concern. The
fundamental assumption behind the Oster (2016) formulation is that the unobservables bias
the result in the same direction that the observables do; if the sample is positively selected
on observables, then it must be positively selected on unobservables, and the opposite.
Third, I present results in which I impute grades for students who are not in the grade
sample. I geocode all public colleges in the state, and assign all students who did not
attend college to their nearest community college, while assigning all students who attended
private or out-of-state colleges, or did not take any large enough credit-bearing courses, to
their nearest four-year public college. After “placing” each non-attendee in a college, I then
assign the non-attendees to courses: each of these students is assigned to a math class, an
English class, and one other class in their respective college in the appropriate year. The
courses are chosen randomly, with the probabilities of course placement equal to the observed
fractions of students enrolled in that course. In other words, if 50% of freshmen enrolled
in a math class at Washtenaw Community College in 2011 take college algebra, 25% take
calculus, and 25% take statistics, a non-attendee assigned to Washtenaw Community College
would have a 50% probability of being placed in college algebra, 25% probability of being
placed in calculus, and a 25% probability of being placed in statistics.
I assign grades to these students in two ways. First, as a bounding exercise, I assign 0.0
GPAs to all students in the counterfactual sample. Second, to obtain a more realistic effect,
13This parameter is chosen to allow the results of 90% of randomized experiments to be upheld in the
bias-adjusted framework.
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I use out-of-sample prediction to give grades to these students. In the sample of students
who have course grades available, I regress their course grades on the full set of observables,
except for the value added of their high schools. I then use these estimates to impute the
grades of the students who do not actually attend public colleges in Michigan. For instance,
a student with a high 8th-grade test score taking pre-algebra would likely receive a high
grade, while a student with a low 8th-grade score taking calculus would likely receive a low
grade.
I.5.3. Robustness Results
Table I.7 presents estimated coefficients on high-school value added, separated by subject,
for each of the bias adjustments outlined in Section I.5.2. While some of those adjustments
shrink the point estimates, almost none of them alter the statistical significance of the results.
The estimates are especially robust to the attenuation bias in the VAM and to across-district
school choice mechanisms; neither the instrumented VAM nor the home-district sample
changes the results meaningfully in any subject. The selection into college makes a slightly
larger difference, but all of the corrections for this selection leave a positive and significant
effect of at least 0.04 grade points in the all-subjects sample.
Even after all of these corrections, there remains residential sorting across districts. To
place an upper bound on the effect of the sorting, I follow the methodology in Altonji and
Mansfield (working). This involves estimating the contribution of school characteristics to
outcomes, controlling for student-level and aggregated student characteristics. In place of
Equation I.13, I run a slightly-altered first-step regression, in which I replace the school
fixed effects with school characteristics Wj,t−1 that are not student aggregates: per-pupil
expenditure (at the school and district level), pupil-teacher ratio, the fraction of students
who transfer or drop out, and the average certification exam score of the school’s teachers.
(I.18) Yijmnt = µ+ pi1Yim + Π2Xi + Π3X¯j,t−1 + Π4Z¯n + Π5Wj,t−1 + υt + ηijmnt
I then find the variance of the contribution of those school observables Π5Wj and com-
pare it to the variance of the VAM estimates from Section I.4.2. The ratio of these vari-
ances
var(Π5Wj)
var(V alueAddedjt)
represents the relative contribution of school observables to school value
added, which places a lower bound on the contribution of the school itself to value added
and an upper bound on the contribution of students’ sorting across schools and districts to
value added. I multiply my regression coefficients by this ratio to determine the minimum
effect size that can be attributed definitively to school quality and not to sorting.
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These results are shown in Table I.7 as well. I find that this lower bound estimate teeters
along the edge of statistical significance, while its economic significance is somewhat limited,
as a vast change in school effectiveness is met with a fairly modest change in college perfor-
mance. This does cast some doubt upon my overall results if taken literally. However, it is
an intentionally-conservative lower bound backed by a fairly prohibitive assumption: that
all of schools’ contribution to value added can be contained by observable variables such as
per-pupil expenditure, teachers’ certification scores, and student turnover. This leaves no
room for schools to benefit students by teachers’ creativity and hard work or by creating a
positive learning environment, reducing the secret to student learning to a formula. In real-
ity, this assumption is too punitive to be realistic; some of the effect can likely be attributed
to students’ sorting across districts, but there is room for schools to help students learn in
ways that cannot be captured in a spreadsheet.
I.5.4. Results by Subgroup
One interpretation of the model in section I.3 is that schools whose students have weaker
academic backgrounds may be forced to focus on test preparation in order to meet high-
stakes accountability standards, whereas schools with better-prepared students can focus
on content. This would imply a stronger relationship between test-score value added and
college performance in the latter schools, as they provide learning that students can build
upon while the test preparation emphasized in the former schools has less application in other
environments. I test this in Table I.8, running the final specification from Table I.5 separately
by quartile of high schools’ average 8th-grade exam scores. The results do not support this
hypothesis. The largest point estimates are found in the schools in the bottom quartile;
students gain more from attending schools that raise scores from very low to somewhat low
than from attending schools that raise scores from high to very high.
Brand and Xie (2010) find that students who come from groups less likely to complete col-
lege, such as Black students and lower-income students, benefit most from attending college.
This result could possibly extend to attending a good high school, but an opposing argument
is also certainly plausible: that students from disadvantaged groups are underrepresented
in higher-VAM schools (as shown in Table I.1), and thus the schools are not designed to
serve them, or they are socially excluded in these schools; either of these may lead to such
students receiving fewer benefits from attending a “better” school.
I test this by estimating college grades results separately for Black and white students,
and separately for students who were economically disadvantaged and those who were not,
presented in Table I.9. Effect sizes are somewhat larger for Black students than for white
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students; effects are also slightly larger for poor students than for non-poor students, but not
significantly so. This result is reassuring, as it allays the fear that marginalized students are
being left behind in high-VAM schools while white and wealthier students reap the benefits.
High school VAM alone cannot close the state’s gaps in college achievement, but it may be
a part of the solution.
Finally, the ACT tests academic subjects and is used for admission at four-year colleges;
schools that raise ACT scores may not be giving students the tools needed for success at
community colleges as effectively, particularly in courses outside of the traditional academic
fields. These schools may be focusing on their students who are on the four-year academic
track at others’ expense. I test this by running the college grades results separately at two-
year and four-year institutions, as shown in Table I.10. If anything, I find the opposite.
The effect sizes are positive and significant in both two-year and four-year institutions; the
returns to attending a high-quality high school are actually marginally bigger in two-year
colleges.
I.6 Discussion and Conclusion
I.6.1. Policy Context
The students studied in this paper, if they complete their secondary education on time, are
members of the high school classes of 2010, 2011, and 2012. During this period, Michigan
public schools were subject to the accountability measures in the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001 (“NCLB”). High schools were judged on whether they met Adequate Yearly
Progress in math and reading proficiency rates, as well as graduation rates, both for the
student body as a whole and for subgroups of interest such as Black students, Hispanic
students, and students eligible for subsidized lunch. The necessary proficiency rates to
achieve Adequate Yearly Progress grew more stringent year by year, putting schools under
pressure to improve rapidly (Bielawski 2006). Additionally, the required 11th-grade state
standardized test incorporated the ACT college entrance exam during this time period. The
ACT is specifically designed to be predictive of college performance, which implies a stronger
relationship between state standardized test scores and college outcomes than one might
expect from another standardized test. Additionally, the designers of the ACT state that
a composite score of 21 is the benchmark for college readiness; this standard allows easier
comparisons within the group of students who are expected to go to college. Finally, the
Michigan Merit Curriculum required students during this sample period to take four years of
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math and English, three years of social studies, two years of a foreign language, and courses
in biology, art, music, and either chemistry or physics (Jacob et al. 2017). This resulted
in more challenging high-school coursework, and it prevented high schools from dedicating
entire days to math and reading in the way that some elementary and middle schools did to
prepare for standardized tests (McNeil and Valenzuela 2000).
From a policy perspective, or from the perspective of someone who cares about educa-
tional equality in the United States, the empirical results of this paper are encouraging.
The model presents a bleak scenario in which schools with low-achieving incoming students
cannot teach lasting lessons to students because they need to focus so completely on exam
preparation. I do not find empirical evidence to support this claim; if anything, effect sizes
are largest in these schools. Furthermore, effect sizes are notably large for Black students
and for economically disadvantaged students; exposing these students to better schools, ei-
ther by improving integration of disadvantaged students into more-advantaged schools or by
making investments in schools with more-disadvantaged populations, can make a meaningful
difference in their long-run success.
I.6.2. Further Research
While this study makes a meaningful contribution to the literature about the student-level
returns to high-school quality and the usefulness of value-added models, room for further
investigation remains. For instance, other measures of high-school quality may predict future
success and long-term learning more effectively than test-score value added does; replicating
the exercises done here, replacing test-score value added with measures related to graduation
rates or other quality metrics, and seeing which best predicts long-term learning, would be
a useful extension. Additionally, the set of students who attend in-state public colleges
immediately after graduation tend to be fairly stable and high-achieving students; looking
at the effects of high-school quality on persistence, completion, and grades at for-profit
colleges would also be valuable, although the selection concerns might run in the opposite
direction from the ones in this paper.
Future researchers and policymakers alike may be interested in learning more about the
characteristics of the schools that see high value added and large effects on college perfor-
mance, particularly those that do so despite having low-performing students at entry. If
there are patterns in the classroom practices most prevalent in these schools, or in how they
spend money, assign teachers, and allocate other scarce resources, then other schools may
mimic these patterns, hoping to achieve similar results. Conversely, there is also a chance
that these schools have unique characteristics that other schools cannot replicate to the same
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effect.
I.6.3. Summary
I seek to measure the effect of high-school quality on first-year college course grades, in order
to determine how much of high schools’ value added truly comes in the form of persistent
learning and skills. I match school-year level test-score value added measures onto college
transcripts, looking separately at the effects on grades in all subjects, tested subjects, and
non-tested subjects. Even after numerous adjustments for selection into high schools and
colleges, a stable positive effect of high-school quality on college grades remains; students
who attended a high school one standard deviation above the school-level average receive
first-year grades between 0.04 and 0.1 grade points higher than their otherwise-identical
counterparts who graduated from average schools. This implies that much of these high-
quality schools’ improvements in test scores are driven by durable student learning, a result
that should ease some concerns of some skeptics of standardized testing.
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I.7 Supplemental Figures
Figure I.1.: Distribution of Value Added, Student Level
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Figure I.2.: Distribution of Value Added, School Level
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I.8 Supplemental Tables
Table I.1.: Student Characteristics by VAM Quartile
Lowest 2nd 3rd Highest
Fraction Black 0.353 0.154 0.094 0.137
Fraction Hispanic 0.054 0.046 0.039 0.029
Fraction Asian 0.012 0.013 0.019 0.047
Fraction in Special Education 0.145 0.128 0.113 0.102
Fraction Limited English Proficiency 0.044 0.025 0.021 0.021
Fraction Economically Disadvantaged 0.575 0.379 0.277 0.199
Fraction in Charter Schools 0.052 0.022 0.022 0.033
Fraction in Magnet Schools 0.107 0.163 0.089 0.104
Average 8th-Grade Standardized Test Score -0.335 -0.035 0.158 0.375
Average 11th-Grade Standardized Test Score -0.348 -0.032 0.16 0.362
Fraction Graduating High School 0.69 0.801 0.847 0.869
Fraction Entering College 0.613 0.705 0.769 0.837
Number of Observations 112,147 93,912 84,504 76,103
One observation per student. VAM is estimated following the method in Chetty, Friedman,
and Rockoff (2014).
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Table I.2.: College Placement by VAM Quartile
Lowest 2nd 3rd Highest
No College 0.387 0.295 0.231 0.163
In-State Community College 0.356 0.373 0.351 0.304
In-State Public Four-Year 0.118 0.188 0.26 0.349
In-State Private 0.067 0.074 0.075 0.066
Out of State 0.071 0.07 0.082 0.118
Any College 0.613 0.705 0.769 0.837
In Grade Sample 0.4 0.505 0.564 0.632
Takes Math, If Ever in Michigan Public College 0.403 0.445 0.473 0.486
Takes English, If Ever in Michigan Public College 0.493 0.513 0.501 0.477
Number of Observations 112,147 93,912 84,504 76,103
One observation per student. VAM is estimated following the method in Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014).
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Table I.3.: College Attendance and Graduation - Probits
Takes ACT Graduates HS Any College In Grade Sample
Scaled High School VAM 0.015*** 0.025*** 0.036*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
8th-Grade Test Score 0.078*** 0.1*** 0.161*** 0.149***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Female 0.021*** 0.046*** 0.081*** 0.065***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Black -0.002 0.009** 0.093*** 0.05***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Hispanic -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.031*** -0.041***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Asian -0.018** -0.013 0.032*** 0.051***
(0.008) (0.01) (0.013) (0.011)
Special Education -0.02*** -0.017*** -0.067*** -0.077***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Limited English Proficiency 0.008 0.025*** 0.063*** 0.043***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.01) (0.014)
Economically Disadvantaged -0.076*** -0.099*** -0.092*** -0.11***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Block-Level and School-Level Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 366,663 366,663 366,665 366,663
One observation per student. Average marginal effects shown. Value added is estimated following the method in Chetty,
Friedman, and Rockoff (2014), normalized in terms of its school-level standard deviation. Missing values of covariates are
recoded to 0; missing indicators are included but not shown. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, clustered by high
school.
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Table I.4.: Falsification Tests
7th-Grade Score 7th-Grade Attendance Block-Grp. Pct. In Pov. Block-Grp. Pct. With BA
Scaled High School VAM 0.029*** 0.002* -0.017 1.61***
(0.006) (0.001) (0.303) (0.41)
Student-Level Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Block-Level Variables? Yes Yes No No
School-Level Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 352,629 350,058 366,666 366,666
One observation per student. Value added is estimated following the method in Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014), nor-
malized in terms of its school-level standard deviation. Missing values of covariates are recoded to 0; missing indicators are
included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by high school.
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Table I.5.: All Grades, Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Scaled High School VAM 0.253*** 0.198** 0.161*** 0.11*** 0.095*** 0.086***
(0.027) (0.021) (0.018) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014)
8th-Grade Test Score 0.328*** 0.274*** 0.332*** 0.315***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Female 0.257*** 0.258*** 0.244***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Black -0.427*** -0.309*** -0.294***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
Hispanic -0.147*** -0.115*** -0.115***
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Asian 0.026 0.041*** 0.028
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Special Education -0.112*** -0.092*** -0.092***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Limited English Proficiency 0.181*** 0.204*** 0.185***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.019)
Economically Disadvantaged -0.17*** -0.152*** -0.154***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Course ID Fixed Effects? No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Block-Level and School-Level Variables? No No No No Yes Yes
Bootstrapped or Weighted? Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Weighted Bootstrapped
Number of Observations 594,239 594,239 594,239 594,239 594,239 594,239
One observation per student-course combination. Value added is estimated following the method in Chetty, Friedman, and
Rockoff (2014), normalized in terms of its school-level standard deviation. Outcome variable is the grade in the student’s
first-year courses in college, on a 4.0 scale. Math and English courses must also be the lowest-numbered such course in the
first semester in which a math or English class is taken. Missing values of covariates are recoded to 0; missing indicators are
included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by high school.
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Table I.6.: Grades by Subject, Full Sample
Math English Other Other
Scaled High School VAM 0.131*** 0.061*** 0.095*** 0.082***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.016)
8th-Grade Test Score 0.287*** 0.214*** 0.366*** 0.342***
(0.013) (0.01) (0.008) (0.007)
Female 0.287*** 0.345*** 0.223*** 0.21***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Black -0.312*** -0.299*** -0.308*** -0.289***
(0.024) (0.02) (0.015) (0.014)
Hispanic -0.132*** -0.148*** -0.108*** -0.103***
(0.032) (0.027) (0.02) (0.021)
Asian 0.034 0.043 0.04*** 0.025*
(0.032) (0.027) (0.015) (0.015)
Special Education -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.081*** -0.086***
(0.021) (0.02) (0.013) (0.012)
Limited English Proficiency 0.246*** 0.164*** 0.191*** 0.176***
(0.037) (0.029) (0.021) (0.025)
Economically Disadvantaged -0.094*** -0.159*** -0.16*** -0.166***
(0.014) (0.011) (0.01) (0.009)
Course ID Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Block-Level and School-Level Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bootstrapped or Weighted? Bootstrapped Bootstrapped Weighted Bootstrapped
Number of Observations 79,728 86,566 427,945 427,945
One observation per student-course combination. Value added is estimated following the method in Chetty, Friedman, and
Rockoff (2014), normalized in terms of its school-level standard deviation. Outcome variable is the grade in the student’s
first-year courses in college, on a 4.0 scale. Math and English courses must also be the lowest-numbered such course in the
first semester in which a math or English class is taken. Missing values of covariates are recoded to 0; missing indicators are
included but not shown. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by high school.
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Table I.7.: Estimates Accounting for Bias
All Math English Other
Instrumented VAM 0.068*** 0.09*** 0.066*** 0.064***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.015) (0.012)
[594,239] [79,728] [86,566] [427,945]
Home-District Sample 0.09*** 0.139*** 0.069*** 0.085***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018)
[482,889] [64,953] [69,758] [348,178]
College-Ready Sample 0.04** 0.086*** 0.042* 0.03**
(0.016) (0.022) (0.025) (0.014)
[277,361] [36,024] [32,812] [208,515]
Oster (2016) Bias-Adjusted Treatment Effect 0.049*** 0.092*** 0.011 0.047***
(0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016)
[594,239] [79,728] [86,566] [427,945]
Counterfactual Sample, 0.0 GPAs 0.087*** 0.062*** 0.07*** 0.115***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.02) (0.016)
[1,136,352] [243,585] [254,451] [638,316]
Counterfactual Sample, Imputed Grades 0.043*** 0.025*** 0.028*** 0.062***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.012)
[1,136,352] [243,585] [254,451] [638,316]
Altonji and Mansfield (working) Lower Bound 0.023* 0.036** 0.017 0.022
(0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016)
[594,239] [79,728] [86,566] [427,945]
Course ID Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Block-Level and School-Level Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes
One observation per student-course combination. Estimates shown are the coefficients on the high-school value added term in
the respective regression specification. Value added is estimated following the method in Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014),
normalized in terms of its school-level standard deviation. Outcome variable is the grade in the student’s first-year courses in
college, on a 4.0 scale. Math and English courses must also be the lowest-numbered such course in the first semester in which
a math or English class is taken. Missing values of covariates are recoded to 0; missing indicators are included but not shown.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, clustered by high school. Sample sizes in brackets.
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Table I.8.: Estimates by School 8th-Grade Exam Quartile
All Math English Other
Lowest Quartile 0.115*** 0.159*** 0.129*** 0.101***
(0.024) (0.031) (0.031) (0.021)
[138,781] [18,913] [22,927] [96,941]
2nd Quartile 0.041* 0.091*** 0.014 0.037
(0.024) (0.035) (0.041) (0.026)
[148,373] [19,994] [22,862] [105,517]
3rd Quartile 0.062** 0.127*** 0.001 0.062**
(0.022) (0.038) (0.032) (0.029)
[153,237] [20,632] [21,788] [110,817]
Highest Quartile 0.055** 0.082** 0.008 0.058**
(0.026) (0.036) (0.039) (0.028)
[153,848] [20,189] [18,989] [114,670]
Course ID Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Block-Level and School-Level Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes
One observation per student-course combination. Estimates shown are the coefficients on the high-school value added term in
the respective regression specification. Value added is estimated following the method in Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014),
normalized in terms of its school-level standard deviation. Outcome variable is the grade in the student’s first-year courses in
college, on a 4.0 scale. Math and English courses must also be the lowest-numbered such course in the first semester in which
a math or English class is taken. Missing values of covariates are recoded to 0; missing indicators are included but not shown.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, clustered by high school. Sample sizes in brackets.
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Table I.9.: Estimates by Race and Income
All Math English Other
Black 0.124*** 0.138*** 0.108*** 0.124***
(0.023) (0.037) (0.024) (0.027)
[80,442] [11,176] [13,072] [56,194]
White 0.058*** 0.114*** 0.031* 0.053***
(0.015) (0.022) (0.018) (0.013)
[479,533] [63,867] [68,852] [346,814]
Economically Disadvantaged 0.105*** 0.119*** 0.119*** 0.098***
(0.016) (0.028) (0.024) (0.018)
[136,079] [18,753] [22,269] [95,057]
Not Economically Disadvantaged 0.075*** 0.13*** 0.037** 0.072***
(0.013) (0.024) (0.015) (0.015)
[458,160] [60,975] [64,297] [332,888]
Course ID Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Block-Level and School-Level Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes
One observation per student-course combination. Estimates shown are the coefficients on the high-school value added term in
the respective regression specification. Value added is estimated following the method in Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014),
normalized in terms of its school-level standard deviation. Outcome variable is the grade in the student’s first-year courses in
college, on a 4.0 scale. Math and English courses must also be the lowest-numbered such course in the first semester in which
a math or English class is taken. Missing values of covariates are recoded to 0; missing indicators are included but not shown.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, clustered by high school. Sample sizes in brackets.
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Table I.10.: Estimates by College Type
All Math English Other
Four-Year Colleges 0.076*** 0.109*** 0.047** 0.073***
(0.015) (0.027) (0.024) (0.019)
[332,708] [41,054] [36,964] [254,690]
Two-Year Colleges 0.092*** 0.137*** 0.07*** 0.087***
(0.017) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019)
[254,343] [37,630] [48,510] [168,203]
Course ID Fixed Effects? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Block-Level and School-Level Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes
One observation per student-course combination. Estimates shown are the coefficients on the high-school value added term in
the respective regression specification. Value added is estimated following the method in Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014),
normalized in terms of its school-level standard deviation. Outcome variable is the grade in the student’s first-year courses in
college, on a 4.0 scale. Math and English courses must also be the lowest-numbered such course in the first semester in which
a math or English class is taken. Missing values of covariates are recoded to 0; missing indicators are included but not shown.
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses, clustered by high school. Sample sizes in brackets.
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A Mathematical Appendix
As stated above, when the high-stakes accountability constraint binds, the result must
satisfy the accountability constraint KSγLδ = θ and the budget constraint Ω = cSS + cLL.
Solve the accountability constraint for S:
(I.19) Sγ =
θ
ALδ
;S =
θ
1
γ
K
1
γL
δ
γ
Substitute this into the budget constraint:
(I.20) Ω(1 + A∗∗) = cS
θ
1
γ
K
1
γL
δ
γ
+ cLL
This cannot be solved analytically unless δ = γ. However, if ∂T
∂S
> ∂T
∂L
at the unconstrained
optimum under high-stakes accountability, then the school will reallocate toward short-term
resources (i.e. focus more on test preparation) in order to move toward the threshold. Since
T = KSγLδ:
(I.21)
∂T
∂S
= γKSγ−1Lδ;
∂T
∂L
= δKSγLδ−1
Evaluate the derivatives at the unconstrained maximizing values of S and L:
(I.22)
∂T
∂S
= γK
(
Ω(1 + A∗∗)
cS
(
αγ
αγ + αδ + βζ
))γ−1(
Ω(1 + A∗∗)
cL
(
αδ + βζ
αγ + αδ + βζ
))δ
(I.23)
∂T
∂L
= δK
(
Ω(1 + A∗∗)
cS
(
αγ
αγ + αδ + βζ
))γ (
Ω(1 + A∗∗)
cL
(
αδ + βζ
αγ + αδ + βζ
))δ−1
Start by dividing both equations by
(
Ω(1+A∗∗)
cS
(
αγ
αγ+αδ+βζ
))γ−1 (
Ω(1+A∗∗)
cL
(
αδ+βζ
αγ+αδ+βζ
))δ−1
;
then ∂T
∂S
> ∂T
∂L
if:
(I.24) γ
(
Ω(1 + A∗∗)
cL
(
αδ + βζ
αγ + αδ + βζ
))
> δ
(
Ω(1 + A∗∗)
cS
(
αγ
αγ + αδ + βζ
))
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Then divide through by γΩ(1+A
∗∗)
αγ+αδ+βζ
, and obtain that ∂T
∂S
> ∂T
∂L
if:
(I.25)
αδ + βζ
cL
>
αδ
cS
If the costs are equal, the school will always move toward short-term resources if con-
strained, because βζ > 0.
B Data Appendix
B.1. Covariates In Fully-Specified Regressions
The first stage of the value-added model contains the following covariates.
• Individual test scores: standardized 8th-grade math score, standardized 8th-grade read-
ing score, interaction of standardized 8th-grade math and reading scores.
• Individual demographics: Black, Hispanic, Asian, female, economically disadvantaged,
limited English proficiency, special education.
• Census block group averages: household income, has a high school diploma, has a
bachelor’s degree, white, Black, Asian, Hispanic, married, employed, home owner,
below poverty line.
• School averages: Black, economically disadvantaged, 8th-grade test score.
• School-level variables: enrollment.
• Missing indicators for all of the above.
• Cohort fixed effects.
• School fixed effects (variable of interest).
The second stage of the value-added model contains the following covariates.
• Average residualized scores: one year forward, two years forward, one year backward,
two years backward.
• Missing indicators for all of the above.
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The Altonji and Mansfield (working) decomposition regression contains the following co-
variates.
• Individual test scores: standardized 8th-grade math score, standardized 8th-grade read-
ing score, interaction of standardized 8th-grade math and reading scores.
• Individual demographics: Black, Hispanic, Asian, female, economically disadvantaged,
limited English proficiency, special education.
• Census block group averages: household income, has a high school diploma, has a
bachelor’s degree, white, Black, Asian, Hispanic, married, employed, home owner,
below poverty line.
• School averages: Black, economically disadvantaged, 8th-grade test score.
• School-level variables: enrollment, per-pupil instructional expenditure, district per-
pupil instructional expenditure, pupil/teacher ratio, fraction of students leaving the
school without graduating, teacher certification exam score.
• Missing indicators for all of the above.
• Cohort fixed effects.
The outcome regressions contain the following covariates.
• Individual test scores: standardized 8th-grade scores in a fourth-order polynomial.
• Individual demographics: Black, Hispanic, Asian, female, economically disadvantaged,
limited English proficiency, special education.
• Census block group averages: household income, has a high school diploma, has a
bachelor’s degree, white, Black, Asian, Hispanic, married, employed, home owner,
below poverty line.
• School averages: Black, economically disadvantaged, 8th-grade test score, attendance.
• School-level variables: enrollment, magnet, charter.
• Missing indicators for all of the above.
• High school value added, expressed in terms of its school-level standard deviation
(variable of interest).
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B.2. Subject Abbreviations
The following abbreviations correspond to English courses at the listed institutions:
• “ENG”: Alpena Community College, Central Michigan University, Delta College, Goge-
bic Community College, Grand Valley State University, Henry Ford Community Col-
lege, Jackson Community College, Kalamazoo Valley Community College, Kirtland
Community College, Marygrove College, Mid Michigan Community College, Muskegon
Community College, North Central Michigan College, Northwestern Michigan College,
Oakland Community College, Schoolcraft College, St. Clair County Community Col-
lege, University of Michigan-Flint, Washtenaw Community College, Wayne County
Community College, Wayne County Community College District, Wayne State Uni-
versity, West Shore Community College
• “ENGL”: Bay de Noc Community College, Eastern Michigan University, Ferris State
University, Kellogg Community College, Lake Michigan College, Lake Superior State
University, Macomb Community College, Monroe County Community College, Mont-
calm Community College, Mott Community College, Saginaw Valley State University,
Southwestern Michigan College, The Robert B. Miller College, Western Michigan Uni-
versity
• “DEN”: College for Creative Studies
• “COM”: Glen Oaks Community College
• “EN”: Grand Rapids Community College, Northern Michigan University
• “WRIT”: Lansing Community College
• “WRA”: Michigan State University
• “UN”: Michigan Technological University
• “WRT”: Oakland University
• “ENGLISH”: University of Michigan-Ann Arbor
• “COMP”: University of Michigan-Dearborn
The following abbreviations correspond to math courses at the listed institutions:
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• “MTH”: Alpena Community College, Central Michigan University, Delta College,
Gogebic Community College, Grand Valley State University, Jackson Community Col-
lege, Kirtland Community College, Marygrove College, Michigan State University,
North Central Michigan College, Northwestern Michigan College, Oakland Univer-
sity, St. Clair County Community College, University of Michigan-Flint, Washtenaw
Community College, West Shore Community College
• “MATH”: Bay de Noc Community College, Eastern Michigan University, Ferris State
University, Henry Ford Community College, Kalamazoo Valley Community College,
Kellogg Community College, Lake Michigan College, Lake Superior State University,
Lansing Community College, Macomb Community College, Monroe County Commu-
nity College, Montcalm Community College, Mott Community College, Muskegon
Community College, North Central Michigan College, Saginaw Valley State Univer-
sity, Schoolcraft College, Southwestern Michigan College, The Robert B. Miller Col-
lege, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor, University of Michigan-Dearborn, Western
Michigan University
• “NSM”: Glen Oaks Community College
• “MA”: Grand Rapids Community College, Michigan Technological University, North-
ern Michigan University
• “MAT”: Mid Michigan Community College, Oakland Community College, Wayne
County Community College, Wayne County Community College District, Wayne State
University
• “MMTH”: West Shore Community College
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B.3. Appendix Tables
Table I.11.: College Attendance and Graduation - Probits, College-Ready Sample
Takes ACT Graduates HS Any College In Grade Sample
Scaled High School VAM 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.028*** 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
8th-Grade Test Score 0.052** 0.056*** 0.151*** 0.258***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.041) (0.058)
Female 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.045*** 0.032***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Black -0.016*** -0.012** 0.022*** -0.03***
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011)
Hispanic -0.021*** -0.023*** -0.012 -0.025***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
Asian -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.002 0.036***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.011)
Special Education -0.032*** -0.044*** -0.052*** -0.073***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
Limited English Proficiency -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.06***
(0.006) (0.01) (0.009) (0.015)
Economically Disadvantaged -0.037*** -0.052*** -0.064*** -0.091***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Block-Level and School-Level Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 115,116 115,116 115,116 115,116
One observation per student. Marginal effects at means shown. There are as many “college-ready” students as have a maximum
ACT composite of 21 or higher; this same number of students is then chosen based on their 8th-grade test score. Value added
is estimated following the method in Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014), normalized in terms of its school-level standard
deviation. Missing values of covariates are recoded to 0; missing indicators are included but not shown. Bootstrapped standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by high school.
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Table I.12.: Falsification Tests, Home-District Sample
7th-Grade Score 7th-Grade Attendance Block-Grp. Pct. In Pov. Block-Grp. Pct. With BA
Scaled High School VAM 0.054*** 0.003** -0.145 1.92***
(0.007) (0.001) (0.365) (0.583)
Student-Level Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Block-Level Variables? Yes Yes No No
School-Level Variables? Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 275,601 276,897 287,348 287,348
One observation per student. Only students who attend non-charter, non-magnet high schools in the district in which they
reside are included. Value added is estimated following the method in Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2014), normalized in
terms of its school-level standard deviation. Missing values of covariates are recoded to 0; missing indicators are included but
not shown. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by high school.
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II The Impact of Local Labor Market Shocks on College
Choice: Evidence from Plant Closings in Michigan
II.1 Introduction
Students who face a weak local labor market when they graduate from high school are
left with a daunting decision to make. If they choose to acquire additional education, they
gain credentials that will help them get higher-paying work when they finish and they do
not forgo lucrative immediate employment options, but they incur heavy costs at a time
when their families’ financial situations are at their most precarious. If they instead choose
to enter the labor market immediately, they avoid burdening themselves and their families
with high costs and debt when unemployment is prevalent, but they may have trouble finding
work in the weak labor market and they will have fewer opportunities for higher-paying work
without a college degree.
Economic justification exists for both choices. Human capital theory dating back to Becker
(1975) and Rosen (1977) suggests that when the local labor market is in a recession, stu-
dents should respond by acquiring more education. If there are no credit constraints, then
a substantial negative shock to local employment opportunities should actually induce an
increase in college attendance; students will be less able to acquire a job with only a high
school diploma, making additional credentials more valuable. Furthermore, the opportunity
cost of attending college will be much lower when the local job market is in bad shape,
as high school graduates’ expected wages if they enter the job market (including zero as a
possible value if they are unable to find work) will be low. Empirical studies such as Black,
McKinnish, and Sanders (2005) and Cascio and Narayan (2015) validate this theory in the
case of public high school education, which has no cost to the student except the opportunity
cost of the time spent in school. However, many studies, most famously including Lochner
and Monge-Naranjo (2011), have indicated that students are heavily influenced by their
current resources when deciding whether or not to enter college, indicating that students
are sufficiently credit-constrained that they cannot always fully borrow the cost of college.
Therefore, the shock to family resources resulting from a local economic downturn (partic-
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ularly if a parent becomes unemployed) may well diminish or even outweigh the positive
response to the reduced opportunity cost.1
In this study, I evaluate the effects of local job losses on several measures of students’
postsecondary education choice. To do this, I take advantage of the reporting requirements
of the WARN Act of 1988, which requires employers to post public notices and send written
notifications to city and state officials if they lay off more than 50 workers or close a facility
with over 50 employees. Controlling for students’ academic backgrounds and demographics,
I determine whether students alter their choices of whether to attend college (and if so, what
type of college to attend) as they see larger percentages of people in their local areas lose
their jobs in these plant closings2 and mass layoffs. In order to create some context for the
college findings, I also examine the effects of these events on 8th-grade test scores, following
a similar approach to Ananat, Gassman-Pines, and Gibson-Davis (2009); this separates the
effects of psychological and school resource shocks from the changes in relative costs that are
assumed to drive much of the college results.
The results suggest a significant role for credit constraints in driving students’ postsec-
ondary education decisions. In OLS specifications, a 1-standard deviation increase in the
fraction of the local population losing jobs in a year is associated with a 0.2-percentage-point
(0.3%) increase in the probability of attending college. This effect is composed entirely of
a 0.3-percentage-point (1.2%) increase in the probability of attending a two-year college,
implying that many of the students who move into attending two-year colleges would have
otherwise skipped college; a few students who otherwise would attended a four-year college do
attend community college instead. These results imply that one additional student will enter
college for each 6.51 jobs lost. Using per capita WARN Act job losses as an instrument for
the county unemployment rate leads to a substantively similar result: a 1-percentage point
increase in the local unemployment rate is associated with a 3.2-percentage point (4.5%) in-
crease in the probability of attending college, again driven by a large (3.8 percentage points,
15.3%) increase in the probability of attending community college.
In any specification, the overall number of students in college increases slightly in response
to an adverse labor market shock, even as there is a slight (usually not statistically signif-
icant) decrease in the probability of attending a four-year college. As some students are
1Additionally, students who attend college under shocks to family resources may be more likely to work in-
creased hours while enrolled, which may diminish academic performance (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner
2003).
2Not all events categorized as “plant closings” involve factories. A supermarket, a restaurant, a bank
branch, or a car dealership could close; as long as an entire physical location is shut down, it is counted
as a plant closing. The term is commonly used to avoid confusion with firm shutdowns (a term referring
to the closure of an entire company, rather than a single location; a firm shutdown implies one or more
plant closings but the reverse is not true) and I use it throughout this paper.
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responding to labor market shocks by acquiring less education, which is opposite to their
best interest in the labor market, credit constraints are likely to be a factor, but not enough
to outweigh the opportunity cost aspect of the decision. I also examine the results for dif-
ferent subgroups, dividing students according to factors such as race, gender, eligibility for
subsidized lunch, and predicted probability of attending a four-year college. The results
are broadly consistent, particularly the effect on two-year attendance, but they are most
pronounced among white students, male students, students in the middle (particularly the
upper middle) of the distribution of predicted attendance, and students not eligible for free
or reduced-price lunch.
II.2 Literature Review
The theoretical literature that provides context for this study centers around Lochner
and Monge-Naranjo (2011). The authors model the college attendance decision, imposing
a framework of credit constraints and determining how theoretical students will act. The
constraints are similar to the designs of federal and private student loan programs; students
must spend all of their federal loan money on education, subject to a fixed dollar maximum,
and private lenders will not provide loans greater than the amount that they can expect
to be able to garnish from the student’s wages after graduation in the event of a default.
These constraints are incorporated into a life cycle model and calibrated using observed
parameter values. As expected, an increase in the cost of education along with an increase
in the return to education, both of which have occurred in the United States in recent years,
is associated with a much higher number of students being constrained out of being able to
afford education. As stated in the previous section, this result is essentially a prerequisite
for students to respond to a negative labor market shock by reducing their educational
investment rather than increasing it; otherwise, the opportunity cost effects from Becker
(1975) and Rosen (1977) predominate. Manoli and Turner (working) find evidence that
these credit constraints are relaxed by tax refunds.
This study falls at the intersection of two empirical literatures. The first focuses on the
effect of shocks to family resources on college attendance and other educational outcomes,
providing context for students’ reaction to a job loss or an income loss in their families.
Hilger (2016) matches fathers to their children in U.S. tax data and studies the impact of
any job loss (not just those that result from plant closings or firm shutdowns) on students’
post-secondary education choices. The effects are negative, particularly among middle-class
students who are not poor enough to receive full need-based aid but not wealthy enough
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to pay for their education out of pocket; however, the estimated effects are fairly small,
regardless of the outcome of interest; students whose fathers are laid off are 0.43 percentage
points less likely to attend college, and attend colleges whose alumni earn $84 less per year.
Coelli (2011) uses Canadian data to match children to their families’ main income earners
and looks at the effects of those earners’ job loss (either through mass layoff, firm shutdown,
or plant closing) on the child’s post-secondary choices. There are significant negative effects
on college attendance, as a main income earner’s job loss is associated with a 10-percentage
point decrease in the probability of attending a postsecondary institution; there is no change
in the probability of attending a community college, while almost all of the effect is on the
probability of attending a university. However, there are no controls for students’ academic
ability, so any counterfactual predictions are based solely on demographics such as race,
parents’ education, and family income. Oreopoulos, Page, and Stevens (2008) match fathers
to sons, looking at the effects of a father’s job loss (due to plant closing or firm shutdown)
while his son is in adolescence on the son’s long-run outcomes. Sons do indeed lose about
9% of long-run income when their fathers lose their jobs at this stage, and this effect is even
stronger among children in the least-wealthy families. Kalil and Wightman (2011) look in
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics at the relationship between parental job losses and
postsecondary enrollment, finding that Black students are three times as vulnerable to being
induced to skip college than their white counterparts, even among middle-class students.
Lovenheim and Reynolds (2013) look at positive income shocks instead, focusing on house
price appreciation. They use data from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY97), allowing them to capture the rapid increase in home prices that occurred in the
late 1990s and early 2000s. Their key finding is that a $10,000 increase in home prices in the
four years prior to high school graduation is associated with a 0.2% increase in a student’s
likelihood of attending his or her state flagship public university (such as the University
of Michigan, University of Virginia, or University of Florida) as opposed to a non-flagship
public university (such as Eastern Michigan University, Virginia Commonwealth University,
or University of Central Florida) and a 0.6% decrease in the likelihood of attending a com-
munity college. There is no effect on the probability of attending a private university. Most
of the variation is driven by students in the lowest income categories. Charles, Hurst, and
Notowidigdo (working), however, find opposite results. An increase in housing demand in a
metropolitan area, instrumented by a structural break in housing prices between 2000 and
2006, is associated with a decrease in college attendance in that metropolitan area as mea-
sured both by Census data and by the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System
(IPEDS).
The second focuses on the effect of changes in local labor market opportunities on educa-
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tional investments and other related outcomes. Ananat et al. (2009) use county-level data
on job losses in North Carolina between 1997 and 2007, focusing on the impact of job losses
on 8th graders’ test scores. Their identification strategy includes a weighted index of local
job losses (again, measured through plant closings and mass layoffs) from the past several
quarters, using an exponential decay function to determine the weights. After regressing 8th
grade exam scores on this weighted index of job losses, student demographics, time trends,
and county fixed effects, Ananat et al. find a small and insignificant negative effect of job
losses for the full student population, but the effect grows to a statistically significant drop of
2.4 percentage points per percentage point of job loss when the sample is limited to students
from low socioeconomic status families. The authors conclude that despite the county-wide
measure of job losses, the effects do indeed result from family income shocks, rather than
declines in school funding (which is largely determined by the state and responds more
slowly); even though parents’ job losses are not identified directly, they explain most of the
phenomena.
Studies such as Black, McKinnish, and Sanders (2005) and Cascio and Narayan (2015) ex-
amine the effects of changes in employment in extractive industries on educational outcomes;
the former paper focuses on the coal boom and bust, while the latter focuses on hydraulic
fracturing for natural gas. Both find that as employment in extractive industries increases,
male students are less likely to go to college, while female students’ college decisions do not
change; the opportunity cost of college increases as more high-paying jobs are available for
low-skilled men in the coal mines and fracking rigs. Ost, Pan, and Webber (working) look at
how mass layoffs affect working college students’ time allocation and educational persistence;
they find that few effects on enrollment but an increase in credits attempted due to a decline
in the opportunity cost of coursework. Ge (2015) finds spillovers from mass layoffs associ-
ated with the reform of Chinese state-owned enterprises near the turn of the 21st century,
as students in cities where more people lost their jobs in these events are even less likely to
continue their education than those whose fathers worked in businesses with smaller layoffs.
What I aim to do in this study is to adapt the local-shock framework used by Ananat
et al. (2009) to study similar outcomes to those examined by Hilger (2016). The results
from Ananat et al. provide reassurance that there are legitimate effects of plant closings and
mass layoffs on educational outcomes, and that the mechanism of these effects is through
family income shocks rather than through schools’ resources. Foote, Grosz, and Stevens
(2015) support the use of WARN data as a proxy for unemployment data, for reasons that
include the endogeneity of local unemployment with respect to labor supply and migration,
the discrete nature of the shocks in a mass layoff, and the possible measurement error in
unemployment rates collected for small geographic areas. With these results in mind, I
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can confidently use job losses within a commuting radius to proxy and/or instrument for
directly-measured job losses, and take advantage of some of the advantages of Michigan’s
student administrative data to more completely capture students’ postsecondary choice sets,
with and without large local job losses. I describe these data more completely in Section
III.3.
II.3 Data
II.3.1. Student Data
The state of Michigan collects detailed information on all its public school students, from
elementary school through high school as well as any postsecondary school that they may
attend. Each observation used in this analysis is a record from the Michigan Student Data
System (MSDS), which observes students in Michigan public elementary and secondary
schools three times per year from the 2002-03 academic year onward, collecting information
ranging from attendance to race to disciplinary incidents. I obtain the latitude and longitude
associated with each student’s home ZIP code in the student’s last year in the data. If the
student’s home ZIP code is unavailable, I use the ZIP code of the student’s high school. The
other variables that I gain from the MSDS are demographics such as race, gender, special
education, and limited English proficiency.
For students who attend college, I use a common unique identifier to merge in variables
from the National Student Clearinghouse (NSC), a nationwide database of attendance at
colleges of all sorts, including community colleges, private colleges, for-profit institutions,
and public universities. The vast majority of these institutions3 nationwide report to the
NSC, and the state of Michigan collects data from the NSC on all college students who ever
attended public school in Michigan. The variables of interest from the NSC database are
the college that a student attends and the year that he or she begins to attend. 76% of
MSDS observations at this point merge into the NSC data; the remaining students do not
attend any college during the sample period or attend a college that does not report to NSC.
College attendance outcomes are measured as of three years after expected graduation, thus
making the last year of the high school sample 2011-12.
The last state data set that I use is a database of students’ scores on 8th and 11th-grade
state standardized exams. Michigan’s high school standardized testing regime changed sig-
nificantly during the sample period, as the state replaced the high school MEAP (Michigan
3Michigan’s NSC records account for colleges attended by over 90% of college students; most of the colleges
still missing are small, for-profit, less-than-two-year institutions.
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Educational Assessment Program) with a new assessment, known as the Michigan Merit
Exam (MME), that incorporates the ACT college entrance exam. To make results easier to
interpret, I normalize the scores within each grade, subject, and year such that they have a
mean of zero and a standard deviation of 1. Thus, it is straightforward to compare students
who scored the same number of standard deviations above or below the mean against each
other, regardless of subject area, year, or test type.
I match the state data with a database of ACT scores and self-reported high-school grade-
point averages provided by ACT, Inc. Even before the MME came into effect, making the
ACT mandatory, it was the most popular college entrance exam in Michigan. This data set
contains observations for all students who took the test in Michigan between 2003 and 2011.
It contains the same unique identifier variable as the state data; students in the state data
who do not merge into this data set are assumed not to have taken the ACT.
II.3.2. Unemployment and Plant Closings
The simplest measure of a local labor market shock is the unemployment rate. I use county-
level unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, averaging them out over a
school year, and matching the average to a student’s home county and year of expected
graduation. For instance, if a high school student in Grand Traverse County takes the 11th-
grade standardized test in 2006-07, that student is expected to graduate in the spring of
2008, and is assigned the average of all monthly unemployment rates in Grand Traverse
County between September 2007 and August 2008, the period that would most likely be
that student’s senior year and the period in which the student would most likely decide
whether and where to attend college. For middle-school students, I use the average of the
12 months before the 8th-grade exam; if a middle school student in Kent County takes the
8th-grade standardized test on February 11th, 2007, that student is assigned the average of
all monthly unemployment rates in Kent County between February 2006 and January 2007.
However, there are well-documented concerns about measurement error and endogeneity in
county unemployment rates (see Foote et al. 2015), and many workers in Michigan commute
across county lines. To address some of these concerns, I instrument and proxy for county
unemployment rates with data on plant closings and mass layoffs from the WARN Act.
The federal Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (“WARN Act”) of 1988
requires all employers with 100 or more employees to provide 60 days’ advance notice before
laying off at least 50 workers at once or closing a facility (such as a store, a factory, or
an office) with at least 50 employees. Companies must not only inform their employees of
plant closings and mass layoffs, but they also must provide the same notice to the mayor of
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the city where the relevant facility is located and to the relevant state agency responsible
for dislocated workers. In Michigan, these notices are reported to the Michigan Workforce
Development Agency (WDA); the web sites of the WDA and of Michigan Labor Market
Information (MILMI), a state repository of economic statistics, provide data from the notices
to the public in an electronic format. All notices dating back to 2000 are available through
these channels, with identifying information including the company name, the type of action
(mass layoff or facility closing), the number of workers displaced, the date of the action, and
the city in which the affected facility is located. Additional searching allowed me to find the
addresses associated with a large majority of the sites where a layoff or closing took place,
usually by locating a scanned version of the paper notice4. Using Google Maps’ geocoding
API through the geocode3 package for Stata, I obtained precise coordinates associated with
these addresses, which I use to determine the distance from each layoff site to each high
school. 92% of WARN Act events between 2002 and 2011 were geocoded successfully.
Figure II.1 graphs the distribution of jobs lost per event. The left-most bar represents the
number of plant closings or mass layoffs in which the total number of jobs lost was between
50 and 99; each additional bar has a similar interval of 50. Most of the events displace
fewer than 200 workers, but some of them displace over 1,000 workers. Five of the ten
largest plant closings in Michigan during the sample period involved the decommissioning
of General Motors factories; the discontinuation of the Oldsmobile brand resulted in three
factories in Lansing (Michigan’s capital and Oldsmobile’s longtime home) being closed down
and laying off more than 900 workers each, while plant closings in Pontiac (an industrial
suburb north of Detroit) and Grand Rapids (a mid-sized city on the west side of the state)
displaced 1,230 and 1,500 workers, respectively.
Figure II.2 collapses the job losses listed in Figure II.1 to the year level. Not surprisingly,
the level of job losses was high throughout the 2000s as auto manufacturers and suppliers
condensed operations and moved production overseas, and it hit its peak in 2007-2009, as
General Motors and Chrysler declared bankruptcy and Ford teetered on the edge. Soon
thereafter, the frenzy of plant closures calmed, and fewer than 5,000 workers per year were
laid off as a result of WARN Act eligible plant closings and mass layoffs in Michigan in
2010-2013.
Figure II.3 overlays job loss events on a map of the Lower Peninsula of Michigan5, with
4The largest single event in the WARN Act data is the closing of the Farmer Jack supermarket chain in
2007, which is coded as a “statewide” event rather than as a series of local store closings. I use the
paper notice to obtain the addresses of all the Farmer Jack locations in the state, remove any that were
immediately sold to other supermarket chains such as Kroger, and assign equal fractions of the total
statewide job losses to each of the remaining store locations. Results are robust to removing the Farmer
Jack observations.
5There were some job loss events in the Upper Peninsula, but this area is left off the map for space
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each dot representing a plant closing or mass layoff; darker markers correspond to more jobs
lost. To a large extent, Figure II.3 mirrors the overall population distribution of the state.
Much of the job loss activity is in southeast Michigan in the Detroit metropolitan area,
but considering that over four million of the state’s nearly 10 million residents live in the
Detroit Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), this is hardly disproportionate. Large plant
closings and mass layoffs certainly occurred in the state’s secondary population centers; cities
such as Lansing, Grand Rapids, Flint, Battle Creek, and Kalamazoo all saw major WARN
events during the sample period. A few coastal communities along Lake Michigan and in the
tourist-friendly northern region of the state saw some job losses as well; fewer jobs were lost
in these regions, but these areas are populated quite sparsely. Overall, none of the evidence
in Figure II.3 indicates that job losses are concentrated geographically in a fashion that is
not proportional to population density.
II.3.3. College Analysis Sample
For the college analysis, I keep all students who take the 11th-grade Michigan standard-
ized test between 2001-02 and 2010-11, regardless of whether they graduate. I drop any
students who are missing common demographic information (race, gender, subsidized lunch
eligibility, limited English proficiency, or special education enrollment). This leaves me with
approximately 950,000 students.
I now have a detailed picture of the academic trajectory and personal characteristics of
each of the approximately 950,000 students in the data; what remains is to match them to the
job losses in their surrounding neighborhoods. A student expected to graduate in the 2005-
06 school year will be assigned the job losses from September 2005 through August 2006. I
calculate the number of jobs lost within radii of 30 miles6 of each ZIP code in each academic
year, then divide it by the number of people living in tracts within that radius according
to the 2000 Census.7 Figure II.4 shows the plant closings that occurred in September 2005
through August 2006 within a 30-mile radius of an address in southern Oakland County.
When I use WARN as the independent variable of interest in an OLS regression, I stan-
dardize these per capita measures at the student level, so that the average student has a
value of 0 and a value of 1 represents one standard deviation above the student-level average.
reasons. A map including the Upper Peninsula is available upon request. The Upper Peninsula contained
approximately 3% of the population of Michigan as of the 2010 Census.
6According to the American Community Survey, the average commuting time in Michigan in 2009-2013 was
24 minutes. At a 70-mph highway speed (the speed limit on many freeways in Michigan), this corresponds
to a 28-mile commute. For robustness, I also use radii of 10 and 50 miles; results, available upon request,
are largely similar.
7Later population sizes would presumably be affected by changes in the labor market, so I use a population
size that predates the sample period to avoid endogeneity.
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This allows the empirical estimates to be interpreted as the effects of a 1-standard deviation
increase in per capita job losses. A kernel density plot of the distribution of this variable is
shown in Figure II.5. When WARN is used to instrument for a measure of unemployment,
I leave it in per capita terms.
II.3.4. The Big Picture
Table II.1 presents a summary of high school student characteristics separated by their
postsecondary education choices.8 Most of the results are not surprising. Students who
ever attend four-year colleges have higher scores on state standardized tests, higher ACT
scores, and higher grade-point averages. These students are also less likely to be Black or
Hispanic, less likely to be eligible for subsidized lunch, and less likely to be enrolled in special
education. Two-year attendees and students who do not go to college are similar on some
measures, but two-year attendees perform somewhat better on the state exam (if not on the
ACT) and are less likely to be in special education or eligible for subsidized lunch.
Table II.2 divides high school students into quartiles by the per capita job losses in their
surrounding areas in their expected graduation year. One might expect that areas where very
few job losses occur have substantially different populations from areas that are harder-hit.
The actual pattern is not as clear. Most notably, the average state standardized test scores
in the hardest-hit and least hard-hit areas are separated by about 0.13 standard deviations.
Students are somewhat different across quartiles in terms of characteristics such as race and
subsidized lunch eligibility, but not in consistent monotonic patterns; furthermore, some
regions of the state suffered more job losses in particular years. For instance, more than
4,000 jobs were lost due to plant closings and mass layoffs in Lansing in 2005, while fewer
than 200 were lost in Lansing in 2008; meanwhile, more than 2,000 jobs were lost in similar
events in Grand Rapids in 2008, while about 1,000 were lost in Grand Rapids in 2005. The
least hard-hit quartile does look somewhat different from the rest of the state in several ways:
it is much more concentrated in rural areas and small towns, which explains the disparities
in race and income between this quartile and the other three quartiles, as Michigan’s rural
population tends to be whiter and poorer than the state as a whole. These areas were
economically hard-hit, but since they have fewer businesses employing enough people to be
required to file WARN Act notices, the job losses in these areas are less likely to enter into
the data here. 9
8All summary tables are calculated for the high school graduating class of 2006, for whom the ACT was
not yet mandatory. Patterns of results, except for ACT results, are broadly similar for other cohorts.
9Because of this, I estimate my empirical models both including and excluding the least population-dense
areas of the state; results are very similar.
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II.4 Empirical Specifications and Results
II.4.1. Specifications
In order to gain a fuller understanding of the effects of local labor market shocks on student
outcomes without worrying about issues related to costs, I begin by examining the impact of
these shocks on 8th graders’ standardized test scores. These students are affected by reduced
family resources and increased uncertainty at home as well as possible reductions in school
resources, just like high school students, but there is no direct monetary cost to earning a
higher exam score, and the opportunity cost of studying does not generally change because
the minimum age for almost all employment in Michigan is 14.10 The general equation that
I use is as follows:
(II.1) TestScore8ijsct = ψ + δJct + χXi + κct + µs + τt + νict
The 8th-grade standardized test score (rescaled to have mean zero and standard deviation
1) of student i in subject j, who attends school s and lives in location c in year t, depends on
some measure of local job losses Jct and a set of student characteristics Xi, which includes
indicators for whether the student is female, Black, Latino, Asian-American, eligible for
subsidized school lunch, in a program for students with limited English proficiency, and in
special education. κct is a county-level linear time trend, µs is a school fixed effect, and τt is
a graduation year fixed effect. The coefficient of interest here is δ, the estimated effect of an
increase in job losses on the student’s standardized test score.
The focus of this paper is college attendance, though, and the richness of the Michigan
student data allows for a number of potential specifications that can shed light on the rela-
tionship between local job losses and students’ college decisions. Perhaps the most drastic
reaction to local economic shocks involves credit-constrained students choosing to forgo at-
tending college entirely and enter the labor force; other students might avoid the poor labor
market and attend college instead of seeking work immediately. I model this as follows:
(II.2) AnyCollisct = α + βJct + γTestScore11i + θXi + ηct + ωs + φt + ict
The probability of student i, who attends school s and lives in location c, attending
10The minimum age to work as a youth sports referee or golf caddy is 11; the minimum age to participate
in some farming occupations or set traps for some shooting events is 13 (Youth Employment Standards
Act).
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any college after graduating in year t depends on some measure of local job losses Jct, the
student’s score on the state high school standardized test, and student characteristics Xi.
ηct is a county-level linear time trend, ωs is a school fixed effect, and φt is a graduation year
fixed effect. The coefficient of interest in these specifications is β, the estimated effect of an
increase in job losses on the probability of attending any college in the NSC data.
This framework can also be used to estimate effects more narrowly on attendance at four-
year colleges or two-year colleges, by changing the outcome variable to take the value 1 if a
student attends a four-year college and 0 otherwise (or a similar setup substituting two-year
college attendance for four-year college attendance). In an unconstrained world, we would
expect to see students responding to labor market shocks by demanding more education,
resulting in higher attendance at four-year colleges; the effects on two-year college attendance
would be ambiguous and depend on additional factors. The opposite would be true in a world
where credit constraints are important; students would be pushed out of four-year college
attendance by labor market shocks, and some of them may choose to attend community
colleges, while some students who might have attended community college could choose not
to pursue any postsecondary education at all. Examining attendance at two-year and four-
year colleges separately is a useful way to pit the competing theories against each other and
see which is more accurately reflected in the data.
Additionally, the effects of local unemployment on college attendance may vary across
different groups of students. Poor students may be particularly vulnerable to unemployment
shocks because their families have little to no money saved, even as they may also have the
most to gain from a college education. Similarly, there are massive wealth gaps between the
average white household and the average Black household, which could result in different
responses from Black students and white students; in 2009, the average white household
had a net worth of $113,149, while the average Black household had a net worth of $5,677
(Kochhar, Fry, and Taylor 2011). On the other hand, female students and male students may
also react differently to changes in the local job market, as many of the most common jobs
in Michigan that do not require a college education are dominated by male workers (such
as work in automotive factories), and those jobs are also the most likely to be displaced
during the state’s economic struggles. As such, I include results estimated separately by
race, gender, and subsidized lunch eligibility.
II.4.2. Comparing Measures
There are multiple ways to measure the strength of a student’s local labor market. The
most straightforward measure is probably the county unemployment rate, and I begin by
56
presenting results from OLS linear probability regressions11 of college outcomes on county
unemployment rates (along with other observables). However, as outlined by Foote et al.
(2015) and discussed in previous sections, there are reasons to be cautious about using
unemployment rates as the sole measure of labor market strength, and the WARN Act data
can help to alleviate some of these concerns. Worker separations may be endogenous; workers
who become unemployed for reasons other than plant closings and mass layoffs may have
been fired for poor performance, or they may have quit their jobs and found no employers
willing to hire them. Either of these reasons may be correlated with their children’s success
at navigating the college application and financial aid system. Additionally, unemployment
rates at the county level are measured with error, as they frequently extrapolate from surveys
with small sample sizes, while WARN reporting is required by law and thus the WARN data
should capture the full population of major job loss events.
Still, it is worth checking to see that these capture the same thing. A first-stage regression
of the average county unemployment rate on the per capita WARN Act job loss measure,
along with a set of year and county fixed effects, produces a positive and highly statistically
significant relationship, with a coefficient of 0.513 and an F -statistic of 25.77. The coefficient
means that 1.95% of the local population must lose their jobs in a given year in WARN-
eligible events to induce a 1-percentage point increase in the unemployment rate. The
median student is exposed to about 0.1% of the local population losing jobs in a year (with
a standard deviation of 0.13%), so reporting these results involves reporting the impact of
an event that is extraordinarily large. Put differently, the median ZIP code in the data has
470,793 people living within 30 miles of it; 9,180 of these people must lose their jobs in mass
layoffs and plant closings to trigger a 1-point increase in the unemployment rate. This is,
again, an extremely rare event, and the IV results should be interpreted with this in mind.
Depending on one’s preferred interpretation, the WARN variable can be used either as a
proxy or an instrument for the local unemployment rate. I report results both with the OLS
framework (using WARN job losses as a proxy for unemployment) and the instrumental
variables framework (using WARN job losses to instrument for unemployment). In cases
where the WARN variable is used as a proxy, I put it into standard deviation terms for ease
of interpretation; most WARN shocks involve less than 1% of the local population losing a
job in a given year, so leaving it in percentage terms would be illustrating the impact of an
event that is so large as to be exceedingly rare. In cases where the WARN variable is used as
an instrument, I leave it in per capita terms, because unemployment rates are conventionally
11Preliminary results using probits instead of linear probability models had vastly similar results to the
OLS models. As a result, OLS results are reported throughout the paper due to computing limitations
stemming from the size of the data set and the number of fixed effects.
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listed in percentages.
II.4.3. Results
Methodologically, the most similar paper to this one may be Ananat et al. (2009), which
studies the effect of plant closings and mass layoffs on 8th grade exam scores. They find a
small negative effect on exam scores in the full sample, which becomes larger when limited
to a sample of students of low socio-economic status. As shown in Table II.3 and Table
II.4, local job losses are associated with some test score decreases in the Michigan context
as well. A 1-standard deviation increase in per capita job losses in the preceding 12 months
is associated with a statistically significant 0.005-standard deviation decrease in 8th grade
reading scores; effects on math scores are minimal. When the sample is limited to students
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch, the effect on reading scores remains constant. Seeing
that the results of a similar specification are in line with a well-known previous study leads
to a more confident interpretation of the headline results in this addition to the literature.
In the college attendance results, I present each outcome in a separate table, with results
using the county unemployment rate, the standardized WARN variable, and an instrumental
variables framework with the latter instrumenting for the former, in separate columns from
left to right. Standard errors are clustered by ZIP code throughout the empirical results.
Table II.5 presents results for whether a student attends college at all. The variables driving
overall college attendance most are the ones that one would expect; students with high
standardized test scores are much more likely to go to college than their peers, while students
in special education and students eligible for subsidized school lunch are less likely to attend
college. The phenomenon of Black students attending college more than their white peers
(conditional on observable characteristics) while Hispanic students attend less than their
white peers is fascinating, but a proper investigation and explanation of it is outside the
scope of this paper. The unemployment rate seems to have no significant impact on the
probability of a student attending college, but in both OLS and instrumental variables
frameworks, WARN Act job losses do have a positive association with college attendance.
In the OLS WARN Act results, a 1-standard deviation increase in per capita job losses
is associated with a 0.2-percentage point (0.3%) increase in the probability of attending
college, which is significant at the 5% level. This translates to approximately 6.51 jobs lost
per student induced to enroll in college12. The IV results are similar in sign and significance
12There were 9,938,444 people living in Michigan as of the 2000 Census. One standard deviation of job
losses is 0.127% of the population, or 12,661 people. Collegegoing increased by 0.2 percentage points in a
sample of 944,748, or 1,946 new college students. 12, 661÷ 1, 946 = 6.51. Of course, this abstracts from
the involvement of population density and which students are exposed to which job losses.
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but have a larger magnitude; a 1-percentage point increase in the county unemployment
rate is associated with a statistically significant 3.2-percentage point (4.5%) increase in the
probability of attending college. This result by itself supports the Becker/Rosen opportunity
cost story. High school graduates exposed to more severe labor market shocks are more likely
to attend college than those exposed to smaller shocks or no shocks at all. Both effects might
be at play, but with this indicator variable for any college attendance as the outcome, the
reduced opportunity cost outweighs credit constraints in the aggregate.
However, not all colleges are the same, and there may be significant substitutions within
the set of colleges that would support Lochner and Monge-Naranjo’s credit constraint hy-
pothesis. Credit-constrained students may move from pricier schools to cheaper colleges,
perhaps including community colleges, while students focused on the opportunity cost of
college may choose to continue their education beyond a two-year degree. In order to under-
stand which of these explanations might characterize the results here, it is necessary to look
at additional outcomes. Table II.6 presents similarly-organized results for four-year colleges.
The effects are never statistically significant in any specification, even in the IV framework
that otherwise produces large coefficients. Table II.7 finishes the exercise with two-year col-
leges, which appear to drive the results seen in Table II.5. The local unemployment rate
remains statistically insignificant, but in the OLS WARN framework, a 1-standard deviation
increase in per capita job losses is associated with a statistically significant 0.3-percentage
point (1.2%) increase in the probability of attending a two-year college. A back-of-the-
envelope calculation similar to the one above suggests that 5.44 jobs are lost per student
induced to attend community college, according to this result. The instrumental variables
result is large enough to stretch credibility: a 1-percentage point increase in the county
unemployment rate is associated with a 3.8-percentage point (15.3%) increase in the prob-
ability of attending community college. These results imply that most of the new students
who enter two-year colleges in the aftermath of a local unemployment shock are students
who otherwise would not have attended college at all; there is little to no movement out
of four-year schools into two-year schools. Due to the difficulty of interpreting the IV ef-
fect sizes, I will focus on the OLS proxy specification in future sections, and I will discuss
potential biases in Section II.5.1.
II.4.4. Heterogeneity
Table II.8 presents the OLS results for various subgroups. Students who are eligible for
subsidized lunch would be the least likely to be able to pay the sticker price for college on
their own, due to their parents’ low incomes; if charged the full price, they would need to
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borrow, and these students are also the most likely to be credit-constrained. However, these
students are also frequently eligible for need-based grants and scholarships that could reduce
their costs significantly. The results are broadly similar to those in the full sample. A 1-
standard deviation increase in per capita job losses is associated with a 0.2-percentage point
(0.3%) increase in the probability that a subsidized lunch eligible student attends college; this
is the same magnitude as in the overall sample, although it is not statistically significant in
the subsample due to the smaller sample size. Unlike in the full sample, this is largely driven
by four-year attendance; a 1-standard deviation increase in per capita job losses is associated
with a 0.2-percentage point (0.6%) increase in the probability of attending a four-year college,
but a 0.02-percentage point (0.1%) increase in the probability of attending a two-year college.
(Neither is statistically different from zero.) On the other hand, students who are not eligible
for subsidized lunch have slightly different responses to local unemployment shocks. There is
still a small (0.2 percentage points, or 0.3%, significant at the 10% level) increase in overall
college attendance and a somewhat larger (0.5 percentage points, or 2.1%, significant at the
1% level) increase in community college attendance in response to a 1-standard deviation
increase in per capita job losses, but there is a 0.3-percentage point (0.6%) decrease in the
probability of attending a four-year college. Perhaps students eligible for subsidized lunch
have a dimmer view of their labor market prospects without a college education, thus making
their perceived opportunity cost of attending a four-year college lower.
The set of jobs commonly filled by young women with a high school diploma is somewhat
different from the set of jobs commonly held by their male counterparts, and this may result
in different reactions to labor market shocks by men and women. The overall effect on college
attendance among women is positive but not statistically significant; the effect on attendance
at four-year colleges is essentially zero. There is a 0.2-percentage point (0.8%) increase in the
probability that a female graduate attends a two-year college associated with a 1-standard
deviation increase in per capita job losses, which is slightly smaller than the effect in the full
population, although it is significant at the 10% level. In contrast, all results are stronger
for male graduates, including a 0.3-percentage point (0.4%) increase in the probability of
attending any college and a 0.5-percentage point (2%) increase in the probability of attending
community college. Given that many of the jobs that disappeared in these plant closings
and mass layoffs were held by men with high school diplomas, it is not surprising that male
students may be more sensitive to events in this particular sector of the labor market. The
stronger negative coefficient in the specification examining four-year college attendance is
more surprising, but the effect is still not significant at any conventional statistical level, so it
is probably worth less concern. In other results (not shown, available by request), I find that
none of the coefficients are significant for Black students while the results for white students
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mimic those of the overall sample, but this may be due more to differences in sample size
than any differences between students or between their labor markets.
One may also expect that students are affected differently depending on their academic
qualifications and other variables that may determine how likely they would be to attend
college absent any economic shocks. Students with exceptional standardized test scores
would likely be offered scholarships if their families could not pay the bill, and they may
be highly motivated students who do not need the additional external incentive that comes
from a shock to the opportunity cost of college. Meanwhile, students who struggled with
their coursework and standardized tests may be less internally motivated and have areas of
career interest that do not involve college education, and a shock to the opportunity cost of
college may not be enough to induce them to attend. Academic preparation, of course, is
not the only predictor of college attendance; students from wealthier families, for instance,
are more likely to attend college and also are more likely to be able to weather a shock to
family resources. Any effects are likely to be concentrated among students at the margin
between attendance and non-attendance.
To measure this, I run a preliminary OLS regression of four-year college attendance on all
the right-side variables except for job losses. From this, I obtain each student’s predicted
probability of attending a four-year college, which I split into quartiles. I then run Equation
II.2 and its equivalents for two-year and four-year attendance separately for each quartile of
predicted probability of attendance, using the standardized WARN variable as the measure
of job losses. Table II.9 contains the results. As expected, the effects of job losses are con-
centrated among students in the middle of the distribution, who are closest to the margin of
college attendance. In the middle two quartiles, a 1-standard deviation increase in per capita
WARN Act job losses is associated with a 0.4-percentage point increase in the probability of
college attendance, stemming from a 0.4 to 0.5-percentage point increase in the probability
of attending a two-year college. Effects are close to zero and not statistically significant in
the highest and lowest quartiles.
These results combine to show us who the marginal students who are induced into changing
their college choices are, and these students are often the same ones whose labor-market
opportunities changed most drastically as a result of job losses in their communities. A large
percentage of the jobs lost in Michigan during this sample period, particularly in WARN
Act eligible events, were manufacturing jobs at automotive companies or their suppliers.
These jobs were often held by men without college degrees. The logical alternative to these
blue-collar, male-dominated jobs may be a trade such as heating and cooling repair, welding,
or construction management, which may require study at a community college. Accordingly,
there are sizable increases in community-college attendance among boys exposed to more
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job losses. These students are rationally readjusting their human capital development in
response to changes in their labor-market options.
II.4.5. Potential Mechanisms and Other Outcomes
Earlier sections of this paper address the most direct ways that local job losses might influ-
ence students’ postsecondary education choices: shocks to family income and shocks to the
individual-specific return to education. Measuring these requires well more information than
we actually have about individual students; we can make inferences about which effect dom-
inates but cannot isolate each effect. However, there are intermediate outcomes that could
be affected by the plant closings, and these outcomes could also serve as mechanisms for
the effect of job losses on college choice. Students cannot go on to higher education without
finishing high school; they cannot go to four-year colleges without taking a college placement
exam, which is usually the ACT in Michigan. Students’ takeup of these intermediate steps
could determine whether and how they advance to higher education. Additionally, students
could be affected by changes in school funding; if they struggle during their senior year be-
cause of overfilled and underequipped classrooms or if their guidance counselors are forced
to take on additional duties, then this may make the college application process even more
daunting.
Table II.10 presents the results. A 1-standard deviation increase in per capita job losses is
associated with a 0.3-percentage point increase in the probability that a student graduates,
conditional on observables. If the local job market is deteriorating, this makes jobs especially
few and far between for high school dropouts as more-credentialed candidates take the jobs
that they once held. This gives students an incentive to finish high school, and this effect
is indeed visible. Also, a 1-standard deviation increase in per capita job losses in 11th grade
is associated with a 0.5-percentage point decrease in the probability that a student takes
the ACT. This is almost certainly an underestimate of the true effect, considering that the
ACT was mandatory for much of the later part of the sample period. Before the move to
the mandatory ACT, taking one of the college placement exams was costly in terms of both
money and time, and so if a student felt fairly sure that he or she would not be applying to
four-year colleges, he or she would be more likely to skip the ACT. The move toward two-year
attendance (and, in some subsamples, away from four-year attendance) is consistent with
the decline in ACT taking, although we cannot observe whether the students knew ahead of
time that they would not apply to four-year colleges and thus rationally chose not to take
the ACT or whether they were unable to apply to four-year colleges, even if they wanted
to, because they lacked an ACT score. However, the specifications focus on job losses in
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12th grade, which generally occur after the student has taken the ACT (or when it is too
late for him/her to take it), and there is no relationship between 12th grade job losses and
ACT-taking when conditioning for observables. Similarly, there is a significant decline in
per-pupil expenditure after a major job loss shock during the previous school year, but there
is no simultaneous relationship.
Other results (available upon request) indicate that there does not seem to be anything
happening differentially by tuition prices at local community colleges. Marginal students may
be more able to opt into going to college when it is less expensive, and students who otherwise
might have gone to four-year institutions can save more money by attending a community
college instead if tuition at the community college is lower; both of these phenomena imply
a stronger relationship between local job losses and college (particularly community college)
attendance in areas where community college is cheaper. In reality, I find no evidence of such
behavior. Splitting the data set by quartile of local community college tuition and estimating
the equations shown in Tables II.5-II.7 produces no patterns of differential responses by
tuition price. Perhaps marginal students view community college as inexpensive enough
that they are not especially price-sensitive.
II.5 Discussion and Conclusion
II.5.1. Validity and Robustness
There are certainly some pieces of unobserved information that would provide additional
clarity if I were able to incorporate them into the analysis. For instance, the National Student
Clearinghouse data do not contain information on the financial aid that a student receives.
While information about financial aid is certainly not always transmitted effectively to college
applicants (see, for instance, Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 2007), it is not a stretch to say
that some students will at least consider it as they make their college decisions. Generous
need-based aid may explain why there is no decrease in four-year attendance among students
eligible for subsidized lunch; even though these students may be the most credit constrained,
they may be eligible for enough financial aid that tuition at four-year colleges is not much
more expensive than tuition at two-year colleges.
There is also an unobserved heterogeneity among the students who are affected by local
plant closings. Some of them have parents with stable incomes that are undisrupted by local
economic fluctuations; these students see the closed factories out their car windows as they
drive by, but there are no immediate effects on them or their families. For these students,
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the only result of the local economic shock is a change in their expected earnings if they enter
the labor market. Their resources on hand to pay for college do not change. These students
would react very differently from students whose families lost income, up to and including
lost jobs, due to the local shock. The latter group of students now has fewer resources on
hand to pay for college, and we expect credit constraints to be more likely to bind for them.
I cannot distinguish between these types of students, and so any effects that I estimate are
averaging across two very different groups. Perhaps the best available measure of a shock
to a student’s family income is whether he or she is newly eligible for free or reduced-price
lunch; Table II.8 shows that these students are particularly likely to be induced into college
attendance; a 1-standard deviation increase in per capita job losses is associated with a 0.9-
percentage point (1.5%) increase in the probability of attending college, and a 0.8-percentage
point (3%) increase in the probability of attending a two-year college. Credit constraints
appear to bind surprisingly little for this population.
Another threat to validity is the nature of the WARN data. Firms that do not employ
at least 100 workers are not required to file WARN notices; layoffs or closings that result in
fewer than 50 job losses are also not required to be reported. Obviously, densely-populated
areas will have higher concentrations of large firms, while more rural areas will have more
workers working in firms that are too small to be eligible. To provisionally test the degree to
which this matters, I use the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics database to find
the percentage of workers working in firms with fewer than 50 employees in each county, then
run the main specifications again after removing counties with fewer than 30% of private-
sector workers working in firms of sufficient size. This ends up removing five counties, whose
observations make up about 0.5% of the data; coefficients on the job loss variable increase
in size by about 3% after performing this sample restriction. The inclusion of these small
counties biases the full-sample results toward zero.
Furthermore, there are a number of other elements of the college decision process that
I do not observe in the data. If I observe a student from a hard-hit community who has
extraordinarily high test scores and attends a community college, I implicitly assume that
the student is attending community college instead of a four-year school as a response to
the job losses. However, the mechanism through which this takes place is not always clear.
The student could have been accepted at, say, Michigan State and chosen not to attend; she
could have chosen not to even apply to Michigan State for fear that it was too expensive;
she may have even been rejected from Michigan State despite her strong credentials. I do
not observe the set of colleges to which a student is accepted; I have some information on
the set of schools to which the student sends ACT scores, which can serve as a proxy for the
set of schools to which the student applies, but the process in which the student sits down
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with her family at the dinner table and decides which schools she should apply to and which
are out of reach is unobservable to researchers.
Additionally, not every student who starts his or her postsecondary career at a community
college intends to enter the labor market with an associate’s degree. Some community college
students intend to transfer to four-year schools and earn a bachelor’s degree; others do not
intend to graduate at all, but only seek to take a few classes to build their human capital and
train themselves for jobs in a particular field or industry. Spending the first two years at a
less-expensive community college before earning a degree from a four-year school is a rational
response to credit constraints that still enables students to get four years of higher education;
if a student gets an associate’s degree within two years and transfers to a four-year college
immediately afterward, we treat that student as a four-year college student and not as a
two-year college student. However, community college students’ intentions are unobserved
in this data set. Therefore, it is most straightforward to treat community college students
as pursuing an associate’s degree unless they are seen transferring, even though the reality
is significantly more complex.13
While Michigan’s economic experience in the 21st century has been more challenging than
most other states’, providing more variation in the data for the purposes of this study, there is
little that is unique to Michigan that would make this study not replicable in other locations
in the United States. The WARN Act requires all states to report large unemployment shocks
due to plant closings or mass layoffs, so the job loss data should be available throughout the
country. The state’s student data system is generally quite good, complete with a unique ID
that allows linking of records across state databases, but other states are catching up and
placing more emphasis on tracking student data.
II.5.2. Future Research
While this paper as it currently exists may make a valuable contribution to the literature
on the determinants of college attainment and college choice, there is certainly room for
expansion upon its findings. For instance, since the data on job losses are calculated at
the local level, I am careful to phrase the impact of these plant closings as stemming from
local economic shocks, rather than from a direct unemployment shock to the student’s family.
Again, this is still valuable; students’ responses to local economic shocks are worth observing.
However, it cannot accurately estimate the effects of plant closings on their most immediate
victims: the households that had a family member become unemployed. If a data source
13Additional results, available by request, show that there is no effect of local job losses on community
college students’ transferring to four-year colleges in the full sample. There is a positive and significant
effect when the sample is limited to students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch.
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allows for the merging of unemployment insurance filings onto student records (using address
and perhaps last name as match variables), this would enable a much more precise estimation
of the impact of family members’ job losses on college outcomes, similar to what Coelli (2011)
and Oreopoulos et al. (2008) accomplish with Canadian data or the work by Hilger (2015)
using U.S. tax data. There would be flaws in this type of study as well, of course; not
everyone who loses a job files for unemployment benefits, and it is certainly possible that
there are systematic differences between filers and non-filers that could result in a biased
estimate of the effects of unemployment. However, even considering these biases, a match
using unemployment benefits data would allow a more definitive estimate of how students’
college decisions respond to job losses in their own families.
II.5.3. Conclusion
As Michigan’s automotive industry accelerated its decline in the 2000s, a number of factories
throughout the state shut their doors for good, putting thousands of workers out of their
jobs. The contagion from the industry’s downturn spread through the state’s economy,
shuttering grocery stores, hospitals, shopping malls, and small businesses. In a perfect and
frictionless world, high school graduates would likely respond to this by demanding more
education; the opportunity cost of a year in college is low when one’s job prospects are poor,
and education will help a student get a better job if the job market remains in a downturn
after he or she graduates. In reality, things may be more complex; if families are credit-
constrained, they may be unable to help pay for their children’s education after an income
loss. This is particularly pronounced among households headed by high school graduates,
underrepresented minorities, and lower-income families; their children may benefit greatly
from higher education, but they are significantly credit constrained and have less experience
navigating the financial aid system.
In my study of Michigan students’ educational response to local mass unemployment
events, I find evidence that credit constraints matter for the overall population. Students
exposed to economic shocks are more likely to attend two-year colleges and less likely to
attend four-year colleges. If credit constraints did not bind, there would be movement toward
attending four-year colleges in response to local economic shocks; this may or may not come
at the expense of two-year colleges. Interestingly, the result largely goes away when the
population of study is a less-privileged subgroup of Michigan high school graduates; effects
are less significant for Black students or for students eligible for subsidized school lunch.
These students may be eligible for more types of financial aid, whereas the “next-poorest”
students may come from families making too much money to receive much grant aid (or
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subsidized lunch) but not enough to pay for college without borrowing, particularly in the
event of an economic shock. These students are the ones hurt most by credit constraints, as
they are prevented from achieving the optimal level of education in the face of a downturn
in the local labor market.14
If this trend persists, Michigan may see widening income inequality in years to come, as
less-wealthy students are priced out of accessing the education that could help them improve
their situation, despite having the academic credentials required for admission. Meanwhile,
seats at the best universities will remain largely reserved for students from more-privileged
backgrounds who can afford the tuition and who are not credit constrained. These temporary
unemployment shocks may end up having damaging consequences for poorer students’ careers
and for the quality of Michigan’s labor force in the years to come.
14From a glance at some of the more detailed paper WARN notices, the majority of jobs lost in WARN Act-
eligible events in the sample period were in occupations that did not require a four-year degree. Students
are not re-calculating their unconstrained optimum and, in response to local labor market contractions,
choosing less education as their optimal decision.
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II.6 Supplemental Figures
Figure II.1.: Distribution of Plant Closing and Mass Layoff Sizes
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Figure II.2.: Annual Total Job Losses Due to Plant Closings and Mass Layoffs
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Figure II.3.: Geographic Distribution of Plant Closings and Mass Layoffs
Each red marker is a plant closing or mass layoff. Darker red markers are associated with
more jobs lost.
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Figure II.4.: An Empirical Example: Plant Closings in Metropolitan Detroit in 2005-2006
Each blue marker is a plant closing or mass layoff that occurred between September 1,
2005, and August 31, 2006. Darker blue markers are associated with more jobs lost. Blue
markers inside the circle are counted toward the “per capita job losses” measure of a
student who lives at the star and graduates in spring of 2006. Red markers mark the edges
of the circle; they do not correspond to plant closings or mass layoffs.
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Figure II.5.: Distribution of Job Loss Variable
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II.7 Supplemental Tables
Table II.1.: Summary Statistics by Postsecondary Choice
No College 2-Year Only Ever In 4-Year
Standardized State Test Score -0.585 -0.25 0.461
(1.02) (0.877) (0.804)
Percentage Taking ACT 26.4 47.5 87.2
ACT Composite Score 18.6 18.5 22.2
(4.87) (3.9) (4.51)
High-School GPA 2.89 2.9 3.39
(0.74) (0.616) (0.53)
Percentage Female 43.6 48.5 54.6
Percentage Black 17.9 18.2 13.9
Percentage Hispanic 5.15 3.22 1.9
Percentage Asian 1.66 1.35 2.83
Percentage Subsidized Lunch Eligible 37.5 27.7 16.7
Percentage Special Education 19.1 11.9 3.86
Percentage Limited English Proficiency 3.15 2.08 1.13
Percentage in Urban Schools 18.3 18.5 15.4
Percentage in Town/Rural Schools 40.4 35 32.9
Number of Students 30,215 25,543 52,009
Standard deviations in parentheses. Summary tables use only 2006 graduates.
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Table II.2.: Summary Statistics by Population-Adjusted Job Loss Quartile
Lowest Second Third Highest
Standardized State Test Score 0.018 0.08 0.014 -0.114
(0.955) (0.998) (1.01) (1.03)
Percentage Taking ACT 57.7 61.3 65 58.7
ACT Composite Score 21 21.5 21.3 20.5
(4.47) (4.55) (4.95) (4.99)
High-School GPA 3.25 3.27 3.26 3.2
(0.614) (0.629) (0.597) (0.623)
Percentage Female 49.3 49.5 50.4 51.1
Percentage Black 8.11 8.23 22 26.1
Percentage Hispanic 2.82 4.5 2.36 2.85
Percentage Asian 1.11 1.83 2.84 2.83
Percentage Subsidized Lunch Eligible 27.5 21.9 20.2 31.1
Percentage Special Education 11 10.4 8.73 10.1
Percentage Limited English Proficiency 0.704 1.7 2.16 3.16
Percentage in Urban Schools 12.7 13.5 15.7 26.2
Percentage in Town/Rural Schools 66.2 49.5 12.7 13.3
Percentage Attending Any College 70 70.3 75.6 71.9
Percentage Attending 4-Year College 45.3 47.2 53.3 47.1
Number of Students 26,999 26,911 27,340 26,405
Standard deviations in parentheses. Job losses are taken within a 30-mile radius of the
student’s high school, divided by the population living in census tracts within that radius.
Summary statistics use only 2006 graduates.
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Table II.3.: 8th Grade Exam Scores, Full Sample
Math Reading
Standardized WARN, Last 12 Mos. 0.001 -0.005***
(0.003) (0.002)
7th Grade State Exam Score 0.628*** 0.614***
(0.006) (0.002)
Female -0.088*** 0.1***
(0.002) (0.002)
Black -0.267*** -0.114***
(0.008) (0.005)
Hispanic -0.107*** -0.03***
(0.009) (0.007)
Asian 0.309*** 0.124***
(0.023) (0.009)
Subsidized Lunch Eligible -0.173*** -0.107***
(0.004) (0.003)
Limited English Proficiency -0.234*** -0.249***
(0.019) (0.014)
Special Education -0.486*** -0.354***
(0.007) (0.004)
Year Dummies? Yes Yes
School FE & County Trends? Yes Yes
Student Demographics? Yes Yes
R2 0.483 0.546
Number of Observations 1,022,588 695,039
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. Exam year dummies and school-specific
time trends included. “Standardized WARN” variable is the per-capita number of jobs lost
in the preceding year within a 30-mile radius of the student’s home ZIP code in 8th grade,
adjusted so that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is one. The reading exam was
not offered in all years of the sample. * = significant at 0.10 level, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
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Table II.4.: 8th Grade Exam Scores, Students Eligible for Subsidized Lunch
Math Reading
Standardized WARN, Last 12 Mos. 0.002 -0.005**
(0.003) (0.002)
7th Grade State Exam Score 0.585*** 0.599***
(0.006) (0.003)
Female -0.071*** 0.098***
(0.002) (0.002)
Black -0.205*** -0.102***
(0.006) (0.006)
Hispanic -0.063*** -0.012
(0.009) (0.008)
Asian 0.218*** 0.129***
(0.016) (0.014)
Limited English Proficiency -0.186*** -0.233***
(0.02) (0.018)
Special Education -0.383*** -0.344***
(0.006) (0.005)
Year Dummies? Yes Yes
School FE & County Trends? Yes Yes
Student Demographics? Yes Yes
R2 0.418 0.504
Number of Observations 386,093 284,695
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school. Exam year dummies and school-specific
time trends included. “Standardized WARN” variable is the per-capita number of jobs lost
in the preceding year within a 30-mile radius of the student’s home ZIP code in 8th grade,
adjusted so that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is one. The reading exam was
not offered in all years of the sample. * = significant at 0.10 level, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
76
Table II.5.: Effects of Labor Market Shocks on Any College Attendance: Full Sample
Unemployment Rate Standardized WARN IV - WARN for Unemployment
Labor Market Shock, Grade 12 0.003 0.002** 0.032**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.014)
High School State Exam Score 0.138*** 0.14*** 0.137***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Female 0.054*** 0.054*** 0.053***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Black 0.104*** 0.101*** 0.103***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Hispanic -0.045*** -0.049*** -0.045***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Asian 0.007 0.008 0.007*
(0.008) (0.008) (0.004)
Subsidized Lunch Eligible -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.074***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Limited English Proficiency 0.014 0.009 0.013***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005)
Special Education -0.084*** -0.083*** -0.085***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
First Stage 0.513***
(10.1)
First-Stage F Statistic 25.77
R2 0.189 0.191 0.188
Number of Observations 945,759 944,748 944,748
Outcome Mean 0.713 0.713 0.713
“Labor market shock” corresponds to the variable at the top of each respective column. Year dummies, school fixed effects,
and county time trends included. Unemployment rates are measured at the county level. “Standardized WARN” variable is
the per-capita number of jobs lost within a 30-mile radius of the school that the student attends in 11th grade, adjusted so
that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is one. Per capita WARN job losses used as an instrument for the county
unemployment rate during the 12-month period starting in September of the year after a student starts 11th grade for the first
time. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by ZIP code. * = significant at 0.10 level, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
77
Table II.6.: Effects of Labor Market Shocks on Four-Year College Attendance: Full Sample
Unemployment Rate Standardized WARN IV - WARN for Unemployment
Labor Market Shock, Grade 12 0.001 -0.001 -0.006
(0.002) (0.001) (0.015)
High School State Exam Score 0.202*** 0.203*** 0.202***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Female 0.057*** 0.053*** 0.057***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Black 0.098*** 0.095*** 0.098***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
Hispanic -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.038***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Asian 0.047*** 0.051*** 0.047***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Subsidized Lunch Eligible -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.076***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Limited English Proficiency 0.016** 0.013** 0.016***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Special Education -0.044*** -0.037*** -0.044***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
First Stage 0.513***
(10.1)
First-Stage F Statistic 25.77
R2 0.249 0.25 0.249
Number of Observations 945,759 944,748 944,748
Outcome Mean 0.464 0.464 0.464
“Labor market shock” corresponds to the variable at the top of each respective column. Year dummies, school fixed effects,
and county time trends included. Unemployment rates are measured at the county level. “Standardized WARN” variable is
the per-capita number of jobs lost within a 30-mile radius of the school that the student attends in 11th grade, adjusted so
that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is one. Per capita WARN job losses used as an instrument for the county
unemployment rate during the 12-month period starting in September of the year after a student starts 11th grade for the first
time. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by ZIP code. * = significant at 0.10 level, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
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Table II.7.: Effects of Labor Market Shocks on Two-Year College Attendance: Full Sample
Unemployment Rate Standardized WARN IV - WARN for Unemployment
Labor Market Shock, Grade 12 0.001 0.003*** 0.038***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.014)
High School State Exam Score -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.064***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Female -0.003** 0.001 -0.003***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Black 0.006* 0.007* 0.005**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Hispanic -0.008** -0.014*** -0.007**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Asian -0.04*** -0.042*** -0.04***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Subsidized Lunch Eligible 0.002 -0.002 0.002*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Limited English Proficiency -0.002 -0.004 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.005)
Special Education -0.04*** -0.046*** -0.041***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
First Stage 0.513***
(10.1)
First-Stage F Statistic 25.77
R2 0.053 0.051 0.051
Number of Observations 945,759 944,748 944,748
Outcome Mean 0.249 0.249 0.249
“Labor market shock” corresponds to the variable at the top of each respective column. Year dummies, school fixed effects,
and county time trends included. Unemployment rates are measured at the county level. “Standardized WARN” variable is
the per-capita number of jobs lost within a 30-mile radius of the school that the student attends in 11th grade, adjusted so
that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is one. Per capita WARN job losses used as an instrument for the county
unemployment rate during the 12-month period starting in September of the year after a student starts 11th grade for the first
time. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by ZIP code. * = significant at 0.10 level, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
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Table II.8.: OLS Linear Probability Model Results, WARN: Subgroups
Any College Attendance 4-Year Attendance 2-Year Attendance
Students Eligible for Subsidized Lunch 0.002 0.002 0.0002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
[0.596] [0.319] [0.276]
Students Not Eligible 0.002* -0.003** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.764] [0.526] [0.238]
Students Newly Eligible 0.009** 0.001 0.008**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
[0.616] [0.347] [0.269]
Female Students 0.002 -0.001 0.002*
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
[0.753] [0.506] [0.247]
Male Students 0.003** -0.002 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.673] [0.422] [0.252]
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes
School FE & County Trends? Yes Yes Yes
Student Demographics? Yes Yes Yes
Coefficients on “Standardized WARN” variable shown. “Standardized WARN” variable is the per-capita number of jobs lost
within a 30-mile radius of the school that the student attends in 11th grade, adjusted so that the mean is zero and the standard
deviation is one. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by ZIP code; subgroup means in brackets. * = significant at 0.10
level, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
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Table II.9.: Effects by Predicted Probability of Four-Year Attendance
Any College Attendance 4-Year Attendance 2-Year Attendance
Lowest Quartile 0.003 0.001 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
[0.467] [0.166] [0.301]
Second Quartile 0.004* -0.0005 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
[0.696] [0.372] [0.324]
Third Quartile 0.004*** -0.001 0.005***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
[0.83] [0.593] [0.237]
Highest Quartile -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
[0.909] [0.805] [0.104]
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes
School FE & County Trends? Yes Yes Yes
Student Demographics? Yes Yes Yes
Coefficients on “Standardized WARN” variable shown. “Standardized WARN” variable is the per-capita number of jobs lost
within a 30-mile radius of the school that the student attends in 11th grade, adjusted so that the mean is zero and the standard
deviation is one. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by ZIP code; subgroup means in brackets. * = significant at 0.10
level, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01. Students are assigned to a ”predicted” group based a regression of an indicator for attending a
4-year college on all covariates except for job losses; I take predicted values from this and break them into quartiles.
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Table II.10.: Possible Mechanisms for College Effects
Graduation ACT Taking Gr. 12 Per Pupil Expenditure
Prior-Year Standardized WARN 0.003* -0.005** -0.005***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
High School State Exam Score 0.057*** 0.103*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female 0.025*** 0.027*** 0
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Black 0.005* 0.05*** 0.021***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Hispanic -0.021*** -0.007** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Asian -0.02*** 0.014*** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Subsidized Lunch Eligible -0.039*** -0.032*** 0.003**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Limited English Proficiency 0.005 -0.019*** 0.004
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Special Education 0.004 -0.054*** 0
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Year Dummies? Yes Yes Yes
School FE & County Trends? Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.139 0.512 0.913
Number of Observations 944,748 944,748 942,788
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by ZIP code. School and graduation year fixed effects and county-specific time trends
included. “Standardized WARN” variable is the per-capita number of jobs lost in the preceding year within a 30-mile radius of
the student’s home ZIP code, adjusted so that the mean is zero and the standard deviation is one; for ACT taking and per-pupil
expenditure, this is measured in 11th grade. * = significant at 0.10 level, ** = 0.05, *** = 0.01.
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III Teacher Turnover in Michigan Public Schools: A
Descriptive Analysis
III.1 Introduction
Regardless of the quality of the other inputs in a student’s education, teacher quality
remains one of the most crucial components in determining how much a student learns in
school. If teacher quality were distributed randomly throughout the education system, dif-
ferences in teacher effectiveness would be more likely to even out over the course of students’
careers, making it less of a concern in policymakers’ efforts to ensure high-quality education
for all. In reality, though, teacher quality is hardly distributed evenly across schools. Low-
income students, Black students, Hispanic students, students in urban schools, and students
with poor academic preparation all have their socioeconomic disadvantages compounded by
having lower-quality teachers than their white and wealthier peers have (Goldhaber, Lav-
ery, and Theobald 2015; Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2007; Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff
2002). This stands to widen the achievement gaps by race and family income, in spite of
policymakers’ best efforts toward reducing them.
We argue that teacher turnover is at the heart of this story. If teachers have limited
ability to choose their first jobs, they may not stay at their first teaching positions but
continue to search for a job that they prefer until they find a better match. Sometimes
this better match is a job outside the public school system altogether. Given that novice
teachers perform notably worse than teachers with several years of experience (Murnane and
Steele 2007, Clotfelter et al. 2007), if certain schools are systematically losing experienced
teachers, students at these schools will see their academic performance drop accordingly.
Furthermore, if teachers are consistently leaving schools with more disadvantaged students,
this would widen the achievement gap even further.
A thorough study of teacher turnover would also be instructive in explaining the behavior
of teacher labor markets; hiring may be drastically different at various points in the business
cycle. On the labor supply side, during economic booms, there are more jobs available in the
private sector, and thus teachers’ outside options will generally be higher; candidates who
still choose to teach will be either very committed to teaching or “stuck” teaching because
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their outside options are particularly bad. During recessions, the outside options will be
fewer and less lucrative, and more workers will pursue teaching positions. Even if college
students must commit to studying education before observing what economic conditions will
be upon graduation, graduates may pursue jobs in the private sector or in other localities
in response to economic fluctuations. On the demand side, during recessions, there will
more likely be more candidates per job as fewer districts will be hiring, and therefore hiring
schools can be more selective and choose only the best prospective teachers (if they can
identify quality or characteristics associated with it); during booms, schools may not be able
to be so picky and thus might have to hire whatever candidates they can get. If teachers
hired during recessions are more likely to stay in their initial jobs even after the recessions
end, this indicates that schools successfully identify which teachers are the best fits for the
open positions; if teachers hired during booms are more likely to stay, then they are sensitive
to the diminishing value of their outside options as economic conditions worsen.
We use a database of teachers in public and charter K-12 schools in Michigan who start
teaching between 2003-04 and 2011-12 to answer four main questions about the patterns
related to teacher turnover. First: what factors predict the probability that teachers leave
their first jobs within five years of being hired? Second: what factors predict teachers’
choice of a second job, including jobs outside of the Michigan public education system, new
teaching positions in the same school district, and moving across school districts? Third:
how does teacher mobility affect the distribution of teachers across schools, particularly
across socioeconomic levels? Fourth: how do teacher labor markets respond to events in the
business cycle?
We then turn to administrative data from the same schools to look at what happens in
the wake of teacher turnover. All of these concerns about which schools lose teachers would
be overblown if it turns out that these schools are able to replace departed teachers with
instructors of similar quality, resulting in no drop-off in student performance. Matching
annual teacher mobility data with students’ test scores and demographics, we answer three
additional questions about the aftermath of teacher mobility. One: how does student perfor-
mance change after teachers leave? Two: how does this effect differ based on where teachers
go after they leave? Finally, three: do the responses differ based on students’ backgrounds,
paying particular attention to the repercussions of Black students losing Black teachers?
While teacher turnover is a well-worn subject, and we owe much methodologically and
organizationally to studies such as Boyd et al. (2005), Hanushek and Rivkin (2007), and
Hanushek, Rivkin, and Schiman (2016), we believe we have valuable data to add. Michigan
in the late 2000s is a unique setting compared with the literature that largely focuses on
North Carolina, New York, and Texas a few years earlier. With nine cohorts of teachers,
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centered around the late-2000s recession, we observe a full business cycle and how teacher
hiring and mobility may change for teachers hired before, during, and after the economic
downturn (which was especially damaging in Michigan). Furthermore, Michigan has a much
more expansive and laissez-faire charter school sector than most states, in which teachers
can be dismissed more easily and have less-generous salaries and benefits. Methodologically,
most of the work to date on the consequences of teacher turnover assumes a linear response,
which may not be sufficient; schools may be able to handle going from losing 0% of their
teachers to losing 5%, whereas going from losing 15% to losing 20% may be quite damaging as
fewer and fewer people have institutional knowledge and more new teachers must be trained.
We use a fractional polynomial framework in addition to an OLS framework to capture the
full shape of the aftermath of teacher turnover.
Many of our findings will come as no surprise to readers who are well-acquainted with
the existing literature on teacher turnover. As in studies such as Goldhaber et al. (2011),
Hanushek and Rivkin (2007), and Loeb, Darling-Hammond, and Luczak (2005), teachers
are more likely to leave schools with more students who are disadvantaged in some way or
who are seen as “difficult” to teach, including students eligible for subsidized lunch, Black
students and lower-performing students. Teachers in charter schools are more likely to leave
the public school system. Teachers in schools with higher per-pupil expenditures are less
likely to move across districts. Michigan-educated teachers are less likely to leave the public
school system, in line with the Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2005) “draw of home”
hypothesis.
In some ways, the things that we find not to matter are more interesting than the things
that we do find significant. There are no significant mobility differences by gender, not even
into part-time work1, even as more flexible work schedules are growing increasingly popular
among women with children. Teachers in math or science, fields where outside options are
much more lucrative, are only marginally more likely to leave the public schools than teachers
in less-lucrative fields such as English or history. Cohort effects are minimal until a large
short-term program enters the state in 2010, implying that business-cycle fluctuations have
less influence than expected on teachers’ mobility decisions (compare to Oreopoulos, von
Wachter, and Heisz 2012). Similarly, local unemployment rates have almost no effect. The
economic forces that affect teachers’ labor mobility appear to be more unique to teaching.
Turning to the consequences, we find that teacher mobility does predict declines in student
performance, but that those declines are economically small. Students in schools that lose
1Much of the literature does not include part-time or administrative work as an outcome. We argue that
it is relevant and important, as sociological work dating back to Lortie (1977) outlines desirable career
paths in education that do not involve full-time teaching for extended periods of time.
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teachers to other schools, particularly but not exclusively to schools in other districts, see
the most significant fall in test scores afterward; the consequences of losing teachers to the
private sector2, for instance, are modest. Finally, Black students’ math achievement declines
modestly in schools with more turnover among Black teachers, but the results for lagged
turnover are similar enough to the results for upcoming turnover that a causal interpretation
of these estimates is particularly tenuous.
III.2 Literature Review
A number of studies have attempted to determine the factors that predict teacher turnover.
Perhaps the best-known study in this literature is by Boyd et al. (2005), who focus on how
close a teacher’s job is to his or her home town. Using data from the state of New York
between 1998-99 and 2002-03, they find that new teachers are twice as likely to take jobs
within five miles of home as to take jobs between five and 20 miles of home, and that teachers
from the suburbs prefer to stay in their home metropolitan area while teachers from rural
areas tend to stay in rural areas. However, this study necessarily excludes teachers who did
not grow up in New York. The prospect of living in or near New York City may be a draw
to many teachers from out of state, and the New York metropolitan area itself spans state
boundaries.
Numerous studies have looked at the influences of student composition on teachers’ mo-
bility decisions. Most of these concentrate on how teachers react to teaching more poor
students, low-performing students, and students of color, finding that teachers are more
likely to leave schools and districts with more poor students and white teachers in partic-
ular are more likely to leave schools with more Black students. Using a multinomial logit
framework, Goldhaber et al. (2011) find that teachers in North Carolina are more likely
to move within their districts if they teach in low-performing schools, while they are more
likely to transfer to other districts if they teach more Black students or more poor students.
Hanushek and Rivkin (2007) find similar patterns in Texas, showing that the average teacher
has 2% fewer Black students, 4.4% fewer Hispanic students, and 6% fewer students eligible
for subsidized lunch in his or her second school as in his or her first school. Loeb, Darling-
Hammond, and Luczak (2005) use a teacher survey to decouple student characteristics from
administrative characteristics, finding that some of the effect of teaching more Black or poor
students actually can be attributed to poor facilities, old textbooks, and large class sizes,
2Our term for leaving the Michigan public school system. These teachers could also have left to teach in a
public school in another state or in a private school.
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which are disproportionally found in schools with more disadvantaged students; however,
even controlling for these working conditions, teachers are still significantly more likely to
leave schools with more Black or more poor students.
An understanding of the distributional effects of teacher placements and turnover is im-
portant. Lankford et al. (2002) find that teachers who leave their first jobs in New York are
more qualified than those who stay, based on college selectivity, certifications, and advanced
degrees. Goldhaber et al. (2011) look at teaching effectiveness, as measured by value added,
instead of pre-service qualifications, and find the opposite; teachers who stay in their initial
placements have higher value added than those who leave. Boyd et al. (2011) find both of
these results simultaneously in the New York City system. Schools have some ability to iden-
tify good teachers, based on both pre-service qualifications and teaching effectiveness; they
also prefer teachers who live nearby, as Boyd et al. (2013) show. Even so, urban schools are
at a disadvantage due to their late hiring periods, when their top targets have often already
taken jobs (Levin and Quinn 2003).
Policymakers have attempted to address teacher turnover in a few ways, some of which have
been evaluated rigorously. Hansen, Backes, and Brady (2016) look at Teach For America’s
concentrating its Miami-area teaching corps in a few schools after years of spreading them
more widely through the district; using a difference-in-difference framework, they find that
the clustering made corps teachers more likely to stay in their first school after their first
year, although it had no effect on mobility after their two-year commitment. Increased
salaries, of course, can help keep teachers in their schools; Miller (2012) finds that salaries
lag particularly in rural schools, and these schools suffer most from turnover, while Springer,
Swain, and Rodriguez (2015) see some positive effects from retention bonuses paid to effective
teachers in tested subjects in low-performing schools. Accountability policy seeks to weed
out ineffective teachers while retaining effective ones; Sun, Saultz, and Ye (2017) are able
to separate teachers who leave voluntarily from teachers who are removed by their schools,
finding that No Child Left Behind induced a slight increase in involuntary transfers from
economically disadvantaged schools.
Some studies have also examined the repercussions of teacher turnover, finding mixed re-
sults. Hanushek and Rivkin (2007) find that teachers who move across districts are similarly
effective to teachers who stay in their first jobs, whereas teachers who move within a district
are less effective than their colleagues who stay. Hanushek, Rivkin, and Schiman (2016)
account carefully for endogenous and nonrandom sorting of teachers and students, finding
negative effects of teacher turnover (focused in low-achieving schools) despite worse teachers
leaving the profession; the result stems from how experienced teachers are reallocated in the
wake of turnover. Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2013) use a fixed-effects strategy to look at
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within-school-year variation by grade and within-school-grade variation by year, also find-
ing negative effects of turnover concentrated in schools with more low-achieving and Black
students. Adnot et al. (2016) find positive effects from turnover induced by accountability
methods; students perform better in schools where teachers were forced out, whereas the
effects of non-penalized teaching on student performance are negative but insignificant.
III.3 Data
III.3.1. Predictors
To determine what factors predict teacher mobility, we use administrative data from 2003
to 2017 for all Michigan public schools. Specifically, we use personnel data merged with
school-level and student-level data for the school in which each employee spent the most
time working in each year. This data set makes it possible to analyze the characteristics of
schools and teachers associated with mobility in Michigan public schools.
Our analytic sample includes all teachers hired into Michigan public schools between the
fall of 2003 and fall of 2011. We restrict this sample to those who were initially hired as
full-time teachers, defined as those with at least 1.0 FTE3 in teaching assignments for the
school year. In other words, any employees who began working in Michigan public schools as
part-time teachers or in any assignment other than teaching are not included in the analysis.
We further restrict our sample to teachers who accepted their first job at a school that
remained open for five years thereafter4. By doing so, our analysis of teacher mobility is
restricted to mobility by choice — either on the part of the teacher or the school — rather
than by force.
The main data set is a panel of the first five years after the date of hire for each teacher in
the analytic sample. To carry out our analysis, we create a balanced data set at the teacher-
year level. We assign teachers who worked in multiple schools during a single year to the
school where they worked most often. In cases where teachers split their time exactly evenly
between two schools, we break ties randomly. For teachers who did not work in the Michigan
public school system in a particular year, we create an indicator to note their absence. For
analyses of factors associated with where teachers accept their second full-time teaching job,
we limit our sample to teachers who accepted another job within five years of their initial
date of hire.
3“FTE” stands for “full time equivalent”; a teacher with an FTE of 1 teaches the same amount as a full-time
teacher, while a teacher with an FTE of 0.5 teaches half as many hours as a full-time teacher.
4This removes 1.9% of teachers from the sample.
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If the lowest grade that a teacher teaches during a given year is ninth grade or higher, we
define that teacher as a secondary school teacher; all other teachers are defined as elementary
school teachers. We define hiring cohorts based on the spring of the first academic year that
the teacher works in Michigan public schools; teachers first found in the data in the 2006-2007
school year are assigned to the 2007 cohort.
To analyze teacher mobility outcomes, we create indicators to specify teachers’ employment
status in Michigan public schools in each year for five years after their initial date of hire.
The primary outcome of interest is whether or not teachers were in the same job at the same
school where they were originally hired. This outcome is then broken down by type of move:
teachers can move within their first districts, move to full-time teaching jobs in different
districts, leave the Michigan public school system, or move to part-time or administrative
jobs in the public schools. We also break down moves by how economically disadvantaged
the student body of the teacher’s second school is, using the fraction of students eligible for
free or reduced-price lunch (FRPL) and whether the school is eligible for Title I funding.
III.3.2. Aftermath
To determine what effects teacher turnover might have on student achievement, we continue
to use administrative data from the Michigan Department of Education and its partners,
creating a student-year level panel matched to school-year level aggregate measures of teacher
mobility. We begin with all teachers employed in Michigan public schools from 2003-04
through 2015-16, determining each teacher’s “main school” the same way that we do in
Section III.3.1 and measuring the same mobility outcomes: leaving one’s school at all, moving
to a school in another district, moving to a school in the same district, taking a part-time or
non-teaching job in the Michigan public schools, and leaving the school system entirely. We
mark teachers who leave the system and do not return as retiring if they are above 55 years
old at the time that they leave. Teachers who leave the system temporarily and return to
the same school are assumed to be on parental leave and are not coded as changing jobs.
One key difference between this sample and the sample used in the “predictors” sections
of the paper is that we do not limit the set of teachers to include only those in their first
five years of employment. While we as researchers are particularly interested in the initial
placements of teachers and how those initial placements can influence teachers’ choices of
whether and where to take a new job, there is no immediate reason to believe that students’
success is only influenced by the mobility of early-career teachers.
Once we have the mobility decision of each teacher in the system, we collapse the data
to the school-year level to determine the fraction of teachers who leave each school in each
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year, including the fraction of teachers who make each individual mobility decision (e.g.
how many teachers at Central High School left for the private sector, how many teachers
at Lincoln Elementary School moved to a different school district). We match this school-
year level data to student-year level administrative records containing individual students’
demographic information, test scores, and the school in which they spent the most time in
the given year. This leaves us with a student-year panel with school-year level turnover for
each school that a student attends. The panel structure of this data set allows us to include
students’ prior test scores as predictors of their current ones. We also merge this panel
onto the school-level data that we use in the “predictors” section, allowing us to control for
environmental factors that could influence both teacher departures and student outcomes.
III.3.3. Descriptive Statistics
Table III.1 shows some characteristics of all teachers (regardless of date of hire) in Michigan
public schools in the 2015-16 school year by FRPL eligibility quartile. A few characteristics of
this distribution are especially important in motivating our work on teacher turnover. First,
teacher race is unevenly distributed across Michigan public schools. In particular, Black
teachers predominantly teach in schools with high FRPL. 17.1% of teachers in the poorest
schools are Black, compared with only 1.2% of teachers in the wealthiest schools. Second,
beginning teachers were also disproportionately concentrated among teachers who teach in
the poorest schools. Among the quarter of teachers who work in the poorest schools, 16.1%
have 3 or fewer years of experience. Among the quarter of teachers who work in the least
poor schools, however, only 7.4% have 1-3 years of experience. Given such inequalities, we
explore the extent to which the initial placement of teachers and their early-career mobility
might shape the distribution of teachers in Michigan public schools.
Table III.2 looks at the initial placement of teachers in our analysis sample (in other words,
teachers hired between fall 2003 and fall 2011), again separating them by quartile of FRPL
eligibility. The patterns shown in Table III.1 are also present in Table III.2, despite the
different time frames in the respective samples. Specifically, disparities in terms of race,
degree attainment, and selectivity of undergraduate institution between teachers who work
in schools with high FRPL compared to teachers who work in schools with lower FRPL
appear in the initial placement of teachers in Michigan public schools. Given how closely
disparities in Table III.2 match those in Table III.1, the effect of teacher turnover may look
minimal; however, it is notoriously difficult to predict teacher quality based on observable
characteristics (see, for example, Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2007), so this churn of teachers
with similar qualifications may mask differences in unobservable measures of motivation
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and skill. Furthermore, the fact that low-qualification teachers are replaced by other low-
qualification teachers can further disadvantage schools that are already disadvantaged by
the distribution of teachers’ initial placements.
Table III.3 ties together the lessons found in Tables III.1 and III.2, presenting charac-
teristics of teachers and their assignments in the 2015-16 school year, separated by how
long ago they were hired. While there are minimal differences in the fraction of teachers
who are highly qualified across experience levels, and the fraction with a master’s degree
largely differs as a function of age and time (as many teachers earn their master’s degrees
after they begin teaching), there are noticeable differences in the settings in which novice
and experienced teachers work. The average teacher with one year of experience works in
a school with 31.8% Black students and 60.7% poor students; the average teacher with ten
years of experience works in a school with 19.3% Black students and 47.8% poor students.
Disadvantaged students are disproportionally exposed to teachers with less experience on
the job.
Table III.4 contains descriptive statistics related to teacher mobility events during the first
five years of teachers’ careers. After the first year of teaching, 77.5% of teachers continued
working in their initial jobs, and 10.9% of teachers left Michigan public schools. The re-
maining teachers continued to work in Michigan public schools in some capacity. For these
teachers, a full-time teaching job within their original district was the most common mobil-
ity event. After five years from the date of hire, 42.6% of teachers remained in their initial
job, and 23.6% had left Michigan public schools. 26.1% of teachers had accepted a full-time
teaching job in a different school by five years since their date of hire, and the majority of
these teachers had moved to a job outside their original school district.
Given that our sample of teachers spans significant change in Michigan’s economic con-
ditions, variation in teacher mobility events may occur among cohorts. Table III.5 contains
descriptive statistics of teacher mobility events by cohort. These statistics suggest that,
unconditional on any other relevant factors, teacher mobility events were roughly constant
among cohorts until the 2010-2012 period, when far fewer teachers continued to teach full-
time in their first schools for five years. One contributing factor to these changes is the
introduction of Teach for America (TFA) to the Detroit area, which began with the 2010-
11 school year (Teach for America n.d.). Teach for America has sent over 800 teachers to
Detroit since 2010, most of whom were on two-year commitments to their schools. In the
cohorts that include TFA teachers, more teachers leave for other school districts and the
private sector than in the pre-2010 cohorts.
One concern about teacher mobility is that these events can disproportionately affect
disadvantaged students. Descriptive statistics in Table III.6 indicate that evidence may
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support this concern. As seen in Tables III.4 and III.5, roughly 45% of teacher continued
working in their initial job five years after their date of hire, but not all schools retain teachers
at the same rate. Schools with the fewest economically disadvantaged students had 53.4%
of the teachers they hired continue working in the same school and same job five years after
the original date of hire. Schools with the most economically disadvantaged students, on the
other hand, had 27.3% of the teachers they hired continue working in the same school and
same job five years later. Each of the other teacher mobility events also provide evidence of
legitimate concern that economically disadvantaged students have borne the largest burden
of teacher mobility.
III.4 Predictors Methodology
There are numerous factors that may contribute to teachers’ mobility decisions. Some
of these are impossible to observe directly with school administrative data (for instance, a
teacher’s spouse may find a job in another state, causing the teacher to move to that state
and thus leave the Michigan public school system), but many factors such as teacher age
and school size are observable. Furthermore, if teachers generally seek to leave schools with
difficult working conditions and struggling students, we can observe this through variables
such as the school’s per-pupil instructional expenditure or the school’s relative performance
on state standardized tests. Combining all these factors, we can get a fuller picture of what
drives teachers to leave their first job, and even what drives them to make particular types
of moves. The teachers who leave their first job to take a new job in a school in a poor
district may be very different from the teachers who leave the teaching profession after their
first job.
We can think of a teacher’s mobility decision, Yist, as a function of six types of factors:
(III.1) Yist = f(Dst, Ps, Zst, Gst, Xi, Ci)
Variables contributing to the mobility decision of teacher i, who accepted a full time teach-
ing position at school s, after t years since the initial date of hire, are grouped into five broad
categories. The first set of factors, Dst, measures the demographics of the student body of
the initial school. Some teachers prefer not to teach in schools with more poor students
or students of color, whether this is due to the teachers’ own prejudices or the inequitable
distribution of resources and working conditions across schools (Hanushek & Rivkin 2007).
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Additionally, teachers may find students with unique needs, such as English language learn-
ers and special education students, to be more challenging to teach and may seek a less
difficult environment. Our demographic variables include the fractions of students who are
Black, Hispanic, enrolled in special education, English language learners, and economically
disadvantaged5.
The second set of factors, Pst, is the academic performance of students at school s, which we
measure as of the time that the teacher is hired. We break the school’s average standardized
score in all state tests in the given year into quintiles, using the first (lowest) quintile as the
reference group. Teachers may be frustrated by teaching low-performing students and may
seek to leave low-performing schools. Additionally, low-performing schools frequently have
administrative turmoil and other concerns that may make a teacher want to leave.
Third, Zst represents characteristics of the teacher’s first school, including whether the
school is a charter, whether it is a high school, its per-pupil expenditure, and its change in
enrollment during the five years after the teacher begins working there. Teachers in charter
schools have fewer protections and lower pay than their counterparts in traditional public
schools. Teachers in high schools may have more lucrative outside options, because there is
more emphasis on subject mastery in high school teaching than in earlier grades, and this is
more transferrable to the private sector. Schools with higher expenditures may pay teachers
better or provide superior working conditions. Schools in which enrollment is declining may
lay off or reassign teachers in response to the smaller student body.
Gst represents the characteristics of the area in which the school is located, including
whether it is a city or a rural area, local unemployment rates, and the average per-pupil
expenditures of schools in the surrounding county. Teachers in urban or suburban areas,
in which other schools with job openings are more numerous, may feel more comfortable
leaving their jobs than teachers in rural areas, who might need to move in order to take a
new job. If unemployment is high, teachers may not want to leave teaching and face the
open labor market. High expenditures in surrounding schools are a sign of a strong labor
market and good working conditions in other nearby schools, both of which may tempt a
teacher to leave his or her job.
The fifth set of factors, Xi, is the teacher’s personal characteristics. We include demo-
graphics, such as age, gender, and race; qualifications, such as whether the teacher has a
masters degree, a degree from a selective college, or highly qualified status under No Child
Left Behind; indicators for whether the teacher teaches math, science or special education;
5“Economic disadvantage” is measured by eligibility for free or reduced-price school lunch. CEPI replaced
this variable with a broader variable that includes direct certification for state aid beginning with the
2013-14 school year, which is after the end of our sample period.
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and an indicator for whether the teacher attended college in Michigan. Younger teachers
may feel less established in their communities and more comfortable leaving. Female teachers
may be more likely to move to part-time teaching for family purposes. Teachers in certain
fields that are in high demand, such as special education or high-school math, may have
more opportunities to leave than teachers in other fields; math or science teachers are also
likely to have more lucrative options in the private sector. Teachers who attended college in
Michigan may feel more loyalty to their communities, while teachers who attended selective
universities or have master’s degrees are likely to have more job opportunities, both in and
out of teaching.
Finally, teachers who entered the profession in each cohort Ci face different labor mar-
kets and opportunities. Our sample includes teachers who began teaching in 2003-04 (our
reference group), when the labor market in Michigan was robust; the sample also includes
teachers who started in 2008-09 — at the depth of the U.S. recession and the automotive
crisis which crippled Michigan’s economy. As the economy and labor market struggled,
teachers had fewer opportunities to find employment both in and out of the profession. At
the same time, struggling districts may have laid off teachers in the leanest years.
We attempt to control for as many factors as possible, but some variables remain unob-
served. For instance, teachers may relocate in order to accommodate a spouse’s new job6,
but we do not observe marital status in the data; as older people are more likely to be
married, this may bias the coefficient on age downward in the main specification. Similarly,
we do not observe distance to home directly; therefore, white teachers who are moving away
from urban schools with more Black students may not be reacting specifically to the racial
composition of the school or the urban environment, but instead may be looking to move
closer to where they were raised (Michigan is the third-most segregated state in the country
during the sample period; see Frey and SSDAN, n.d.), and this would bias the coefficients
on the race and urbanicity variables downward in the main specification for these teachers.
We also do not observe whether teacher turnover is driven by the supply side or the
demand side; that is, whether teachers are leaving of their own accord or being pressured
to leave by the school. Some factors may have similar effects on both the supply side and
the demand side; for instance, schools with more poor students are frequently in financial
challenges and are looking to cut or reallocate teachers, but teachers may also leave these
schools voluntarily due to the poor working conditions. However, on other factors, such as
teacher qualifications, the supply and demand sides pull in opposite directions. Schools will
want to keep their most qualified teachers if at all possible, but the most qualified teachers
6Stinebrickner (2001) observes marital status and incorporates it into the model, which is rare in this
literature.
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are also the ones who can get new jobs most easily, so they have more opportunities to leave
even when their employers want them to stay. This will bring the net effect of these factors
closer to zero.
We begin with a multinomial logit specification, in which our outcome is the teacher’s
employment status in the fifth year of the data. The base case is that the teacher remains in
his or her first job full-time in the fifth year; the alternative outcomes are that he or she moves
to a different full-time teaching job in the same district, moves to a different full-time teaching
job in the same district, transitions to a part-time or non-teaching position (regardless of
school or district), and leaves the Michigan public school system entirely. Teachers whose
first schools closed less than five years after the teacher was hired are removed from the
sample; we aim to study teacher turnover, not school closing, and the repercussions of each
are somewhat different. All school and student characteristics are measured in the teacher’s
first school at the time that he or she was hired, unless explicitly labeled otherwise. We also
include missing indicators for any variables that are ever missing in our data set. Standard
errors are clustered at the school level.
The interpretations of most of the covariates are fairly straightforward. The most inter-
esting coefficients shed light on the labor markets in which these teachers are participating.
For instance, teachers with advanced degrees or bachelor’s degrees from selective colleges are
likely to be highly sought-after candidates for other jobs, both in and outside of the Michi-
gan public school system. If these teachers are more likely to stay in their first job despite
these prevalent outside options, it demonstrates that these teachers are either particularly
dedicated to teaching or they can choose a first job that is a particularly good fit for them.
The story behind the coefficients on the recession-era cohort dummies is similar. Michigan’s
economy was in a deep slump in 2007-2009. Because private-sector jobs were few and far
between, any available jobs were likely to draw more applicants than usual, and not all
applicants for teaching jobs were necessarily highly committed to teaching. A positive coeffi-
cient on the recession cohort dummies would indicate that many people leapt at the first job
available with little intent to stay at it, or even to stay in the teaching sector; they moved on
to other jobs as soon as the economy improved and these jobs became available. Conversely,
a negative coefficient on these dummies would indicate that schools could screen candidates
effectively, choosing the best fits from the large applicant pool and getting teachers who will
continue teaching at their schools for years.
This specification helps us to answer several questions about the data. For instance, we can
gain further insights about the role of teachers’ outside options. Teachers with a background
in science or math are likely to have lucrative outside options in engineering or health;
if these teachers are more likely to leave the public school system, these outside options
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are important. Outside options also respond to local unemployment rates; as the local
unemployment rate rises, the expected value of the outside option decreases as fewer jobs
are available. If teachers are more likely to stay put in response to increases in unemployment
rates, then this also demonstrates the importance of the outside option.
We also estimate another multinomial logit specification in which we separate moving to
economically disadvantaged schools from moving to non-disadvantaged schools7. There is
an extensive literature about the disparity in teacher quality between poorer and wealthier
schools (Goldhaber et al. 2015, Clotfelter et al. 2006), so by treating movement to an
economically disadvantaged school8 as a separate outcome from movement to a wealthier
school, we can determine which types of teachers are willing to leave their first job and take
a job in a poor school. Under the practice referred to by Bridges (1991) as “the dance of the
lemons”, low-performing or underqualified teachers move from one poor school to another,
often within the same district, because they cannot easily be fired. If this pattern holds in
Michigan, then teachers who do not have master’s degrees or are not highly qualified under
the standards of No Child Left Behind will be more likely to move to poor schools or leave
teaching than to move to non-poor schools or stay put. Similarly, teachers coming from
schools with many low-income or low-performing students will be more likely to move to
poor schools or leave teaching. On the other hand, teachers may also move to seek better
working conditions and students who they deem “easier” to teach, and this would induce
teachers in economically disadvantaged schools to try to leave for wealthier districts.
III.5 Predictors Results
Table III.7 presents results from the primary multinomial logit specification. All results
are relative risk ratios, in which the base case is that the teacher remains in his or her first
job five years after beginning to teach in the Michigan public school system. Standard errors
are clustered by the teachers first school.
Several measures of student disadvantage are highly correlated with teacher turnover.
Teachers with more Black students are more likely to take full-time jobs in other schools,
regardless of district, and more likely to leave the public school system. Teachers with
more economically disadvantaged students are more likely to leave their district, either for
7Leaving the public school system remains in the model as an third option for the outcome variable.
8We define a school as “economically disadvantaged” if at least 30% of its students are eligible for free
or reduced-price lunch in the first year that we observe that school in the data. This allows for a
definition of economic disadvantage that is not time-dependent, which is important given the business
cycle fluctuations during the sample period. The 30% threshold follows the definition used by the federal
government to determine Title I eligibility.
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a teaching job in another district or for a job outside the public school system. A 10-
percentage point increase in the fraction of subsidized lunch eligible students is associated
with a 13.7% increase in the probability of moving to another district and a 3.5% increase
in the probability of leaving the public school system; the pattern is somewhat reversed for
an increase in the fraction of students who are Black, as a 10-point increase is associated
with an 11.3% increase in the probability of leaving public schools and an 8.9% increase
in the probability of moving to another district. Teachers with students who scored better
on standardized tests are less likely to leave for other districts or the private sector. As
Hanushek and Rivkin (2007), along with others, find, the students who would benefit most
from an effective and experienced teacher, but who are deemed most difficult to teach, are
most likely to lose their teachers due to turnover.
Charter schools seem to exhibit particularly high rates of teacher turnover; charter teachers
are 61% more likely to move to new districts than non-charter teachers and 87% more likely to
leave for the private sector. High school teachers also are highly likely to leave, although their
differences from elementary-school teachers are not quite as stark as those between charter
and traditional public-school teachers: 28% increases in both the probability of moving to
a new district and the probability of leaving for the private sector. With the exception
of within-district moves (which are frequently impossible because charters are usually one-
school “districts” and many public school districts have only one high school), teachers
in these settings are significantly more likely to leave for any other position. Teachers in
urban schools are more likely to take jobs in other schools within the same district (perhaps
because of the large district sizes), while teachers in rural schools are less likely to move across
districts. Increases in enrollment are associated with an increased likelihood of moving to
another district or moving to a part-time or non-instructional job. Local economic variables,
such as school expenditures and unemployment, are less predictive than one might expect.
Most teacher characteristics are predictive of at least some types of movement, although
only teaching special education predicts turnover of all types, regardless of destination.
Race, gender, and age are less predictive than one might expect; interestingly, there are
no significant differences by gender in the probability of moving to a part-time or non-
instructional position (or anywhere else). Another surprising result is that teachers in math
and science are only marginally more likely to leave for a position in the private sector (or any
position outside the Michigan public school system) than teachers of English, social studies,
or elementary education. Teachers with master’s degrees or degrees from selective colleges
are more likely to take part-time or non-instructional jobs (perhaps in administration) or
leave the public school system, while teachers who are highly qualified according to No Child
Left Behind or attended college in Michigan are the opposite.
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Differences by cohort9 are unclear. The probability of changing districts appears to have
increased with time, although this does not follow any business-cycle pattern. For the most
part, with the exception of the last two cohorts (which go in very different directions),
there are no cohort-level differences on the probability of leaving the teaching profession,
undermining the hypotheses about who attempts to enter teaching (and who is hired) at
different points in the business cycle. Teachers who entered in 2010-11 are 32% more likely
to leave for a new district, 38% more likely to move to a part-time or administrative position,
and 26% more likely to move to the private sector than those who entered in 2003-04; on the
other hand, teachers who entered in 2011-12 are also (86%) more likely to move to a new
district, but they are 35% less likely to move to a part-time or administrative position and
66% less likely to move to the private sector than their counterparts in the 2003-04 cohort.
The interpretation of these results is unclear, but fascinating. Michigan was not in a dras-
tically different part of the business cycle in 2010-11 than in 2011-12. The entrance of Teach
for America into Michigan in 2010-11 explains some of the volatility, as its teachers were
hired on two-year contracts with the intention of moving to other positions (often outside
of teaching) after their two-year commitments; however, preliminary results (available upon
request), imply that the differences in turnover are not driven solely by the Detroit area,
where TFA was focused. Other potential explanations for the cohort effects include changes
in teacher training over time, changes in norms about job switching, changes in the appeal
of education as a career, differences in union strength, and new policies regarding teacher or
school accountability. Testing for these effects is very difficult and any explanation would be
very speculative.
Table III.8 divides new jobs in the Michigan public schools by economic disadvantage
(marked by the new school being eligible for Title I funding) rather than by district. The base
case is staying in one’s first job; leaving for the private sector is also a possible outcome. Not
surprisingly, teachers in schools with more economically disadvantaged students are much
more likely to take new jobs in poor schools. Teachers with more Black students are more
likely to leave for any new job, regardless of how well-off the new school is. Teachers with
higher-achieving students are much less likely to take new jobs in disadvantaged schools.
Teachers in rural areas are less likely to take jobs in non-disadvantaged schools, while
teachers in urban areas are more likely to leave the public school system. Teachers in
charter schools are less likely to take new teaching jobs regardless of student socioeconomic
status but more likely to leave the school system; relationships for high school teachers
are somewhat similar but there are much smaller differences in their probability of taking
a job in a disadvantaged school. With the exception of enrollment change, which induces
9All cohort results are compared against teachers who entered during the 2003-04 academic year.
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movement across schools regardless of student disadvantage, any relationships with local
economic variables are minimal. This is largely true for the teacher characteristics and the
cohort effects as well; fairly few of them have consistent differential effects across student
disadvantage. The sharp exception is for Black teachers: they are far less likely (about 60%)
to take new jobs in non-poor schools and more likely (about 37%) to take them in poor
schools. This reinforces the initial placement results from Table III.2, and deserves much
more examination in a separate study.
Tables III.9 and III.10 test for robustness, particularly regarding effects operating through
changes in the composition of the teaching force. Table III.9 estimates the same specification
as Table III.7 but without the teacher characteristics; Table III.10 separates the 2007-08
and 2008-09 cohorts from the others to see if schools had vastly different hiring practices
during the recession compared to before it. Labor economics papers such as Oreopoulos,
von Wachter and Heisz (2012) and Altonji, Kahn, and Speer (2016) find long-term negative
effects on wages for employees who graduated during recessions; Oreopoulos et al. (2012) find
that more advantaged graduates can recover more quickly by switching firms (or switching
school districts, in our case). Different types of people may enter teaching as economic
conditions change as well. The results in these tables are broadly similar to those in Table
III.7, suggesting that the results are not driven by compositional changes.
Appendix Table III.14 separates the factors associated with mobility outcomes for teachers
with different levels of pre-service qualifications, to see if teachers with more items on their
re´sume´s have different options in the labor market. We include three observable factors
that may make a teacher appear more qualified: a master’s degree, a bachelor’s degree
from a selective institution, and “highly qualified” status under NCLB, and we estimate
results separately for teachers who satisfy zero, one, and two or more of these criteria10.
Two results stand out. One is that Black teachers who fit none of the criteria are much
less likely than white teachers who fit none of the criteria to get teaching jobs in new
districts and much more likely to move to part-time positions. This is not true for teachers
who fit one or more of the criteria, suggesting that districts have less patience for Black
teachers with weak re´sume´s than their white counterparts and limit their opportunities
for new jobs disproportionately to part-time and non-instructional positions. The other
fascinating result is that teachers with two or more pre-service qualifications (who must
either have a master’s degree or a degree from a prestigious college) are almost unaffected by
the fraction of economically disadvantaged students in their schools, with only a marginally-
significant positive relationship between the fraction of poor students and the probability of
moving to a new district. The relationships between the socioeconomic status of the student
10If a teacher satisfies one of them, it is almost always the NCLB status.
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body and teacher turnover are much stronger for almost all outcomes for teachers with fewer
pre-service qualifications. This result suggests that these highly-educated teachers are less
intimidated by teaching disadvantaged students and chose to do so intentionally, rather than
as a stopping point before getting a “better” job with wealthier students. However, this is
tempered by the disparities in initial placements, as more-qualified teachers are often placed
into wealthier schools, so perhaps we are showing more that teachers with stronger pre-
service qualifications are more effectively able to self-select and teach the students that they
want.
To ensure that there is nothing unique about five-year mobility, we estimate the same
specification shown in Table III.7 separately for mobility in the second, third, and fourth year
after hire, with results shown in Appendix Tables III.15-III.17. Results are largely similar
regardless of the year studied. 76% of significant coefficients in Table III.7 are significant
in the same direction in the fourth-year specification; 57% are significant in the third-year
specification, and 48% are significant in the second-year specification. Important predictors
such as the fraction of students eligible for subsidized lunch, the fraction of Black students
in the school, and whether a teacher attended college in Michigan are consistent across time
horizons.
III.6 Aftermath Methodology
The main outcomes that we study are students’ standardized test scores in math and
reading. The simplest specification measures the relationship between the fraction of teachers
who left the student’s school and the student’s test score in the given subject:
(III.2) TestScoreist = f(FracLeavingst)
Of course, many characteristics of a school (both observed and unobserved) are corre-
lated with teacher turnover; that is one of the major points of this study. Many of these
characteristics are also correlated with student performance. Schools with poor working con-
ditions such as outdated textbooks, crumbling facilities, and overworked support staff will
hold back student learning just as they push teachers to leave. We deal with these biases in
two ways. First, we control for the school-level and geographic characteristics that predict
teacher turnover (D, P , Z, and G, in the language of Section III.4). What remains is the
effect of losing teachers, conditional on many of the factors that may lead them to leave.
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Second, because some factors that affect both teacher turnover and student performance are
unobserved or unquantifiable, we use the turnover that occurs after the year of observation
to perform a falsification test. These teachers have not yet left the school, but they and
their students have been exposed to the working conditions that may induce turnover, and
that will be observed in students’ scores. If the relationship between the turnover from the
previous summer (“lagged” turnover) and student performance is stronger than the one with
the next summer’s turnover (“future” turnover), then there is likely to be a true effect of
turnover on student achievement that is not driven solely by other variables.
How students may react to teachers leaving, conditional on the working conditions and
other factors that encourage them to leave, depends on the type of human capital that makes
teachers effective. If teaching effectiveness is driven largely by firm-specific human capital,
in which teachers need skills specific to their schools to be successful, then teacher turnover
may be very damaging, as teachers who have accumulated this human capital are replaced
by teachers with none. Firm-specific human capital in the teaching case may refer to under-
standing of the school’s mission and curriculum, good relationships with administration and
parents, and understanding of the lives and needs of the unique group of students at a par-
ticular school. If instead the human capital needed for effective teaching is industry-specific
and acquired on the job, then the effect of losing teachers depends on who replaces them; if
a teacher with three years of experience leaves and is replaced by one with twelve years of
experience (spent at other schools), then this could actually improve student outcomes as
the new teacher will have learned more of the skills necessary to teach effectively. Industry-
specific human capital in this case may include things such as experience making lesson
plans, dealing with uncooperative students, and balancing lectures with activities. Finally,
if teaching effectiveness is driven by an innate intelligence and ability that is not unique to
teaching and not acquired with experience, then the effect of teacher turnover on student
achievement would depend on which teachers leave, how well schools can identify this ability,
and whether the composition of the teaching force changes. Replacing experienced teachers
with novices would not inherently cause a problem in this scenario; some schools may lose
their best teachers to other schools, while others may be particularly adept at identifying
and hiring the most promising candidates for openings.
There is no reason to believe that students’ response to teacher turnover is linear in the
fraction of teachers who leave. Students may be very resilient to modest levels of churn but
begin to suffer greatly once the turnover reaches a certain level. As such, we estimate the
relationship between teacher turnover and student achievement both parametrically (using
OLS regression with school fixed effects) and semi-parametrically (expressing turnover as
a flexible fractional polynomial of dimension 2). We express the semi-parametric results
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graphically, showing the effect of teacher turnover on student achievement at each point in the
distribution of turnover. In addition to the school fixed effects, our preferred specifications
also control for students’ prior test scores in the given subject and for a fairly standard set of
student demographics (race, gender, special education enrollment, economic disadvantage,
and limited English proficiency).
Not all teacher exits mean the same thing. We are also interested in the relationships
between particular types of teacher turnover and student success. For instance, if a school
is particularly good at identifying which teachers are not cut out for the profession and
encouraging them to move to the private sector, this may lead to better outcomes for students
as the effective teachers are retained while the least-effective teachers are winnowed out. On
the other hand, if a school loses many of its teachers to schools in other districts, this suggests
that its teachers are good enough at teaching that someone else is willing to hire them, and
they are choosing disproportionately to flee a particular school or district due to its unique
and possibly challenging characteristics. Students in these schools may particularly lose
out, as their worst teachers may stay while those who have opportunities elsewhere may
choose to pursue those opportunities. To incorporate this, we estimate a single OLS model
containing all of the types of turnover separately; we would expect the most substantial
negative coefficients to come from the fraction of teachers leaving for other districts11. In
the semi-parametric specifications, we estimate different regressions for each type of turnover,
allowing us to compare the responses to the different types throughout the distribution.
III.7 Aftermath Results
Table III.11 presents results from OLS regressions of math and reading test scores on future
and one-year lagged fractions of teacher exits. A 10-percentage point increase in the fraction
of teachers who leave at the end of the current year of observation is associated with a 0.004-
standard deviation decline in math scores and a 0.002-standard deviation in math scores; the
same increase in teacher turnover at the end of the previous year is associated with declines
of 0.006 and 0.004 standard deviations, respectively. Both estimates for lagged turnover are
statistically different from their future counterparts, implying that there is a relationship
between the actual teacher departures and student performance, above and beyond any
11Of course, the Bridges (1991) “dance of the lemons” hypothesis implies that even bad teachers who
want to continue teaching can find a way to do so, usually in schools with the fewest resources or the
most underserved students, and teachers who leave for the private sector may do so because they are
particularly skilled (and not only in teaching). These hypotheses, also perfectly plausible, would lead to
opposite effects of the ones that we describe above.
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effects of the working conditions that pushed the teachers to quit. If anything, the difference
between the lagged coefficient and the future coefficient is likely an underestimate of the true
effects of teacher turnover, as the current working conditions may be more salient to student
performance than the prior year’s working conditions would be. In any case, we proceed
using the values of turnover from the summer before the observation.
Table III.12 decomposes the relationship by the departing teachers’ destinations. For
both math and reading scores, the responses to teacher turnover are driven by teachers
who depart for other full-time teaching positions in the Michigan public schools, especially
teachers who move to other districts; a 10-percentage point increase in teacher departures
to other districts is associated with a 0.013-standard deviation decrease in math scores and
a 0.009-standard deviation decrease in reading scores. The relationships between teacher
retirements, teachers moving to part-time or administrative positions, and teachers moving
to private-sector jobs, and student performance are either statistically insignificant or only
marginally significant. This result supports one main hypothesis in this study: namely, that
teachers’ mobility outcomes reveal something about their quality, and that teachers who
move to other districts are more likely to be effective (because more than one district is
interested in hiring them) while teachers who leave the public school system are more likely
to be ineffective (whether they learned that they were not a good fit for teaching and chose
to leave, or their employers encouraged or forced them to leave). It is the loss of effective
teachers that hurts students’ success the most.
To interpret the figures, it is best to focus on the shape of the line and where it is signif-
icantly different from its value when no teachers leave. Drawing a horizontal line from the
y-intercept of the graph and determining where it exits (and possibly later re-enters) the
confidence region reveals which levels of teacher turnover are associated with significantly
worse student outcomes than no turnover at all. Of course, it is rare for schools to lose more
than half of their teachers in a single year, so the confidence intervals grow wider at the
highest levels of turnover.
Figure III.1 contains the results for general types of mobility. Students exposed to more
than 5% of their teachers leaving see declines in their math scores, but these declines are
initially fairly modest before growing sharper toward the middle of the distribution. Students
who have about 50% of their teachers leave have math scores about 0.05 standard deviations
lower than those who have no teachers leave, though the confidence interval is somewhat
broad. The declines for reading scores are a bit more modest, requiring about 10% of teachers
to leave before any significant effects are seen, with the effects hitting a trough at around
0.03 standard deviations for 60% of teachers leaving before starting to move back toward
the initial level at the very top of the distribution (again, with wide confidence intervals).
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Figure III.2 presents the non-parametric results for math separately for different types of
teacher turnover. The patterns generally match the OLS results. There is a sharp decline
that comes from losing any teachers to cross-district moves, followed by a steady continued
decline, while the decrease in math scores following in-district moves is slower-developing
and the decline accompanying teachers leaving the profession is unclear due to very wide
confidence intervals. Figure III.3 repeats the exercise for reading scores; the patterns are
broadly similar. In general, the results show that losing more teachers is associated with
worse outcomes, and that departures to other schools are most damaging. Schools can
weather some in-district turnover, but large amounts of it signify problems in the district
that lead to poor scores; meanwhile, even a small number of teachers leaving for other
districts can have noticeable effects on student achievement.
These results suggest that firm-specific human capital is a significant driver of teachers’
productivity, combined with innate ability. As teachers leave a school, abandoning the school-
specific human capital that they have accumulated, students perform worse, as these teachers
are replaced by teachers without any experience in the given school and who need time to
learn how to work best with the students and staff in their new environment. However, as
the relationships are larger for teachers who leave for other schools and smaller for teachers
who leave for the private sector, it is likely that teachers learn about their innate ability to
teach (and capacity to improve) over time on the job, and those who find out that they are
poorly suited to the profession leave without doing harm to their former schools. Teachers
who find that they have higher innate abilities to teach will continue teaching, and if they
leave for greener pastures in other districts, their former schools will end up worse off.
Finally, we look at the relationship between Black teachers’ turnover and the achievement
of Black students. There is an extensive literature (see Tyson 2003, among many others)
on how Black teachers are especially valuable to Black students, whether by serving as role
models for children who look like them, practicing more culturally relevant pedagogy, or
communicating more effectively with Black families. Table III.13 and Figure III.4 show the
results of similar specifications to those above, looking exclusively at Black teachers and
Black students. Black students perform slightly worse in math, with inconclusive results in
reading, after more Black teachers leave, and this estimate is very similar to how they perform
in years after which more Black teachers leave. At face value, one may take this as evidence
against the importance of Black teachers to Black students, but it is important to consider
alternative explanations. Michigan’s public school system is quite segregated; recall from
Table III.2 how most Black teachers take their first jobs in schools with large populations
of Black students. Our variable looks at who leaves and not at who enters; if one Black
teacher is replaced by another, the effects should be closer to regular turnover effects than
105
to effects that take into account racial matching. Looking at the effects of Black teachers
leaving on Black students’ outcomes in suburban or rural schools (which are almost always
majority-white in Michigan) may reduce the sample size significantly but more effectively
capture the effects of losing these important teachers.
III.8 Conclusion
We find that teacher turnover reinforces many of the disparities in the American educa-
tional system. Poor and Black students already have less-experienced teachers than their
wealthier white counterparts, and these teachers are more likely to leave those schools with
more marginalized students. Students exposed to more teacher turnover, in turn, receive
lower scores on standardized tests; this is more true of teacher turnover in the summer be-
fore the test date than the summer after it, implying that the effects cannot be attributed
solely to environmental factors at the school that push teachers to leave. As such, students
who are already disadvantaged are most likely to suffer academically as a result of insta-
bility in their schools’ staffs. Other predictors of teacher turnover include teaching in a
charter school, teaching in a school in an urban area, and having attended college outside of
Michigan.
Looking beyond the raw fraction of teachers who leave a school and focusing on their des-
tinations reveals important patterns of which teacher exits are most detrimental to student
achievement. Students exposed to more teachers who retire, leave for the private sector,
or move to part-time or administrative positions are largely unaffected by these departures.
On the other hand, students in schools with more teachers moving to other full-time public
school teaching positions, particularly those in other districts, see more significant drops in
their test scores. The former set of teachers may well be leaving their jobs because they do
not see themselves as effective teachers, so they choose to do something else, whether that
involves scaling back their teaching commitments or leaving the profession entirely. The
latter teachers remain committed to teaching and have been deemed worthy of another full-
time teaching job by another district or school. It is these teachers who struggling schools
cannot afford to lose.
The greatest policy conclusion from this study, then, is that schools should have the will-
ingness and the resources to aggressively work to retain their most effective teachers, rather
than allowing them to be poached by other districts. High retention bonuses, tied to a mean-
ingful measure of effectiveness (whether measured by value added, principal observation, or
some combination of the two), would provide incentives for wavering teachers to continue
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in their same schools. Considering that many of the schools that lose teachers have very
strained budgets, state or local governments should provide additional funding targeted to
this bonus pool. These efforts to retain teachers can improve student achievement while
strengthening the ties of teachers to their schools and communities.
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III.9 Supplemental Figures
Figure III.1.: Non-Parametric Effects of All Lagged Turnover on Test Scores
(a) Math Scores
(b) Reading Scores
Fractional polynomial results shown. All regressions control for student and school character-
istics, including the student’s last observed test score. Fractions leaving include all teachers
who stop teaching full-time at the given school except for retirements and temporary exits
that are coded as parental leave. Standard errors clustered by school.
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Figure III.2.: Non-Parametric Effects of Lagged Turnover on Math Scores, By Type
(a) In-District Move (b) Cross-District Move
(c) To Part-Time (d) To Private Sector
Fractional polynomial results shown. All regressions control for student and school characteristics, including the student’s last
observed test score. Standard errors clustered by school.
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Figure III.3.: Non-Parametric Effects of Lagged Turnover on Reading Scores, By Type
(a) In-District Move (b) Cross-District Move
(c) To Part-Time (d) To Private Sector
Fractional polynomial results shown. All regressions control for student and school characteristics, including the student’s last
observed test score. Standard errors clustered by school.
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Figure III.4.: Non-Parametric Effects of Black Teacher Turnover on Black Students’ Scores
(a) Math Scores
(b) Reading Scores
Fractional polynomial results shown. All regressions control for student and school charac-
teristics, including the student’s last observed test score. Standard errors clustered by school.
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III.10 Supplemental Tables
Table III.1.: Distribution of Full-Time Teachers in Michigan Public Schools in 2016
Fewest Poor Students 2nd 3rd Most
Teacher is Black 0.012 0.012 0.037 0.171
Teacher is Hispanic 0.009 0.01 0.012 0.018
Teacher is Asian 0.009 0.004 0.006 0.008
Teacher is Highly Qualified 0.875 0.873 0.881 0.866
Teacher Teaches Math 0.084 0.081 0.069 0.058
Teacher Teaches Science 0.079 0.071 0.058 0.043
Teacher Teaches English 0.096 0.093 0.085 0.078
Teacher Teaches Social Studies 0.072 0.066 0.053 0.042
Teacher Teaches Special Ed. 0.128 0.154 0.184 0.162
Elementary Teacher 0.683 0.713 0.77 0.87
Secondary Teacher 0.317 0.287 0.23 0.13
Attended College in Michigan 0.635 0.589 0.586 0.535
Has Advanced Degree 0.707 0.632 0.555 0.522
Teacher Age 43.6 43.3 43.4 43.1
Years Since Hire 14.6 14.1 13.8 12.4
1-3 Years Experience 0.074 0.081 0.103 0.161
4-10 Years Experience 0.255 0.273 0.284 0.315
11-20 Years Experience 0.46 0.443 0.406 0.352
20+ Years Experience 0.212 0.203 0.207 0.172
Max Frac. FRPL Eligible 0.284 0.494 0.699 1
Number of Teachers 18,597 18,584 18,619 18,561
Number of Schools 656 816 969 986
Sample includes all full-time teachers in any Michigan public school for the 2015-2016 school
year. Quartiles of poor students are defined by percent of students in the school who are
eligible for free or reduced price lunch. Cutoffs for these quartiles are 28%, 49%, and 70% for
the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles, respectively. Data for attendance at a Michigan college
are unavailable after 2012. Teachers who accepted their first full-time teaching job in the
2012 -2013 school year or later are missing for this statistic.
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Table III.2.: Distribution of Initial Placements from 2004-2012
Fewest Poor Students 2nd 3rd Most
Teacher is Black 0.021 0.023 0.065 0.147
Teacher is Hispanic 0.01 0.007 0.01 0.023
Teacher is Asian 0.009 0.009 0.01 0.012
Attended Very Selective College 0.179 0.182 0.146 0.128
Teacher is Highly Qualified 0.84 0.86 0.854 0.869
Teacher Teaches Math 0.093 0.09 0.087 0.077
Teacher Teaches Science 0.073 0.072 0.058 0.061
Teacher Teaches English 0.11 0.103 0.084 0.086
Teacher Teaches Social Studies 0.072 0.062 0.052 0.058
Teacher Teaches Special Ed. 0.181 0.188 0.178 0.135
Elementary Teacher 0.64 0.666 0.763 0.808
Secondary Teacher 0.36 0.334 0.237 0.192
Attended College in Michigan 0.827 0.83 0.797 0.775
Has Advanced Degree 0.702 0.652 0.596 0.526
Teacher Age 30.2 30.1 30.9 3.4
Number of Teachers 5,235 5,235 5,235 5,233
Number of Schools 1,142 1,391 1,433 889
Sample includes all full-time teachers in any Michigan public school between the 2003-2004
school year and the 2011-2012 school year. The sample of teachers is restricted to those
who accepted their first job in a school that remained open for at least five years thereafter.
Quartiles of poor students are defined by percent of students in the school who are eligible
for free or reduced price lunch. Cutoffs for these quartiles are 19%, 39%, and 66% for the
25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles, respectively.
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Table III.3.: Teacher Characteristics by Experience in 2016
1 Year 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years
Teacher is Black 0.06 0.072 0.058 0.06
Teacher is Hispanic 0.025 0.017 0.014 0.012
Teacher is Asian 0.018 0.011 0.006 0.003
Teacher is Highly Qualified 0.842 0.858 0.844 0.872
Teacher Teaches Math 0.073 0.069 0.079 0.077
Teacher Teaches Science 0.059 0.048 0.056 0.062
Teacher Teaches English 0.096 0.092 0.075 0.102
Teacher Teaches Social Studies 0.051 0.045 0.061 0.075
Teacher Teaches Special Ed. 0.141 0.171 0.207 0.12
Elementary Teacher 0.757 0.787 0.75 0.751
Secondary Teacher 0.243 0.213 0.25 0.249
Has Advanced Degree 0.206 0.303 0.602 0.79
Teacher Age 31.4 35.5 40.9 49.4
Fraction of Poor Students 0.607 0.559 0.478 0.472
Fraction of Black Students 0.318 0.286 0.193 0.183
Number of Teachers 2,418 2,853 2,801 2,371
Number of Schools 1,322 1,626 1,604 1,400
Sample includes all full-time teachers in any Michigan public school for the 2015-2016 school
year who were hired 1 year, 5 years, 10 years, or 20 years prior to the date of observation.
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Table III.4.: Mobility Outcomes by Experience
Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Full-Time Teacher in Same School 0.775 0.609 0.5 0.426
Full-Time Teacher in New District 0.018 0.091 0.134 0.161
Full-Time Teacher Elsewhere in Same District 0.057 0.081 0.094 0.1
Part-Time Teacher or Non-Teaching Staff 0.041 0.056 0.064 0.075
Left Michigan Public Schools 0.109 0.164 0.207 0.236
All outcomes are relative to the first year of teaching in Michigan public schools. The sample
includes all teachers who accepted a full-time teaching job in any Michigan public school
between the 2003-2004 school year and the 2011-2012 school year. The sample of teachers
is restricted to those who accepted their first job in a school that remained open for at least
five years thereafter.
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Table III.5.: Mobility Outcomes by Cohort
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Full-Time Teacher in Same School 0.435 0.438 0.458 0.442 0.445 0.452 0.381 0.378 0.321
Full-Time Teacher in New District 0.151 0.153 0.127 0.147 0.146 0.144 0.214 0.203 0.253
Full-Time Teacher Elsewhere in Same District 0.107 0.098 0.121 0.117 0.089 0.106 0.061 0.096 0.053
Part-Time Teacher or Non-Teaching Staff 0.065 0.074 0.074 0.083 0.085 0.068 0.08 0.078 0.079
Left Michigan Public Schools 0.241 0.236 0.219 0.21 0.235 0.228 0.262 0.245 0.294
Number of Teachers 3,425 3,536 3,266 2,514 1,987 1,817 1,371 2,227 1,235
All outcomes reflect the teachers’ status five years after they are hired for their first full-time teaching job in the Michigan
public schools. The sample includes all teachers who accepted a full-time teaching job in any Michigan public school between
the 2003-2004 school year and the 2011-2012 school year. The sample of teachers is restricted to those who accepted their first
job in a school that remained open for at least five years thereafter.
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Table III.6.: Mobility Outcomes by Fraction Poor
Fewest Poor Students 2nd 3rd Most
Full-Time Teacher in Same School 0.534 0.489 0.415 0.273
Full-Time Teacher in New District 0.095 0.131 0.18 0.245
Full-Time Teacher Elsewhere in Same District 0.117 0.114 0.102 0.069
Part-Time Teacher or Non-Teaching Staff 0.071 0.068 0.074 0.084
Left Michigan Public Schools 0.184 0.198 0.23 0.329
Number of Teachers 5,232 5,228 5,234 5,229
Number of Schools 1,141 1,392 1,434 890
All outcomes are measured five years after the date of hire. The sample includes all teachers
who accepted a full-time teaching job in any Michigan public school between the 2003-2004
school year and the 2011-2012 school year, conditional on the school remaining open for at
least five years after the initial date of hire. Quartiles are defined by the percent of students
eligible for free or reduced-price lunch at the school level. Cutoffs for these quartiles are
19%, 39%, and 66% for the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles, respectively.
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Table III.7.: Contributing Factors to Mobility, by Next Job Type
New District Same District Part-Time Private Sector
Frac. Subsidized Lunch Eligible 2.37*** 1.09 1.24 1.35**
Fraction of Black Students 1.89*** 2.49*** 1.07 2.13***
Fraction of Hispanic Students 0.451*** 0.264*** 1.002 0.772
Fraction of English Learners 1.33 9.41*** 1.23 1.74**
Fraction of Special Ed. Students 1.04 1.87*** 1.5* 1.09
2nd Quintile Test Scores 0.863 1.42** 0.831 0.826**
3rd Quintile Test Scores 0.696*** 1.25 0.81* 0.742***
4th Quintile Test Scores 0.596*** 1.18 0.717** 0.624***
5th Quintile Test Scores 0.45*** 1.29 0.579*** 0.622***
First School is a Charter 1.61*** 0.073*** 1.65*** 1.87***
First School is Urban 0.956 1.5*** 1.11 1.1
First School is Town/Rural 0.785** 0.908 1.001 0.952
First School is Secondary 1.28*** 0.428*** 1.25*** 1.28***
Avg. Frac. Enrollment Change 1.51*** 0.969 1.36*** 1.01
Local Unemployment Rate 1.01 0.996 1.01 0.995
Per-Pupil Expenditure ($1,000s) 0.977* 1.01 0.994 0.994
County Avg. Per-Pupil Exp. 0.967 1.05 1.2** 1.04
Teacher is Highly Qualified 1.06 0.881 0.724*** 0.77***
Teacher’s Age 0.975*** 1.004 1.005 1.002
Teacher is Female 0.945 1.05 0.905 0.931
Teacher is Black 0.996 1.06 1.24* 0.841*
Teacher is Hispanic 0.79 0.955 0.945 0.811
Teaches Math/Science 1.11* 1.01 0.774*** 1.1*
Teaches Special Education 2.08*** 1.15* 1.66*** 1.15**
Attended Selective College 1.07 1.001 1.26*** 1.23***
Attended College in Michigan 1.11 1.05 0.842** 0.606***
Has Advanced Degree 1.03 1.14* 1.66*** 1.09
Entered Teaching in 2004-05 0.963 0.91 1.19* 1.04
Entered Teaching in 2005-06 0.794*** 1.09 1.27** 1.02
Entered Teaching in 2006-07 0.934 1.05 1.36*** 0.95
Entered Teaching in 2007-08 0.846* 0.824* 1.27** 0.945
Entered Teaching in 2008-09 0.808* 0.931 0.95 0.928
Entered Teaching in 2009-10 1.18 0.701** 1.11 1.1
Entered Teaching in 2010-11 1.32*** 1.02 1.38** 1.26**
Entered Teaching in 2011-12 1.86*** 1.16 0.653** 0.338***
Number of Observations 21,336 21,336 21,336 21,336
Sample Mean 0.145 0.108 0.073 0.228
Multinomial logit odds ratios reported. Outcome variable is conditional on the teacher’s
first school remaining open five years after the date of hire. School/student characteristics
are measured in the first school at the time of hire unless stated otherwise. Standard errors
(available on request) are clustered at the school level. Missing indicators are included, not
shown, for any variables that are ever missing.
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Table III.8.: Contributing Factors to Mobility, by Title I Status of Next School
To Non-Title I School To Title I School Private Sector
Frac. Subsidized Lunch Eligible 0.924 3.39*** 1.57***
Fraction of Black Students 2.01*** 2.27*** 1.81***
Fraction of Hispanic Students 0.36*** 0.393*** 0.416***
Fraction of English Learners 3.23*** 2.4*** 1.43***
Fraction of Special Ed. Students 1.02 1.76*** 2.13***
2nd Quintile Test Scores 0.941 1.05 0.645
3rd Quintile Test Scores 0.849 0.891 1.94***
4th Quintile Test Scores 0.821 0.745** 1.14
5th Quintile Test Scores 0.936 0.425*** 0.829**
First School is a Charter 0.745*** 0.817** 1.83***
First School is Urban 1.14* 1.16* 1.14**
First School is Town/Rural 0.738*** 0.96 0.999
First School is Secondary 0.894 0.786*** 1.22***
Avg. Frac. Enrollment Change 1.44*** 1.44*** 1.001
Local Unemployment Rate 0.985 1.02* 0.993
Per-Pupil Expenditure ($1,000s) 1.004 0.989 0.992
County Avg. Per-Pupil Exp. 1.1 0.89 1.02
Teacher is Highly Qualified 0.925 1.05 0.733***
Teacher’s Age 0.977*** 0.996 1.002
Teacher is Female 0.933 1.07 0.948
Teacher is Black 0.399*** 1.37*** 0.838*
Teacher is Hispanic 0.972 0.806 0.803
Teaches Math/Science 1.09 1.04 1.11*
Teaches Special Education 1.51*** 1.68*** 1.1
Attended Selective College 1.03 1.03 1.2***
Attended College in Michigan 1.08 1.06 0.587***
Has Advanced Degree 1.21** 0.989 1.09
Entered Teaching in 2004-05 0.916 0.955 1.04
Entered Teaching in 2005-06 0.891 0.966 1.06
Entered Teaching in 2006-07 0.937 0.971 0.918
Entered Teaching in 2007-08 0.712*** 0.917 0.936
Entered Teaching in 2008-09 0.883 0.793* 0.89
Entered Teaching in 2009-10 1.23 0.809 1.05
Entered Teaching in 2010-11 1.3*** 1.06 1.25**
Entered Teaching in 2011-12 1.91*** 1.49** 0.31***
Number of Observations 19,097 19,097 19,097
Sample Mean 0.144 0.137 0.221
Multinomial logit odds ratios reported.Outcome variable is conditional on the teacher’s first
school remaining open five years after the date of hire. School/student characteristics are
measured in the first school at the time of hire unless stated otherwise. Standard errors
(available on request) are clustered at the school level. Missing indicators are included, not
shown, for any variables that are ever missing.
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Table III.9.: Contributing Factors to Mobility, Without Teacher Characteristics
New District Same District Part-Time Private Sector
Frac. Subsidized Lunch Eligible 2.36*** 1.1 1.12 1.24*
Fraction of Black Students 1.76*** 2.41*** 1.32 2.62***
Fraction of Hispanic Students 0.463*** 0.23*** 1.06 0.925
Fraction of English Learners 1.26 9.49*** 1.33 1.91**
Fraction of Special Ed. Students 1.28 2.02*** 1.94*** 1.23
2nd Quintile Test Scores 0.882 1.42** 0.841 0.838**
3rd Quintile Test Scores 0.723*** 1.24 0.868 0.779***
4th Quintile Test Scores 0.637*** 1.18 0.777* 0.669***
5th Quintile Test Scores 0.48*** 1.28 0.64*** 0.677***
First School is a Charter 1.52*** 0.076*** 1.5*** 1.7***
First School is Urban 0.982 1.5*** 1.15 1.11
First School is Town/Rural 0.774*** 0.91 1.02 0.974
First School is Secondary 1.16** 0.42*** 1.05 1.25***
Avg. Frac. Enrollment Change 1.51*** 0.958 1.35*** 0.997
Local Unemployment Rate 1.01 0.99 1.01 1.002
Per-Pupil Expenditure ($1,000s) 0.982 1.01 1.01 1.01
County Avg. Per-Pupil Exp. 0.95 1.05 1.23** 1.05
Entered Teaching in 2004-05 0.983 0.898 1.14 0.962
Entered Teaching in 2005-06 0.82** 1.07 1.16 0.904
Entered Teaching in 2006-07 1.002 1.03 1.29** 0.861**
Entered Teaching in 2007-08 0.909 0.811* 1.29** 0.909
Entered Teaching in 2008-09 0.837 0.924 0.899 0.838**
Entered Teaching in 2009-10 1.24* 0.703** 1.05 0.97
Entered Teaching in 2010-11 1.3*** 1.03 1.26* 1.12
Entered Teaching in 2011-12 1.74*** 0.699** 1.41** 1.3**
Number of Observations 21,336 21,336 21,336 21,336
Sample Mean 0.145 0.108 0.073 0.228
Multinomial logit odds ratios reported. Outcome variable is conditional on the teacher’s
first school remaining open five years after the date of hire. School/student characteristics
are measured in the first school at the time of hire unless stated otherwise. Standard errors
(available on request) are clustered at the school level. Missing indicators are included, not
shown, for any variables that are ever missing.
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Table III.10.: Contributing Factors to Mobility, by Pre/Post Recession
(a) Non-Recession Cohorts
New District Same District Part-Time Private Sector
Frac. Subsidized Lunch Eligible 2.63*** 1.17 1.45* 1.46***
Fraction of Black Students 1.99*** 2.58*** 1.05 2.26***
Fraction of Hispanic Students 0.422*** 0.275** 1.15 0.712
Fraction of English Learners 1.22 9.96*** 1.43 1.68**
Fraction of Special Ed. Students 0.971 1.66** 1.42 1.05
2nd Quintile Test Scores 0.903 1.48** 0.819 0.897
3rd Quintile Test Scores 0.748** 1.32 0.934 0.798**
4th Quintile Test Scores 0.598*** 1.2 0.769* 0.606***
5th Quintile Test Scores 0.502*** 1.36* 0.689** 0.626***
First School is a Charter 1.69*** 0.085*** 1.72*** 1.88***
First School is Urban 0.933 1.46*** 1.08 1.08
First School is Town/Rural 0.762** 0.938 1.01 0.872
First School is Secondary 1.33*** 0.44*** 1.24** 1.38***
Avg. Frac. Enrollment Change 1.54*** 1.08 1.42*** 1.09
Local Unemployment Rate 1.02 1.004 1.03* 0.996
Per-Pupil Expenditure ($1,000s) 0.985 1.02 0.996 0.993
County Avg. Per-Pupil Exp. 0.966 1.01 1.21* 1.03
Teacher is Highly Qualified 1.06 0.843* 0.765*** 0.78***
Teacher’s Age 0.971*** 1.004 1.005 1.001
Teacher is Female 0.937 1.02 0.898 0.95
Teacher is Black 0.946 1.01 1.28* 0.803**
Teacher is Hispanic 0.886 0.945 0.902 0.954
Teaches Math/Science 1.08 1.04 0.765** 1.13**
Teaches Special Education 2.34*** 1.2** 1.69*** 1.24***
Attended Selective College 1.07 0.993 1.37*** 1.27***
Attended College in Michigan 1.12 1.06 0.812** 0.609***
Has Advanced Degree 1.02 1.12 1.68*** 1.08
Entered Teaching in 2004-05 0.964 0.91 1.19* 1.04
Entered Teaching in 2005-06 0.801** 1.09 1.28** 1.02
Entered Teaching in 2006-07 0.929 1.04 1.36*** 0.944
Entered Teaching in 2010-11 1.24* 0.966 1.25* 1.23**
Entered Teaching in 2011-12 2*** 1.1 0.577*** 0.313***
Number of Observations 16,173 16,173 16,173 16,173
Multinomial logit odds ratios reported. Outcome variable is measured after five years and
is conditional on the teacher’s first school remaining open five years after the date of hire.
School/student characteristics are measured in the first school at the time of hire unless
stated otherwise. Standard errors (available on request) are clustered at the school level.
Missing indicators are included, not shown, for any variables that are ever missing. Non-
recession cohorts are 2003-04 through 2006-07 and 2010-11 through 2011-12.
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(b) Recession Cohorts
New District Same District Part-Time Private Sector
Frac. Subsidized Lunch Eligible 1.37 0.791 0.578 1.07
Fraction of Black Students 1.72** 2.18** 0.95 1.94***
Fraction of Hispanic Students 0.581 0.217** 0.52 1.04
Fraction of English Learners 1.83 8.57*** 0.908 0.201
Fraction of Special Ed. Students 1.42 3.94** 1.36 1.14
2nd Quintile Test Scores 0.753* 1.26 0.827 0.681***
3rd Quintile Test Scores 0.559*** 1.1 0.484*** 0.642***
4th Quintile Test Scores 0.536*** 1.12 0.474** 0.675**
5th Quintile Test Scores 0.3*** 1.11 0.279*** 0.618**
First School is a Charter 1.42** 0.041*** 1.56** 1.81***
First School is Urban 1.01 1.57*** 1.15 1.13
First School is Town/Rural 0.819 0.797 0.921 1.11
First School is Secondary 1.15 0.377*** 1.35** 1.07
Avg. Frac. Enrollment Change 1.51*** 0.533** 1.03 0.735**
Local Unemployment Rate 0.991 0.984 0.99 0.993
Per-Pupil Expenditure ($1,000s) 0.94 0.975 0.987 0.993
County Avg. Per-Pupil Exp. 0.965 1.19 1.21 1.08
Teacher is Highly Qualified 1.04 1.03 0.622*** 0.745**
Teacher’s Age 0.983*** 1.004 1.003 1.002
Teacher is Female 0.968 1.23 0.93 0.881
Teacher is Black 1.15 1.27 1.16 0.963
Teacher is Hispanic 0.666 1.07 1.01 0.624
Teaches Math/Science 1.2 0.912 0.801 0.997
Teaches Special Education 1.39** 0.963 1.58** 0.876
Attended Selective College 1.06 1.01 1.04 1.09
Attended College in Michigan 1.08 1.01 0.938 0.598***
Has Advanced Degree 1.06 1.2 1.64*** 1.1
Entered Teaching in 2007-08 0.598*** 1.09 0.889 0.848
Entered Teaching in 2008-09 0.624*** 1.26 0.794 0.812**
Number of Observations 5,163 5,163 5,163 5,163
Multinomial logit odds ratios reported. Outcome variable is measured after five years and
is conditional on the teacher’s first school remaining open five years after the date of hire.
School/student characteristics are measured in the first school at the time of hire unless
stated otherwise. Standard errors (available on request) are clustered at the school level.
Missing indicators are included, not shown, for any variables that are ever missing. Recession
cohorts are 2007-08 through 2009-10.
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Table III.11.: Effects of All Turnover on Test Scores
Math Reading
Fraction Leaving After This Year -0.036*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002)
Fraction Left Last Year -0.057*** -0.038***
(0.003) (0.003)
P-value from Test of Equal Coefficients 0.029 0.013
Number of Observations 6,754,830 5,634,372
OLS results shown. All regressions control for student and school characteristics, including
the student’s last observed test score. Fractions leaving include all teachers who stop teaching
full-time at the given school except for retirements and temporary exits that are coded as
parental leave. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.
Table III.12.: Effects of Types of Turnover on Test Scores
Math Reading
In-District Move -0.041** -0.026**
(0.017) (0.012)
Cross-District Move -0.128*** -0.085***
(0.03) (0.025)
To Part-Time/Administration -0.029 0.051
(0.046) (0.036)
To Private Sector -0.063* -0.023
(0.035) (0.028)
Retires -0.011 -0.016
(0.02) (0.016)
Number of Observations 6,743,698 5,623,245
OLS results shown. All regressions control for student and school characteristics, including
the student’s last observed test score, and school fixed effects. Coefficients shown are on the
fractions of teachers who exited in the given fashion after the previous school year. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered by school.
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Table III.13.: Effects of Black Teacher Exits on Black Students’ Scores
Math Reading
Fraction Leaving After This Year -0.052** -0.027
(0.022) (0.017)
Fraction Left Last Year -0.045** -0.024
(0.019) (0.016)
Number of Observations 1,154,865 976,892
OLS results shown. All regressions control for student and school characteristics, including
the student’s last observed test score. Fractions leaving include all teachers who stop teaching
full-time at the given school except for retirements and temporary exits that are coded as
parental leave. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by school.
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Table III.14.: Contributing Factors to Mobility, by Pre-Service Qualifications
(a) Zero Qualifications
New District Same District Part-Time Private Sector
Frac. Subsidized Lunch Eligible 2.63** 3.26*** 0.776 1.07
Fraction of Black Students 3.32** 1.45 3.4** 3.83***
Fraction of Hispanic Students 0.916 0.075** 14.6*** 1.42
Fraction of English Learners 2.94 43.7*** 0.454 4.44***
Fraction of Special Ed. Students 1.53 1.84 1.32 0.594
2nd Quintile Test Scores 0.62* 0.787 0.558* 0.678*
3rd Quintile Test Scores 0.54* 0.731 1.23 0.583**
4th Quintile Test Scores 0.772 1.17 1.13 0.727
5th Quintile Test Scores 0.554 1.08 0.471 0.636
First School is a Charter 1.59* 0.079*** 1.86** 1.55**
First School is Urban 0.743 1.05 0.914 0.807
First School is Town/Rural 0.532** 0.729 0.98 0.914
First School is Secondary 0.887 0.461*** 1.01 0.999
Avg. Frac. Enrollment Change 1.222** 0.948 1.02 1.04
Local Unemployment Rate 0.981 0.986 0.956 1.02
Per-Pupil Expenditure ($1,000s) 0.972 0.96 0.997 0.975
County Avg. Per-Pupil Exp. 0.938 1.03 0.884 1.14
Teacher’s Age 0.965*** 0.99 1.01 1.02
Teacher is Female 1.11 1.14 0.908 1.17
Teacher is Black 0.362*** 1.07 2.6** 1.25
Teacher is Hispanic 1.19 0.519 1.44 0.599
Teaches Math/Science 1.15 0.91 0.553 1.02
Teaches Special Education 1.55** 1.17 1.01 0.896
Attended College in Michigan 0.983 0.862 0.62** 0.441***
Entered Teaching in 2004-05 0.839 1.05 0.891 1.3
Entered Teaching in 2005-06 1.34 1.42 0.984 1.61**
Entered Teaching in 2006-07 0.792 0.965 0.923 1.14
Entered Teaching in 2007-08 0.76 0.773 0.982 1.46*
Entered Teaching in 2008-09 0.874 0.915 1.4 1.1
Entered Teaching in 2009-10 1.34 0.653 1.29 1.2
Entered Teaching in 2010-11 1.95** 1.22 1.11 1.59*
Entered Teaching in 2011-12 1.49 1.23 1.58 1.66
Number of Observations 2,356 2,356 2,356 2,356
Multinomial logit odds ratios reported. Outcome variable is measured after five years and is
conditional on the teacher’s first school remaining open five years after the date of hire. Pre-
service qualifications are master’s degrees, bachelor’s degrees from highly selective colleges,
and classifications as “highly qualified” under NCLB.
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(b) One Qualification
New District Same District Part-Time Private Sector
Frac. Subsidized Lunch Eligible 2.72*** 0.891 1.52* 1.54***
Fraction of Black Students 1.83*** 2.37*** 1.04 2.18***
Fraction of Hispanic Students 0.37*** 0.211*** 0.923 0.802
Fraction of English Learners 1.23 9.35*** 1.31 1.68**
Fraction of Special Ed. Students 1.06 2.21*** 1.22 1.2
2nd Quintile Test Scores 0.921 1.5** 0.942 0.9
3rd Quintile Test Scores 0.753** 1.27 0.849 0.811**
4th Quintile Test Scores 0.625*** 1.12 0.761 0.615***
5th Quintile Test Scores 0.488*** 1.39* 0.724* 0.702***
First School is a Charter 1.58*** 0.079*** 1.72*** 1.94***
First School is Urban 0.994 1.52*** 1.09 1.14
First School is Town/Rural 0.798* 0.843 1.04 1.08
First School is Secondary 1.33*** 0.429*** 1.31** 1.33***
Avg. Frac. Enrollment Change 1.62*** 0.868 0.861
Local Unemployment Rate 1.01 0.9994 1.43*** 0.987
Per-Pupil Expenditure ($1,000s) 0.973 1.02 1.005 1.01
County Avg. Per-Pupil Exp. 0.91 0.996 1.17 0.991
Teacher’s Age 0.975*** 1.01* 1.02*** 1.004
Teacher is Female 0.948 1.03 0.921 0.895**
Teacher is Black 1.09 1.07 1.16 0.933
Teacher is Hispanic 0.751 0.894 0.979 0.817
Teaches Math/Science 1.16** 1.01 0.819 1.17**
Teaches Special Education 2.15*** 1.08 2.41*** 1.4***
Attended College in Michigan 1.13 1.22** 0.726*** 0.453***
Entered Teaching in 2004-05 0.958 0.893 1.35** 1.05
Entered Teaching in 2005-06 0.787** 0.997 1.29* 1.05
Entered Teaching in 2006-07 0.918 1.01 1.56*** 0.974
Entered Teaching in 2007-08 0.879 0.816 1.72*** 1.01
Entered Teaching in 2008-09 0.744** 0.819 1.16 0.996
Entered Teaching in 2009-10 1.15 0.666** 1.2 1.16
Entered Teaching in 2010-11 1.3** 1.01 1.53** 1.33***
Entered Teaching in 2011-12 1.66*** 0.607** 1.7*** 1.19
Number of Observations 14,112 14,112 14,112 14,112
Multinomial logit odds ratios reported. Outcome variable is measured after five years and is
conditional on the teacher’s first school remaining open five years after the date of hire. Pre-
service qualifications are master’s degrees, bachelor’s degrees from highly selective colleges,
and classifications as “highly qualified” under NCLB.
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(c) Two or More Qualifications
New District Same District Part-Time Private Sector
Frac. Subsidized Lunch Eligible 1.67* 0.823 0.746 1.05
Fraction of Black Students 1.88** 4.08*** 0.864 1.96***
Fraction of Hispanic Students 0.829 0.76 0.609 0.963
Fraction of English Learners 1.11 4.82** 1.01 1.31
Fraction of Special Ed. Students 0.397* 0.89 1.41 0.769
2nd Quintile Test Scores 0.763 1.43 0.683* 0.627***
3rd Quintile Test Scores 0.568*** 1.37 0.689* 0.653**
4th Quintile Test Scores 0.465*** 1.33 0.603** 0.658**
5th Quintile Test Scores 0.337*** 1.001 0.411*** 0.512***
First School is a Charter 1.62*** 0.051*** 1.36** 2.09***
First School is Urban 0.865 1.65*** 1.36** 1.09
First School is Town/Rural 0.858 1.23 0.863 0.676**
First School is Secondary 1.25* 0.406 1.19 1.37***
Avg. Frac. Enrollment Change 1.65*** 1.29 1.59*** 1.28
Local Unemployment Rate 1.02 0.991 1.04** 1.01
Per-Pupil Expenditure ($1,000s) 0.996 1.05* 0.962 0.989
County Avg. Per-Pupil Exp. 1.2 1.14 1.6*** 1.22
Teacher’s Age 0.978*** 1.01 1.01 1.01**
Teacher is Female 0.848 1.06 0.906 0.904
Teacher is Black 1.11 0.972 0.971 0.615***
Teacher is Hispanic 0.642 1.23 0.638 1.08
Teaches Math/Science 0.913 0.989 0.633*** 0.87
Teaches Special Education 2.24*** 1.28* 2.03*** 1.28**
Attended College in Michigan 1.09 0.918 0.799* 0.591***
Entered Teaching in 2004-05 1.01 0.916 1.13 0.872
Entered Teaching in 2005-06 0.67** 1.21 1.56** 0.895
Entered Teaching in 2006-07 1.02 1.09 1.37 0.849
Entered Teaching in 2007-08 0.793 0.862 0.911 0.804
Entered Teaching in 2008-09 0.918 1.23 0.709 0.732*
Entered Teaching in 2009-10 1.11 0.805 1.03 0.887
Entered Teaching in 2010-11 1.07 0.922 1.5* 1.18
Entered Teaching in 2011-12 1.93*** 1.31 1.26 0.995
Number of Observations 4,868 4,868 4,868 4,868
Multinomial logit odds ratios reported. Outcome variable is measured after five years and is
conditional on the teacher’s first school remaining open five years after the date of hire. Pre-
service qualifications are master’s degrees, bachelor’s degrees from highly selective colleges,
and classifications as “highly qualified” under NCLB.
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Table III.15.: Contributing Factors to Two-Year Mobility, by Next Job Type
New District Same District Part-Time Private Sector
Frac. Subsidized Lunch Eligible 2.04** 0.97 1.04 1.44**
Fraction of Black Students 1.04 1.96*** 0.949 1.65***
Fraction of Hispanic Students 0.291* 0.518 0.935 1.05
Fraction of English Learners 1.7 4.31*** 0.99 0.917
Fraction of Special Ed. Students 0.475* 1.54 1.31 0.952
2nd Quintile Test Scores 0.632*** 1.03 0.742** 0.777***
3rd Quintile Test Scores 0.619** 1.14 0.732** 0.814**
4th Quintile Test Scores 0.507*** 0.947 0.795 0.657***
5th Quintile Test Scores 0.427*** 1.12 0.86 0.648***
First School is a Charter 1.31 0.104*** 0.99 1.54***
First School is Urban 1.06 1.76*** 1.06 1.07
First School is Town/Rural 1.25 1.14 1.07 1.04
First School is Secondary 1.2 0.403*** 1.06 1.09
Avg. Frac. Enrollment Change 0.722 0.949 0.989 0.455***
Local Unemployment Rate 1.001 0.997 0.976* 0.984*
Per-Pupil Expenditure ($1,000s) 0.924* 1.01 0.989 0.992
County Avg. Per-Pupil Exp. 0.995 0.989 0.844 0.966
Teacher is Highly Qualified 0.643** 0.983 0.485*** 0.596***
Teacher’s Age 0.998 1.01 1.02*** 1.01***
Teacher is Female 0.888 1.16* 1.03 0.89**
Teacher is Black 1.56** 0.902 1.62*** 0.807**
Teacher is Hispanic 0.624 0.538* 1.1 0.882
Teaches Math/Science 1.44** 0.959 0.87 1.06
Teaches Special Education 1.5** 0.818** 0.904 0.819**
Attended Selective College 1.03 0.948 1.08 1.1
Attended College in Michigan 0.842 0.978 0.713*** 0.619***
Has Advanced Degree 1.17 0.931 0.966 1.05
Entered Teaching in 2004-05 0.959 0.636*** 1.62*** 0.985
Entered Teaching in 2005-06 1.02 0.952 1.69*** 1.06
Entered Teaching in 2006-07 0.891 1.17 1.92*** 1.14
Entered Teaching in 2007-08 0.751 0.797 1.76*** 0.997
Entered Teaching in 2008-09 0.813 0.892 2.39*** 1.16
Entered Teaching in 2009-10 1.82** 1.21 3.24*** 0.989
Entered Teaching in 2010-11 1.11 1.17 4.66*** 1.38***
Entered Teaching in 2011-12 3.65*** 1.1 1.52* 0.395***
Number of Observations 21,298 21,298 21,298 21,298
Sample Mean 0.018 0.057 0.041 0.109
Multinomial logit odds ratios reported. Outcome variable is conditional on the teacher’s
first school remaining open five years after the date of hire. School/student characteristics
are measured in the first school at the time of hire unless stated otherwise. Standard errors
(available on request) are clustered at the school level. Missing indicators are included, not
shown, for any variables that are ever missing.
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Table III.16.: Contributing Factors to Three-Year Mobility, by Next Job Type
New District Same District Part-Time Private Sector
Frac. Subsidized Lunch Eligible 2.17*** 1.26 1.75*** 1.59***
Fraction of Black Students 1.5*** 2.14*** 1.21 1.79***
Fraction of Hispanic Students 0.334*** 0.468 0.569 0.687*
Fraction of English Learners 1.42 5.48*** 1.59 1.44*
Fraction of Special Ed. Students 0.789 1.24 1.73** 0.988
2nd Quintile Test Scores 0.72*** 1.19 0.899 0.815***
3rd Quintile Test Scores 0.711*** 1.2 0.899 0.84**
4th Quintile Test Scores 0.576*** 1.09 0.85 0.654***
5th Quintile Test Scores 0.463*** 1.32* 0.857 0.67***
First School is a Charter 1.33*** 0.091*** 1.05 1.58***
First School is Urban 0.905 1.64*** 1.14 1.09
First School is Town/Rural 0.794* 1.08 1.19 0.961
First School is Secondary 1.14* 0.431*** 1.14 1.09
Avg. Frac. Enrollment Change 1.01 0.968 1.001 0.755***
Local Unemployment Rate 1.01 0.996 0.977** 0.993
Per-Pupil Expenditure ($1,000s) 0.989 1.02* 0.999 0.993
County Avg. Per-Pupil Exp. 1.03 1.09 0.891 0.99
Teacher is Highly Qualified 0.94 0.904 0.58*** 0.677***
Teacher’s Age 0.98*** 1.004 1.02*** 1.004*
Teacher is Female 0.9* 1.15** 1.03 0.923*
Teacher is Black 1.1 1.08 1.17 0.892
Teacher is Hispanic 1.1 0.878 1.23 1.05
Teaches Math/Science 1.35*** 0.996 0.875 1.08
Teaches Special Education 1.66*** 0.99 1.13 0.845**
Attended Selective College 0.982 0.947 1.16* 1.2***
Attended College in Michigan 1.04 1.04 0.817** 0.646***
Has Advanced Degree 1.26*** 1.05 1.3*** 0.967
Entered Teaching in 2004-05 0.986 0.916 1.13 0.953
Entered Teaching in 2005-06 0.908 1.22* 1.1 1.15*
Entered Teaching in 2006-07 0.924 1.1 1.34** 1.04
Entered Teaching in 2007-08 0.789** 0.858 1.25 0.987
Entered Teaching in 2008-09 0.79* 1.003 1.2 0.893
Entered Teaching in 2009-10 1.01 1.12 1.83*** 1.08
Entered Teaching in 2010-11 0.785* 1.08 1.76*** 1.21**
Entered Teaching in 2011-12 1.94*** 1.48* 0.552*** 0.311***
Number of Observations 21,292 21,292 21,292 21,292
Sample Mean 0.091 0.081 0.056 0.164
Multinomial logit odds ratios reported. Outcome variable is conditional on the teacher’s
first school remaining open five years after the date of hire. School/student characteristics
are measured in the first school at the time of hire unless stated otherwise. Standard errors
(available on request) are clustered at the school level. Missing indicators are included, not
shown, for any variables that are ever missing.
133
Table III.17.: Contributing Factors to Four-Year Mobility, by Next Job Type
New District Same District Part-Time Private Sector
Frac. Subsidized Lunch Eligible 2.44*** 1.09 1.9*** 1.41***
Fraction of Black Students 1.52*** 2.2*** 1.03 1.85***
Fraction of Hispanic Students 0.327*** 0.268*** 0.941 0.682
Fraction of English Learners 1.35 8.55*** 1.04 1.66***
Fraction of Special Ed. Students 1.06 1.5* 1.3 0.993
2nd Quintile Test Scores 0.765*** 1.28* 0.942 0.763***
3rd Quintile Test Scores 0.611*** 1.13 0.857 0.696***
4th Quintile Test Scores 0.537*** 0.993 0.678** 0.6***
5th Quintile Test Scores 0.445*** 1.19 0.739* 0.608***
First School is a Charter 1.51*** 0.079*** 1.46*** 1.85***
First School is Urban 0.899 1.55*** 1.02 1.1
First School is Town/Rural 0.766** 1.11 0.998 1.05
First School is Secondary 1.22*** 0.441*** 1.05 1.24***
Avg. Frac. Enrollment Change 1.01 0.894 1.004 0.751***
Local Unemployment Rate 1.01 1.001 0.977* 0.997
Per-Pupil Expenditure ($1,000s) 0.99 1.02 0.993 0.9995
County Avg. Per-Pupil Exp. 1.003 1.14 1.16 0.986
Teacher is Highly Qualified 0.997 0.89 0.645*** 0.714***
Teacher’s Age 0.977*** 1.005 1.01** 1.002
Teacher is Female 0.956 1.13** 1.09 0.941
Teacher is Black 1.01 1.05 1.28** 0.894
Teacher is Hispanic 0.979 0.816 1.39 0.923
Teaches Math/Science 1.26*** 1.03 0.871 1.1*
Teaches Special Education 1.97*** 1.1 1.47*** 1.06
Attended Selective College 0.996 1.03 1.21** 1.16***
Attended College in Michigan 1.06 1.001 0.732*** 0.602***
Has Advanced Degree 1.09 1.02 1.33*** 1.04
Entered Teaching in 2004-05 0.977 0.987 1.02 1.1
Entered Teaching in 2005-06 0.773*** 1.21* 1.32** 1.12
Entered Teaching in 2006-07 0.9 1.12 1.36** 1.1
Entered Teaching in 2007-08 0.792** 0.856 1.26* 0.918
Entered Teaching in 2008-09 0.751** 1.002 1.52*** 0.999
Entered Teaching in 2009-10 0.98 0.896 1.32 1.15
Entered Teaching in 2010-11 1.06 1.17 1.38** 1.27
Entered Teaching in 2011-12 1.87*** 1.37 0.638** 0.35***
Number of Observations 21,298 21,298 21,298 21,298
Sample Mean 0.134 0.094 0.064 0.207
Multinomial logit odds ratios reported. Outcome variable is conditional on the teacher’s
first school remaining open five years after the date of hire. School/student characteristics
are measured in the first school at the time of hire unless stated otherwise. Standard errors
(available on request) are clustered at the school level. Missing indicators are included, not
shown, for any variables that are ever missing.
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